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ARTICLE I.

CLAIMS OF RELIGION ON MEN OF LEARNING.

THERE are real and determinate distinctions among men. In common estimates, however, those which are real and determinate seem to be overlooked, and those which are artificial and accidental to stand in their stead. The latter are magnified above the former, because they are more exposed to public observation, and their worth more easily computed. In the estimation of a child, rich clothing, and lordly titles, and magnificent equipage constitute a great man. He thinks not of deeper views. He knows no profounder elements of judgment. He notices no other distinction among men. And why should he believe there is any? But experience leads to some correction of this early estimate. Qualities of a higher order are substituted for those which are, so to speak, visible and tangible. Yet this new estimate, which most men form, is often as radically imperfect and false. It is founded on apparent rather than real distinctions; on temporary differences, and not on those which will last for ever; on those which pass for much, in the opinion of men, but for nothing, with the omniscient Judge of all characters, and Searcher of all hearts. The distinctions created by wit, learning, wealth, office, make men no more perfect in respect to the divine law, or in the

sight of God, than the fact of their having been born in one degree of latitude or in another. They are as truly the rightful subjects of God's moral government, with these qualities, and under these circumstances, as in the absence of them; and as truly in the absence, as in the possession of them. It is not for any of these that God, for Christ's sake, feels a complacency in one that he does not in another; nor, on the contrary, is it for the deficiency of any of these, that he feels an abhorrence of one that he does not of another. There are other grounds of decision. There are other principles of judgment, according to which men are to stand or fall. Elements, taking a deeper hold of man's inward nature, are those which stamp his character, and are to fix his final fate. "God seeth not as man seeth." "That which is highly esteemed among men is abomination in the sight of God." In respect to their obligation to one law, and their amenableness to one tribunal, all men—rich and poor, learned and illiterate, bond and free—are on a footing of equality. Hence, those distinctions among them which terminate with the present scene of things, are purely accidental; like those accidents of matter, which are independent of its permanent state, and only casually superinduced. The only real distinctions are involved in the questions,—are they sinful, or holy—are they conformed to the law and character of God; or are they his enemies? These are distinctions that will survive suns, and systems, and worlds. They will rule the decisions of the judgment-seat. They will pass beyond it. They will fasten their solemn seal upon man's destiny, and assert their fundamental reality in his irreversible condition for ever.

There is, therefore, in man, somewhat, independent of all earthly distinctions. There is that, in the matter of his duty and his destiny, which they cannot affect. In whatever latitude, and under whatever circumstances he is born, and lives, and dies, these mere accidents of his condition interfere not with those graver concerns. That essential something, constituting his obligations and his relations, and which is at the basis of his eternal prospects, will survive, unimpaired, "the wreck of matter and the crush of worlds." They cannot disturb, or modify, or make it other than it is. It is too high, too sacred for

their influence. And if it is raised beyond their power, much more is it beyond the power of the lesser events that happen to man.

That high and sacred principle within us, enthroned above all that is accidental in time and matter, and, therefore, in its main characteristics, essentially the same in persons of all conditions, doubtless requires, in all alike, its proper nutriment. The eye is refreshed by the objects of this glorious creation, and by the contrivances of art. The ear is regaled by eloquence and music. Savory food is prepared for us, to gratify the palate. Flowers and fruits, in their season, fill the air with their fragrance. The wide earth, whose ever opening beauties, on every side, meet around us, is adapted to our organ of motion. Every outward sense, every sensual principle of our nature, so to speak, is furnished with its appropriate means of gratification. God has made provision that the intellect, also, shall be fed according to its necessity. In all this profusion of mutual adaptation, we cannot doubt that, as the soul of man has its appetites, so there is an appropriate nutriment for them. We cannot doubt that, as light gratifies all eyes, and sound all ears, so there is some element of happiness, fitted to meet the wants of all souls. As light is one, and as sound is one, so that element of happiness must be one, of which all may partake, and in which all may find pleasure, whatever may be their condition, or the accidents of their circumstances. As there is a principle in man's nature, independent of time and matter, so its appropriate nutriment must be in that which time and matter cannot affect; which earthly events cannot alter; nor human distinctions modify or destroy.

Such is practical Christianity; adapted equally to the learned and the ignorant; the poor and the rich; the bond and the free. Different conditions may illustrate, with different degrees of forcibleness, its power to enliven and sustain; but its pervasive influence throughout the soul is necessary alike to all conditions. Rank, and office, and titles may satisfy ambition for a moment; but the soul, after all, craves something more. Fine dress and splendid equipages may please an uncultivated mind for a while; but the soul cannot feed upon them. Science and learning may spread forth the treasures of all continents

and languages, and congregate the riches of all minds; but he to whom such an inheritance falls will need some higher principle of happiness, and of hope, and of life, as much as the most degraded and ignorant beggar. Religion is the only universal and the chief good of man. The *summum bonum* of the human race, which the ancient philosophers sought so diligently, is here realized. This good, experiment has decisively shown, will never disappoint its possessor. This elixir of immortality will not leave him who enjoys it to the fate of other men. It is offered to all conditions. It has claims upon the regard of all ranks and stations. Properly appreciated, its own nature is fitted to vindicate its claims. The nature of man, as man, settles the question of its universal adaptation to the necessities of our race. It is not circumstances, but man, that demands its support, and is vivified by its life and love. It is not a low rank, nor an elevated one, for which it is fitted; but human beings, considered without reference to worldly distinctions; considered only as dependent, accountable and immortal. The nature of the law of God, under which we live, is fitted to establish its claims. Its promises and pretensions commend it to universal notice. If they are found true, they must entitle it to universal acceptance. Every other claim must yield to its authority. Every distinction must bow to its demands. Every rank must be lost in the rank of believers. Religion, indeed, is not a levelling system, like the systems of infidelity. But there are respects in which it sets all on a common footing. It recognizes in us all a common nature, common relations to one another and to God, common obligations, common dependence, and a common destination to an eternity of just retributions. So far as it is a system of duties, therefore, it lays upon us all common claims. So far as it is a system of glorious revelations, it sets before us a common banquet, demanding and richly rewarding universal attention.

It is the design of the present article to assert and vindicate the claims of religion on men of learning. Religion is so often seen in connection with ignorance, and poverty, and affliction, that men of cultivated minds, it is to be feared, regard it as belonging to those states, almost exclusively. They deem it, as it were, a solace divinely ordained to meet those necessities of our nature; destined

to make good the balance of happiness in minds which are cut off from other sources; fitted to refine and encourage those whose limited range of ideas would otherwise leave them, in the scale of enjoyment, too far beneath those who move in the higher sphere of intellectual activity. But these views, so far as they are held, are all founded in error. If they have about them an appearance of right reason, they are unauthorized and sophistical. We trust it can be shown that the claims of religion, in every view, are as real and as extensive on the man of a cultivated understanding, as on the most illiterate and degraded.

The claims of religion are the same on the learned and the ignorant, because they have a kindred nature. All men are not only formed of one blood, but, considered as moral and accountable beings, they are created under a common system of circumstances. As weak, dependent, sinful beings, they are subjected to common necessities. As immortal beings, they are alike destined to live for ever; and one set of qualifications will insure their introduction alike to the presence of God, and of the glorious spirits of the just; or the opposite will cut them off alike from all that is blissful in the expectation of immortality. Neither rank, nor learning, nor fame, nor influence, nor any other accidental attainment, will be regarded in the last day as a fulfilment of the scriptural condition of salvation. Excellent and desirable as these may be, in reference to our earthly existence, they cannot take the place of "repentance towards God, and faith in the Lord Jesus Christ." They are of those things which "we cannot carry away with us." Hence, though one person may have had one degree of any of them in this life, and another a very different degree, in the life to come both will be as though they had had the same, or as though they had alike had none. I have physical strength, such as another has not. But do I, therefore, stand in any different relation to the law of God? Is my soul to be saved on different principles from his? Am I absolved from any duty which is binding upon him? Two persons sit side by side, in a place of worship. The first knows a little more of grammar, or logic, or geography, than the second. But does that make the message of the gospel any more applicable to the former, or any less? Should

he be any less interested in moral distinctions, or any more? Is moral obligation a subject that should concern him any less, or any more? Are not men accountable at one tribunal, and to be judged by the same principles, whether they can read the New Testament in one language only, or in two, or in ten? Will not the Searcher of hearts make inquisition for their faith and love, and decide their everlasting condition in the same method and by the same rules in one case as in the other, whether they have received their education at a British or a German university, an American college, a respectable academy, or a district school?

There are situations where the learned and the ignorant must stand on common ground, even aside from moral distinctions. The grave knows no difference among the members of its silent congregation. There the dust of all ranks mingles in one indiscriminate mass. They sleep together; they will wake together on the judgment morning. That day of doom will make no distinction among the spirits of those who shall rise to witness it, on any accidental ground. Men will forget their special privileges on earth, their station, their honor, their influence, their degree of cultivation. They will tremble and turn pale together, if their hearts are "not right in the sight of God." They will mingle their tears and their supplications, at length, in a common appeal to him that sitteth on the throne, and to the Lamb. Forget them! No. Many, we fear, will remember, bitterly remember, their peculiar cultivation. When God decides the destiny of mortals, they will perceive that the eminence it gave them was only the harbinger of their eminent condemnation. They will remember their earthly distinction. It will bring a corresponding distinction in the judgment and in eternity. And to the cultivated intellect, which the grace of God had never enlightened, nor the love of God ever warmed and vivified, what a woful distinction it will be! "For to whom much is given, of him shall much be required." There is not one divine law for the ignorant, and another for the learned. There is not one species of accountability incident to the former, and another to the latter. There are not to be two sets of principles, according to which the rich and the poor, the cultivated and the illiterate are to be judged; nor two eternities, nor two heavens. Nor are

the nature and the necessities of mankind, considered in reference to the whole period of their being, so different that all do not or will not need the support of the same religion; that all are not equally bound to submit themselves to its most reasonable demands. The Scripture acknowledges no such distinction. The voice of Wisdom, on the contrary, is—"To you, O men, I call; and my voice is to the sons of man."

Indeed, religion has special claims on the learned. To them, in a peculiar manner, it commends itself. It is not low, and small, and meagre, rendering it unworthy of the great and the refined; but capable of filling them, in the utmost expanse of their powers. Religion involves the most unobstructed and extended exercise of the mental faculties. While it sets forth its simple and easy principles, its soothing promises, its authoritative claims to those minds which are incapable of comprehending more, it augments the sphere of its revelations, increasing them both in number and extent, and opening wider and richer fields, and profounder depths for investigation, to those who are able to reach forth towards that which is higher, and nobler. There is a native dignity in religion. It has in it a grandeur, raising it, in some views, infinitely above the most learned. While no intellect is so mean, that its practical parts need be misunderstood,—none is so exalted that it cannot refresh and elevate, enlarge and fill it. Whatever parts of the mind are trained and developed by the cultivation of human science, the same may be drawn into the most vigorous and efficient use by the themes of religion. Whatever affections are exalted and refined, by being exercised towards earthly objects, may be exalted and refined, in a degree far surpassing the conception of the men of the world, by being exercised towards heavenly ones. The divine life is the true life of the soul. It is the life of all its powers. It is the life-giving energy, that enables it to unfold itself in a manner worthy of its nature. Many in whom it exists do not appreciate it. It ennoble them; but it does not ennoble them as it might. It elevates them; but it does not elevate them as it ought. It is smothered in them. And yet its legitimate efficiency cannot be wholly restrained. It is obstructed by a mass of ignorance and poverty, worldliness, indecision and deficient discipline. The man of cultivation despises that

which he sees, perhaps, chiefly, mingled in so ungracious a combination. He judges of it, as it appears through so unpropitious a medium; and, disgusted by the medium, he perhaps thinks often only with disgust, of that which he has seen through it. But let him know, though the glass be blurred and smoky, it is a glorious creation beyond it. Religion is independent of the medium through which it is seen. The best is too impure. The splendid tints and delicate shades that adorn it, are either confused or lost. If he would estimate it rightly, he must go to its divine records. He must go to Jesus Christ, in whose person it shone forth, unmarred by human imperfections. He must examine it by itself, carefully separating all that is extraneous and all that is accidental; distinguishing between the false and formal, on the one hand, and the internal and true, on the other. He must experience its transforming power on his own inmost spirit. He must come to a state in which he can look away from all the discordant depositions of human testimony, to "the witness of the Spirit in himself." And he will be remunerated for such an examination. He will be enlightened by the knowledge of God. He will be introduced to new and richer fields of thought. Vistas of glory, before unthought of, will open and widen before him. He will have a new spirit of life. The pageant of the world will be eclipsed by the brightness of the spiritual world, and the glory of divine realities. Delusive forms, appealing to the eye of sense, will give place to enduring substance, revealed to the eye of faith. He will behold, under a new phase, the things of this world, and the things of the world to come. The things of this world will have a new value, estimated by the standard of immortality. The emotions of the soul, under these new discoveries, we can scarcely venture to describe. Perhaps they would partake of wonder, self-condemnation, humility, joy, gratitude and love. But they must be felt, in order to be fully conceived.

We wonder that men of learning do not distinguish religion, more constantly and easily than they do, from the constitutional and other imperfections of its professors. We wonder that those who are by no means deficient in discrimination as to other matters, nor unacquainted with the exactest rules of logical reasoning, should seem to

reason so inconclusively as they do, on the subject of religion; to be deluded by such obvious sophistries; to be unmoved, if not practically unconvinced, by the most sound and awakening arguments. We wonder that not only the testimony of the Scriptures, understood according to the most approved rules of interpretation, but the testimony also of hundreds and thousands of learned men of a former age, and of multitudes whose mental vigor and acuteness cannot be questioned, in the present period of the world, should be esteemed by them of so little value; nay, should be set down by many as, absolutely, of no worth; as if a monomania would be likely to prevail in the world for so many years, attacking so many thousands and millions of persons, of every various degree of mental power and discipline, affecting them all in the same way, lasting till death, and producing such feelings of triumph in the hour of nature's keenest sorrow, as the body can scarcely sustain. We wonder they have never decided that this must be worthy of a better name, than a frenzy of human nature; that they have never ingenuously confessed, that, so far from being a disorder of the imagination, a dormancy of the reason, it is the only reasonable state. If gifted intellect and divine illumination were, in all cases, found together, learning would never enthrone itself, as it does now, a censor of the operations of the Holy Spirit; cultivated mind would never finish its refinement by scoffing at religion; well-disciplined reason would never venture to pronounce any class of emotions visionary, because they were found only in hearts prepared to exercise them. The end of learning and discipline would invariably be humility. The highest respect would be paid to the testimony of undoubted experience, and the plain meaning of the word of God. Learning would again be consecrated, in its fountain-head and in every rill, to Christ and the church. Reason would be found doing homage at the altar of religion. The inductions of regenerate hearts would be counted worthy to stand on a level with the inductions of philosophy; and man, as man, especially cultivated man, would be restored to his becoming allegiance to his Creator.

If religion required the learned to lay aside the exercise of reason, or to abjure the use of the mental faculties, we should not be much surprised at the reception with which

it often meets, from that class of our fellow-men. The pride of reason is too imperious, and the enjoyment of the free exercise of the powers of a disciplined mind is too exquisite, to be thus summarily put down. Religion, in itself considered, must have attractions greater than it ever displays to an unrenowned heart, to be received as the equivalent of such a price. But it requires no such cringing of the reason to absolute assertions. It demands no extinction of the mental powers. It lays no injunction on their legitimate and most salutary use. It never yet hindered the progressive development of the soul. It helps it, in the most efficient manner. True, it does not exalt human reason above divine. It does not set up man as the censor of the ways of God. It does not accord to finite wisdom the prerogative of directing the operations of infinite wisdom. It steadfastly maintains that there is a light, beyond that which the human eye hath seen; that there are revelations, beyond what the human ear hath ever heard; that there are truths, which the mind of man, and, probably, created mind, in general, hath never comprehended. But what wrong is thus done to our race? And why should these claims of religion be deemed exorbitant? We have never supposed ourselves omniscient. We cannot, then, be offended, when incomprehensible revelations prove that we are not so. Truths, different from the experience of a given individual, are not, therefore, disrobed of their reality. Revelations, beyond the measure of human reason, are not contrary to it. The operations of the divine Spirit on the soul may generate exercises, which he who has never been the subject of them cannot adequately conceive. And God may promulgate revelations, which the human mind cannot fathom; but to which an humble, evangelical faith may most reasonably give its implicit assent.

Many of the foregoing remarks may seem to have reference to a speculative Christianity; as if it were the design of this article to defend the truths of the gospel against the philosophical unbeliever. But nothing can be said of the adaptation of religion to the most refined and disciplined powers, of its ability to expand and purify, exalt, adorn and fill them, which is not applicable to a practical Christianity, exerting its efficacy not only over the understanding, but also over the affections, the will, the heart,

the life. Religion is not narrow, feeble, jejune, as many imagine; fitted only for the weak and the uneducated; but rich beyond all the inventions of human wisdom; deep, and full, and glorious, beyond all the appliances of human knowledge, beyond all the expedients of cultivated mind. As the food of the intellect, it is angel's bread. As a ruling principle and constraining motive of the soul, it is an indwelling divinity. Men of the most varied learning and the strongest powers, whose names are written in honorable places on the roll of fame, have turned from all other pursuits with keen relish to religion. We have examples drawn from almost every profession, and from the most difficult departments of human life. Sir Isaac Newton, after having gained the meed of earthly honor by his scientific discoveries, found pleasure in sitting, as an humble disciple, at the feet of Christ. Chief Justice Hale, one of the most distinguished ornaments of the bar, that England could ever boast, has left on record testimonies of the most weighty character, as to the truth and importance of religion. He lived religion in his own person, and could testify from his own experience. President Edwards, who has, perhaps, done his country more honor, as a profound metaphysician, than any other man, was not only eminently religious himself, but was accustomed to enforce religion upon the attention of persons of all ranks, with an authority and power rarely exceeded. His biographer says of him, "We find him regularly making the glory of God the great end for which he lived; maintaining the most open and confidential intercourse with his Maker; cherishing exalted thoughts of Christ and his salvation; feeling himself to be a part of Christ, and to have no separate interest from his; exercising a filial and delightful sense of dependence on the Holy Spirit, for the daily communication of his grace; regarding communion with God as the very life and sustenance of his soul. And, as the result of this, we find the Spirit of God unfolding to him the wonders of divine truth, vouchsafing to him glorious discoveries of the perfections of God, as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; enabling him to live as in the immediate presence and vision of the things that are unseen and eternal; and communicating to him a joyful assurance of the favor of God, and of a title to future glory." Dr. Good, whose authority in medical

science is not often disputed, was a fervent Christian. Dr. Young well says, "An undevout astronomer is mad." Colonel Gardiner found that the scenes of the camp did not prevent his being often swallowed up in the most sweet and rapturous communion with God. A host of other names might be mentioned. The catalogue of the great, the intellectual, the refined, who have made religion the chief pleasure of their life, could scarcely be exhausted. Multitudes, now living, whose mental power and cultivation are an honor to their race, are humble disciples of the Lamb. We may go from the present era to the past, and find that, also, rich in examples. Daniel was a man of no common influence in the Persian court; yet he was found three times a day, praying and making supplication to his God. David was burdened with the cares and loaded with the honors of a kingdom; but his language was, "Seven times a day do I praise thee." Joseph was ruler of all Egypt; but he said to his brethren, "I fear God." Moses was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians; but he counted the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures of Egypt. Finally, to leave all examples of erring men, and to propose our great pattern of life and holiness, the Lord Jesus Christ, as having claims to our highest reverence, his was an eminently religious life; not because incarnate divinity was there; but because such a pattern was worthy to be followed, as the standard of human action. Let Gethsemane tell of his earnest intercession. Let the mountains, where he spent whole nights in prayer, testify to the character of his prevailing spirit. Let the chill winds, that rustled around his retirement, breathe their witness to his piety. Let the damp dews that fell upon him, whisper how they wept in sympathy with his tears for a ruined world. Ah, these testimonies to the piety of our divine Master, who can forget? Who, that rightly considers their thrilling appeals, can be contented to live a prayerless and impenitent life? Yet the great and the learned waste but few thoughts on the themes of piety. Religion is among the last themes they dwell upon, unless it be in a speculative or controversial manner when in company with some clerical acquaintance; or in the cold and dignified air of Johnson, in the interval between the morning and evening services on the Sabbath. They think it out

of their sphere. They feel that they come down to it from a more elevated region. It is easy and simple; the poor man's solace; a useful adjunct in promoting the peace of society and in keeping the rabble out of excesses; beautiful in old age; and a great comfort to the bereaved and the dying, for whom it is chiefly designed. Thus they reason concerning this highest good. They spurn at its claims upon them. They walk forth, with a dignified and stately step, the curl of scorn upon their lip, their hearts filled with self-complacent pride, haughty believers in a speculative Christianity, as if this were all that God could require of them; but, strangers to practical religion. They have never, to use the words of another, "been conscious of the magnificence of Christian truth; filling, distending, and exceeding their faculties." In whatever terms they speak of it, they count it small. They have their tastes; but they are not angelic. They have faculties of perception; but they perceive no glory in celestial things. They have enthusiasm in their worldly pursuits; but not in the things of God. How different is their spirit from that of the ancient father, who said, "Were the highest heavens my pulpit, and all the angels, with the numberless hosts of the redeemed, my audience, and eternity my day, Jesus alone should be my text." How inferior they appear, in their chase after earthly joys and perishing pleasures, that shall result in certain disappointment, to the poet, who sings,

"If thou, my Saviour, still art nigh,
Cheerful I live, and cheerful die;
Secure, when mortal comforts flee,
To find ten thousand worlds in thee."

We have said, religion is not adapted chiefly to the weak specimens of our nature, to the aged, the feeble, the poor, and the ignorant. We deny that any class of the community, in consequence of gifts and cultivation, are above its claims, or able to be independent of its consolations. We deny that they have reached any attainment, which, through the whole period of their existence, will serve them as a sufficient substitute for this. No, it is not to the weak, that religion chiefly appeals. But there is a weakness in human nature, to which its sustaining energy is infinitely important; a weakness, which none can escape; the same in high and low, learned and illiterate,

rich and poor, free and bond. The great and the refined must come down to the common level of their nature. After all the accidents of their earthly condition, which may have raised them above the rabble, they must be reduced to take their places with their fellow-worms. In the enervating hour of sickness, and in the awful solemnities of death, the consolations of religion will be needed by them, and must be felt. Let those who think a fervent, evangelical piety must be a very necessary solace to the aged, the tried, the desponding, the dying, remember that, when accidental distinctions are levelled, as even in their own persons they will be, the faith, and love, and peace, of a practical Christianity will be even to them treasures above all price. In the hour of death, the learned man will forget his philosophy, and thirst for the promises of religion. Philosophy will then lose its dignity in his sight. He will wish something higher and holier. Whatever it be to the healthy, he will feel that it is too poor and low to be proposed as the last consolation to the soul of the dying. He will, then, willingly renounce hypotheses and reasonings, logical deductions and mathematical demonstrations. He will turn away from the dim light of nature, to the certain revelations of the written word. He will desire, in his weakness, to repose on the arm of Omnipotence, to enjoy the consciousness of his interest in the blood of the Lamb, to hallow the declining moments of his life by communion with God, to anticipate heaven and its glorious mansions, as, beyond a doubt, his own sweet home, whose spirit he has long breathed, and whose holiness he has fervently desired to share. The insufficiency of philosophy in the approach of death was keenly felt by the great Dr. Johnson, whom we find, at the age of seventy-five, writing to the Rev. Dr. Taylor, as follows: "O my friend, the approach of death is very dreadful. I am afraid to think on that which I know I cannot avoid. It is in vain to look round and round for that help which cannot be had. Yet we hope and hope, and fancy that he who had lived to-day may live to-morrow. But let us learn to derive our hope only from God." His experience is, doubtless, the experience of thousands in the learned world, who are too proud to avow it. Philosophy has its uses. It is a source of dignified and elegant enjoyment. But there are hours, when the most gifted of its advocates

would willingly change places with "the poor of this world, rich in faith." Philosophy must have afforded but meagre consolation to the victims of the Lexington, when they were driven to the alternative of death by the chilling flood or by the consuming flame. The catastrophe of that fatal night revealed human weakness. The high, the learned, the refined, were there. But they stood in the same necessity as the poorest and most unlettered associates of their fate. How much did they all need, in that hour, a sweet consciousness of the Christian's reliance on God! Who, at such a period, and in such a scene, would be willing to have learning only, without religion?

There are certain habits, bodily and mental, most favorable to the discovery and profitable combination of truths. Religion recommends itself especially to the learned, because it tends to produce those habits. We have high authority in saying that a man of piety, other things being equal, will be more successful in literary pursuits, than a man who is destitute of it. He who would rise to eminence in the learned world must avoid the indulgence of unhallowed passions; he must stem the tide that would carry him into any sort of dissipation, physical or intellectual; he must resist every temptation to that which is unfavorable to investigation, as tending to enervate the body or the mind; he must cultivate those habits which lead to mental clearness, and vigor, and enlargement. Submission to these rules is among the necessary conditions of intellectual greatness. But they are among the first principles of the requirements of religion. In asserting its authority over the mind, and the heart, and the life, these are the elementary claims which it makes. The aspirant to literary or scientific fame must, also, cultivate habits of attention and reflection. He must be accustomed not only to look abroad over the world, but to look within upon himself. Self-knowledge is of the highest value, in almost every circle of human attainment. But these qualities, helpful as they are in a literary view, are made, also, through the Holy Ghost, the germ and support of religion. The operation of that divine agent produces and calls them into exercise. Many minds, otherwise undisciplined, have attained to a high rank of cultivation, under the influence of piety. Having few means of

education, in the common interpretation of that term, they have become, as Christians, literally great men, in mental clearness and power. Impenitent, they would probably have groped their way through this dark earth, like other intellectual dwarfs. Believers, they are prepared to hold intercourse with the advanced student, and to take part intelligently with the angelic hosts, in searching into the mysteries of divine love. In true religion only is there true humility. Pride of intellect, to which men of cultivated minds are peculiarly exposed, is an important barrier to our best interests, present and eternal, as men of learning, and as accountable beings. The student, if he would be successful, must check the spirit of his pride. He must be contented with lowly views of his attainments in knowledge. He must regard himself as knowing comparatively nothing, till induction taught him; and, as destined to increase in knowledge, only so far as he delivers himself up to the same teacher, with the same meek and humble spirit with which he began. This is the true secret of advancement. Yet the connection of genuine humility in the pursuit of knowledge with practical religion, seems to be little understood by men of cultivated minds, and often less thought of. It has sometimes been our lot to fall in company with the young graduate just beginning to feel the freedom of a disciplined mind, and to exult in the boundless field of truth, expanding before him. We have marked, in his exultation, the pride of human wisdom. We have heard him discourse upon the dignity of the inward nature; upon the inherent light of the soul, and its love of philosophical truth; upon the glories of pure reason; upon the perfectibility of man by intellectual training; upon the development of the Christian character. His style of conversation would almost lead one to believe that human nature could be revolutionized and earth made heaven, without regeneration, without sanctification, without an atonement, without the Holy Spirit, almost without a God, except as a kind of philosophical Demiurge, superintending this exalted re-creation, and rejoicing in the ingenuity and beauty of its self-production. Probably, many older men have not outgrown these follies of their youth. But, if the humility of religion, the self-distrust, the sense of deep depravity, the consciousness of personal nothingness it

involves, were present, this vaunting spirit would be crushed. The tongue of dust and ashes would speak in less boastful terms. Depravity would have less confidence in its inherent ability to bring good out of evil and light out of darkness, by its own unaided energy. Moral death would at least be more modest in its proposal, out of its own utter corruption, to originate and mature spiritual life. We must sit at the feet of Christ to learn divine wisdom, waiting silently for the gracious words that proceed out of his mouth. So, also, we must sit at the feet of nature and experience, to be instructed in human science. Humility is, in both, the first requisite. And what is more favorable to its possession in the one, than its diligent and daily cultivation, in the face of every obstacle, in obedience to the demands of the other?

Religion also commends itself to the learned, as that which sets before the mind the most efficient and praiseworthy motives to continued advancement. It neither leaves the mind to despondency and inaction, on account of the absence of motives; nor abandons it to the impulse of motives unworthy of its exalted character, its high obligations, and its immortal destiny. There are no motives to intellectual culture, like those which are furnished by religion. He that rightly appreciates them could not be moved by motives higher or holier, grander or more powerful. These are motives that spring from and tend towards eternity. All others are bounded by time. Those appeal to the immortal spirit within us; these speak only of the fleeting interests of the world, and of worldly things. They differ as much as that which is divine differs from that which is human. The one is as far above the other, as heaven is superior to earth, or as the infinite is above the finite.

The impulses awakened by piety are exalting. They direct the affections upwards. They associate us with invisible spirits. They bind us to the throne of God. They constantly point us to the retributions of eternity. They draw us away from all secular ends, and engage us in promoting the glory of God. They enable us to look upon fame, and wealth, and splendor, and all the honors of this world as infinitely little; unworthy the aspirations of an exalted intellect; too mean to attract the regards of a creature destined to immortality. They set before us an

end, in which we cannot be disappointed. They bring eternity to modify our views of time. They appoint for us a standard of action, of which neither time nor eternity will make us ashamed. Delivering us from the influence of perishing trifles, they bid us be swayed by the motives that govern holy angels. And, however much such things may have been overlooked, do we not pronounce a verdict in which every man's reason acquiesces, when we say all this is favorable to intellectual culture? Has not a system, having such characteristic motives, and merits, and tendencies, a claim upon every disciplined mind?

Religion also commends itself to the learned, as the condition of the highest and most salutary influence on the community. All men exert an influence, good or bad, and all desire to do so. The sphere of one may be larger than the sphere of another; but none is so insignificant, that he influences none at all. The most cultivated are fitted to exert the widest influence. The least cultivated, under ordinary circumstances, and, other things being equal, hold sway over the fewest minds. The civilized man, because he is civilized, will rule the savage. Reason and judgment will always prevail over instinct. God has appointed that cultivated intellect shall be superior to brute force, and to every degree of cultivation beneath itself. Knowledge, therefore, is power; and, as it increases, it increases our power. Mental greatness is more to be coveted than any royal splendor. There is something real in it. It will bear rigid scrutiny. Men cannot help respecting it. It has in it that which is intrinsically and unchangeably valuable. Intellectual cultivation is an element that will survive the decay of the body, and the destruction of the world. But it is not the only condition of influence. Certainly, it is not the sole condition of the highest or most salutary. Who would wish to exert the influence of Voltaire, and the literary cot rie with which he was associated? Who would desire to be to the world what Gibbon was? Who would be proud to stand with Herbert, and Bolingbroke, and Chesterfield, and La Rochefoucault? Who will wish to have been such as they, or to have shared their influence in moulding minds and hearts, when he comes to the judgment of the great day? While learning is a condition of influence, therefore, great and incalculable, it is certainly not the condition of the

highest and most salutary. There is a large class in the community, "poor in this world, but rich in faith," whom mere learning cannot move. They respect it, in itself, and for its own sake. But they feel it to be far less powerful than religion. Theirs is the conscious dignity of saints. And in that character, they feel that every other dignity is beneath them. Worldly men may influence worldly men, by worldly considerations. They may govern them by worldly motives. They may attract them by worldly hopes. They may allure them by worldly promises. The truly pious man will not be moved by such impulses. He demands the power of religion, as an element of influence upon him. His "life is hid with Christ in God." If you would touch strings in his heart that will certainly vibrate, you must go beyond outward distinctions; beyond that which appears to the world; beyond the mere intellect. You must enter into the sanctuary of the soul. Speak to him of his God, of the Holy Spirit, of his own regeneracy, of his high hopes of heaven. Those are the themes on which he dwells. Here you can get hold of his mind. Here you can influence him to some purpose. Show him that you are holy, and that you aim to promote holiness in him, and your power over him will be almost unbounded. This will be striking the right chord. The influence of learning is very great; but it is nothing, compared with the influence of learning and religion combined. Each is mighty by itself. Associate them, and you have the most efficient means of swaying mind and of saving it, that can exist upon earth. In this alliance is "the hiding of power." Let learning, by itself, exert its uttermost energy. However widely it may prevail, how cold it is, and, of course, how inefficient, compared with the warm, expansive, refreshing, sanctifying influence of a cultivated mind, hallowed by religion, and thus vivifying every circle which it reaches. The learned will have influence. Talent and cultivation will confer rank and power. Educated mind will make itself felt in the remotest pulsations of the community. The vandal spirit of modern infidelity, applying to the worst passions of the mob, and seeking to level every thing to the standard of its own ignorance and pollution, cannot talk down, by its sophistries, the influence of talent and discipline. It might as well attempt, by its show of reasoning, to

change the sun into a source of cold and darkness, sending down upon the earth black rays of midnight, instead of light and heat. No; the influence of learning will live; will be felt; will be respected. But in order to its most salutary influence, it must be combined with holiness. What evil a man of high cultivation may do by practical atheism! How his example will spoil the lower classes! How it will encourage and sustain them in rejecting the gospel! He might write the finest treatises to instruct his fellow-men in the evidences of religion, and in the duties of practical Christianity. But he himself would live down his own writings. An argument from the life makes a deeper impression than an argument from the lips. Religion has claims upon the learned, therefore, in consequence of the position they occupy in society. It claims that they should enlighten, and bless, and save a dying world. It is time for men of cultivated intellect to understand, that if any one, they especially ought to be religious. They are peculiarly called to it. It is eminently for their own interest. The community should be considered as demanding it. If the poor and the ignorant need it, in their comparatively irresponsible stations, the great and the refined, who sway the spirits of men involuntarily, need it much more. The former need it as a rule of life and a solace in trial. The latter not only require it for these purposes, but also that they may be the benefactors of souls, that, in the wide sphere to which God has called them, they may not be a bane, instead of a blessing. They need religion, not as a speculative theory, but as a practical reality, regenerating, transforming, redeeming, sanctifying. Theirs will be a more deep and merited condemnation than falls to the lot of other men, if they enter into eternity without it. Chorazin, and Bethsaida, and Capernaum must give place, that to them may be awarded a more conspicuous and alarming doom. We say again,—“To whom much is given, of him shall much be required.”

Man attains not to the perfection of his nature, under any view of it, without religion. He whose mind is never employed upon divine things leaves the most efficient means of discipline and enlargement untried. He drinks turbid waters at every streamlet, but goes not to the crystal nectar at the fountain-head. He deprives himself of the exercise of the most important element of influence. He

finds access to the reason of his fellow-men; but has no passage to their hearts. He can convince them; but it is doubtful whether they will be moved. The man of cultivated taste, who is without piety, makes ample provision for the enjoyment of time; but none for the enjoyment of a blessed immortality. He prepares himself assiduously for this world; but leaves his spirit unsheltered, unpardoned, to meet what doom it may in the world to come. With many of the learned of our own and of former ages, he has drunk deeply at the fountains of knowledge. His mind is enriched with all wisdom. He can hold fellowship with their mighty spirits on equal ground. But he has not, like them, superadded the dignity of the Christian to the dignity of the man. The saint is neglected for the scholar. Heavenly wisdom is wholly excluded from his mind, for the sake of earthly science. The life of the soul is left to take care of itself. A heaven of intercourse with those great and glorious spirits, who have shone so brilliantly on the darkness of the world, is hazarded for the poor gratifications of mortality. Human nature bewails its frailty when he is dead. Religion sighs over his memory. Faith records no triumphs respecting him. And concerning the final blessedness of his separate spirit, hope is silent.

We feel that this is a serious subject. We have been treading on holy ground. Our theme is of infinite interest to a most respectable and rapidly increasing portion of the community. The claims we have urged are not hypothetical, but real. Our views, we solemnly believe, are founded in truth. Whatever attainments a man may possess, we believe religion is imperiously demanded to adorn and sanctify them all; and that he will fall short of the true end of his nature without it. We may be noble in form, dignified in character, polite, learned, affable, affectionate, moral, influential; but while these qualities may satisfy men, they are beneath the claims of God. They do not satisfy the monitor in our own hearts. We feel the obligation to be something more. Our expanding nature and growing powers can reach forth towards something higher; and they ought to do it. Religion is the only path of safety and contentment; of pleasure, honor, usefulness and final glorification. It is our reasonable service. Why should we delay to yield it? F.

[In presenting to our readers this extract from Hensen, we would take occasion to say, that Professor Hackett has it in contemplation to prepare a translation of the entire work. It must be confessed, that we have in our language, at present, no copious and critical history of the apostle Paul, such as is adapted to the wants of the higher class of students; and should this design of rendering the results of the labors of Hensen accessible to them, be executed, it will, in our opinion, form an important addition to our means of biblical study. The work, with such changes as it is proposed to make, by omissions, where the original admits of abridgement, and by brief additions, perhaps, on a few points, which may not seem to be fairly presented, may be reduced to a convenient size, and yet lose none of its value, as a source of thorough knowledge on the subjects to which it relates. The countrymen of the author hold it in high estimation. We may add some particulars at another time.—EDITOR.]

ARTICLE II.

THE EPISTLE OF PAUL TO THE ROMANS.

Origin of the Church at Rome—its condition—occasion and object of the Epistle. Translated from Hensen's "Der Apostel Paulus. Sein Leben, Wirken und seine Schriften." By H. B. HACKETT.

—We are next to institute some inquiry respecting the church to which this Epistle was directed. This is a point of far more difficulty than that relating to the time and place of its composition. In the first place, as regards the origin of the Roman church, it cannot be decided with certainty either *by whom* or *at what time* it was established. Our difficulty here is, not that we are in want of conjectures on the subject, but that we find them unsupported by the evidence which is necessary to sustain them. The generally received tradition is, that the apostle Peter first preached the gospel at Rome; and the Romish church not only attributes to him the office of a bishop there, but elevates him to the chair of chief bishop over all the churches of Christendom. This latter statement is an hypothesis destitute of all historical support, and the former is con-

trary, at least, to all historical probability. A long time before the first journey of the apostle Paul among the Gentiles, Peter is said to have come to Rome, namely, in the year 44 (according to others, 46), and after the defeat of Simon Magus, to have founded a church there, to have presided over it as its head for twenty-five years, and finally to have suffered martyrdom. But that much of this can be regarded only as a fabrication, which made its first appearance after the apostolic age, has been admitted and proved, not only by many learned Protestants, particularly by Samuel Basnage, but by learned members also of the Romish church. Indeed, it has even been denied by some Protestant writers, that Peter ever went to Rome at all. This, however, contradicts both the general tradition of the church, extant from the earliest times, and incontrovertible testimony from the second century of the Christian era. We find that there existed even among the earliest authorities different opinions respecting the time of the arrival of Peter at Rome; some represent him as having come to the capital of the Roman empire under Claudius; others, for the first time, under Nero.

Thus much we may venture to consider as settled, namely, that he did not come *before* the composition of Paul's Epistle to the Romans. In the first place, we know, as has been already remarked, that Peter was cast into prison in the last year of the reign of Agrippa I. This was in the third or fourth year of the reign of Claudius. Hence Peter could not have come to Rome in the second year of the reign of this emperor, as some have affirmed. Further, he was still present at Jerusalem at the time of the decree of the Apostolic Council, that is, in the year 53, which was the twelfth of the reign of Claudius. Again, when Paul wrote the Epistle to the Romans, in the year 60, the fifth year of the reign of Nero, Peter was certainly not yet at Rome. Otherwise his name would not surely have been omitted among those, to whom salutations are sent at the close of the Epistle. It could be said, perhaps, in reply to this, that Peter might have been at Rome, and yet Paul have had no knowledge of the fact. But considering the intercourse which constantly took place between Rome and the cities where Paul had lately spent most of his time, namely, Ephesus and Corinth, considering the attention which the prosperous state of the Roman church

had excited abroad, we cannot reasonably suppose, that Paul would have been long unapprized of an event so important to the Roman Christians as the arrival of Peter. What decides still more strongly against the supposition of his presence among them thus early, is the manner, in which Paul has addressed them in the letter under remark. Had these believers been already under the direction of another apostle, Paul would either have not written to them at all, or in altogether a different style; since it was contrary to his principles to obtrude himself into the work of others. When, furthermore, we add to this, that Peter and Paul had entered into a solemn compact with each other to labor, the former among the Jews, and the latter among the Gentiles, we must regard it as still more improbable, that Peter should have been after this the first to be found at Rome. And, finally, it is not presuming too much to say, that Luke surely would have mentioned Peter, had he been at Rome, when Paul came thither. Upon these grounds, we may safely conclude, that the coming of Peter was subsequent, not only to the date of the letter to the Roman church, but to the arrival of Paul himself. Hence he can neither have been the founder of this church, nor can he have labored long for its increase and establishment, since he could have reached Rome, at the farthest, only two or three years before the persecution, in which he is said to have lost his life.

But while it is thus impossible to ascribe the origin of the Roman church to the apostle Peter, it has been thought by some that the effects of the descent of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost were extended, through the Jews from Rome who were present on that occasion, even to this capital of the world. The possibility of this no one will deny, although this first seed of the gospel cannot be considered as the only cause of the flourishing state, which the church subsequently attained. Bertholdt supposes it even probable that the first foundation of a church at Rome was laid while Christ still remained on earth. Judea being subject to the dominion of the Romans, an active commerce was constantly maintained between that country and Rome. Thus, besides proper Jews, others also may have found their way thither, who acknowledged him who had now appeared as the true Messiah, and who made him known as such to the Jews and Gentile pros-

elytes. On the whole, it may be safely concluded that there was more of accident, so to speak, than design in the manner in which a Christian community was first founded at Rome; that it sprung up, in other words, from the connection in which this city stood with those parts of the Roman empire, in which the gospel had already taken deep root.

The history of the Roman church, before the apostle sent to it his Epistle, may be conveniently divided into two periods. The first extends from the unknown date of its establishment, or, more correctly, its gradual formation, until the banishment of the Jews and Jewish Christians from Rome. Even in this period the apostolic labors of Paul may surely have had some indirect influence upon the progress of the church. It must be regarded as very possible, and even as very probable, that in the course of his extensive missionary efforts in Syria and Asia at this time, many Jews were converted by him to the Christian faith, who were either from Rome, or proceeded thither, and became, in their turn, propagators of the gospel which they had embraced. This period includes the time of the first foundation and gradual extension of the church. The *second* period commences with the banishment of the Jews and Jewish Christians, under Claudius, that is, with the year 54, A. D., or the 13th year of the reign of Claudius. In consequence of this banishment of many Christians from Rome, their former sure and constant increase was for a long time arrested. This calamity, however, which befell them, not as Christians, and which therefore did not extend to the Gentile converts, contributed eventually to their decided advantage. Many of those banished, among whom may be reckoned not only Aquila and Priscilla, but perhaps most of those whom Paul greets at the close of his Epistle, were brought into the closest connection with the apostle. This was especially true of Andronicus and Junias, who, although they were not converted by Paul, but were already Christians before him, are described as distinguished ministers of the word. They were, in all probability, Jews by birth, and had embraced Christianity at Jerusalem. How closely they were connected with Paul, appears from the fact that they were on one occasion his fellow-prisoners. Again; Epenetus, for whom the apostle entertained a special regard,

and who was the first fruits of those converted in Asia, probably at Ephesus, belonged to the community of the Roman Christians. He enumerates still farther a certain Mary, who had rendered to him important service, Persis, Amplias, Urbane, Stachys, Apelles, Herodion, Rufus, and many others, who had stood more or less in intimate relations to him, and in various ways had showed their zeal for the promotion of the gospel. Who now will not consider it natural, that the Roman church should have gained largely in spiritual power and stability from the efforts of these individuals? How much must the amount of Christian knowledge in the church have been increased by the activity of so many laborers, some of them at least of distinguished eminence, thoroughly proved by various trials, and fitted for service by means of an intimate connection with the apostle Paul! That it must, under these circumstances, have received also the peculiar impress of Paul's spirit, is evident from the very nature of the case. This result was promoted especially by the labors of Aquila and Priscilla, who for several years, partly at Corinth, partly at Ephesus, had been the faithful assistants of Paul, and who, at the latter place, had instructed even Apollos, already distinguished for his learning and zeal. At Rome we see them collecting around them a society of believers, and this we may consider as decisive proof of the success of their activity. That they agreed entirely with Paul in his views of the gospel, and of the measures best suited to extend the knowledge of it, admits of so much the less doubt, because they were taught, if not indeed first converted, by him; and they are expressly mentioned by himself as the sharers, not only of his labors, but dangers also, who had been ready to offer up even their lives for his sake. Through them, and many other friends of the apostle, who came back to Rome, he was brought into a very close connection with the Roman church, and exerted indirectly a very important influence upon it. But while the disciples of Paul contributed so much to the further progress and establishment of the church at Rome, they cannot, properly speaking, be considered as its founders. Although little fruit had been gathered, the seed would appear to have been sown before the banishment of which we have spoken. More than this is probably true. The word had not only been

preached, but a church constituted before the period when Aquila and Priscilla, and the other friends of Paul, returned to Rome. That Paul, however, should have sustained such a relation to the Roman Christians as to feel himself called to write to them, and to write to them in the same manner as if he were personally known to them, is readily understood, when we reflect that the most prominent members of this church, the teachers of it, were his most intimate friends. Add to this, that the indirect influence of Paul upon the church of Rome commenced, as intimated already, even at a much earlier period. He could not have failed, either in Asia or Europe, to have had an opportunity to win to the faith some who, on their return to Rome, would devote themselves to the work of there spreading the gospel. From this, perhaps, it arose principally, that the opposition of the Judaizing teachers, that is, of those who were zealous for the law, was far less at Rome than in other churches, especially at Corinth, and in the churches of Galatia. This fact, however, admits also of another explanation, namely, that these supporters of the law directed their chief attention to the regions and cities where they knew the apostle was personally active, and on this account did not consider it necessary to extend their vigilance to Rome, so long as they knew the apostle was not there. Thus the position in which Paul stood in reference to the Roman church, although not direct, was yet such as to enable him to guide and advance its interests; and this, of itself, must have been a special reason why he felt so much joy in the reputation for piety, which it had so extensively acquired. (Rom. 1: 8.)

That the church consisted of Jewish and Gentile converts, our Epistle places beyond all doubt. From the relations, also, of a religious nature, which previously existed between the heathen and the Jews at Rome, we should be prepared to expect that, in case of any change, many of both classes would adopt a common faith. The number of Jews was at first very small; but was afterwards greatly increased by the multitude of captives whom Pompey had brought to Rome. These at first were slaves; but owing to the trouble which they gave their heathen masters, by their rigid adherence to their peculiar customs, they were soon set free. The number of Jews at Rome thus became so considerable, that a particular

section of the city was assigned to them by Augustus, on the other side of the Tiber. Here they had their synagogues, and formed a separate community by themselves. Here they practised their national rites and customs with a strictness which nothing could abate; and showed, even in their exile from it, such a devotion to their native land, that they every year sent valuable presents and offerings to the temple in Jerusalem. To the expense of this annual tribute the heathen proselytes, greatly to the indignation of the Romans, contributed their proportion. Such proselytes were very numerous at Rome, and had been gained not merely from the poorer and more degraded class of the community, but the higher and more distinguished ranks of life. Roman men and women frequented the Jewish synagogues. Nor was the peculiarity of the worship which they there witnessed the only motive which drew them thither. They were impelled by a consciousness of wants, for which they could find no relief in the religion of their fathers, which was every day becoming more and more corrupt. The advance which the despised religion of the Jews was thus making, was too great to pass unobserved. Many of the Romans who remarked it, and saw in it a proof merely of the decline of their ancient glory, expressed themselves in reference to it in terms of the severest censure and reproach. The converts to Judaism, however, still multiplied; and this, it is easy to see, would have an important bearing upon the propagation of the gospel. The relation which these proselytes from heathenism sustained to the synagogue, afforded the preacher of the cross a more ready access to them; and the increasing corruption of morals into which the Romans were sinking, disposed the more reflecting and susceptible among them to a more favorable reception of Christianity. That their partiality for Judaism really had its origin in a sense of their religious wants, and not in a love of novelty, which was pleased with the singular worship of the Jews, we see from the rapid progress which the gospel made among the heathen at Rome. That among those who embraced Christianity were many *proselytes of the gate*, does not admit of a doubt. We have often seen, in the course of the narrative, that these were the very persons who were the first to receive the gospel. The Jews, as was natural, were strongly preju-

diced against it, and sought to prevent, as much as possible, the renunciation of their own for the Christian faith. With this view they insisted especially upon the immutable obligation of the Mosaic law, and the sufficiency of it for the attainment of salvation. At Rome, however, this indirect opposition to the gospel was much less active than in other places, where the apostle himself was present. The causes of this were, in part, that those at Rome who endeavored to uphold the law were Jews themselves, and not, as for example at Corinth, Jewish Christians; and in part, that the gospel had been but recently introduced, and there was none of that hostility to the person of the apostle, which was elsewhere the source of so much opposition. This circumstance was of great importance to the external peace, still more to the internal prosperity of the Roman Christians. Their dangers lay in another direction. The Jewish Christians, who not only brought to their faith in the gospel a partiality for the law, but adhered to its rites, were liable to fail on this account in a proper esteem for their Gentile brethren; and into this error, it appears, they did actually fall. On the contrary, the Gentile believers, in refusing to conform to the manners of the Jews, were in danger of arrogating to themselves a superiority over them. Thus both parties stood in need of proper instruction; and this the apostle, having ascertained the state of the Roman church, furnished in the Epistle before us.

But the disturbances which the Jews excited under the influence of their earthly hopes respecting the Messiah, had a still greater influence upon the condition of the Roman church. They had already for a long time deceived themselves with the vain idea that a worldly king and conqueror would appear among them, free them from the yoke of their oppressors, humble their enemies, and exalt their own nation to a state of distinguished glory and power. These false hopes were not adapted of themselves to render the Jews peaceful subjects of their Roman masters. When now, in addition to this, the intelligence spread at Rome that the expected Messiah had actually appeared, and when the Jews at the same time were suffering certain oppressions under the emperor Claudius, who had prohibited their religious assemblies, it was altogether natural that they should have felt them-

selves more inclined than ever to rebel against the power which was imposing such restraints upon them. The way in which they discovered their disaffection, we cannot determine more definitely, than by supposing that it was in some act of open resistance to the laws of the Roman government. At length these tumults became so frequent, and brought the Jews, already hated on other accounts, into such odium with the emperor, that he banished them from Rome. This expulsion, which had perhaps other political grounds besides the one alleged, affected the Jewish Christians also, who had not yet begun to be distinguished from the Jews. For the same reason, it may be presumed that the Gentile believers did not suffer from this decree of banishment. The Christians in Rome were at this time few in number, and in general unknown as distinct from the heathen and Jews; so that they could not have appeared to the government as an independent community, and as such have excited its attention and jealousy. But whatever may have been the extent of the exile in question, the effects of it were eminently favorable to the prosperity of the Roman church. Those whom it drove from the city came back in the beginning of the reign of Nero, with every hope of security from the mildness which he at first displayed, and with means of usefulness greatly enlarged by the increase of knowledge and improvement of character, which they had attained in their absence. Many of them had been during this period intimately connected with the apostle Paul; and from him, as well as from the discipline of their trials, must have acquired no ordinary fitness for entering with boldness and efficiency upon the course of Christian effort to which they were called at Rome. Their situation, too, surrounded as they were by the idolatry and corruption of the Romans, must have tended still farther to arouse their sympathy and animate their zeal. But these efforts, to which they were thus excited, gave rise to new and imminent danger of collision with their heathen masters. The more tyrannical and cruel the Roman emperors showed themselves to be, the more cause had the Christians to fear that they themselves might become the objects of their violence; and hence they must have apprehended more opposition to their efforts from this source than from any other. To such fear many of them

added, also, the remembrance of persecution and loss of property which they had recently suffered. It was not, therefore, without special reason that Paul exhorted the Roman Christians to lead a quiet life, and to honor the civil authorities and powers, as ordained of God, to which they should submit, not only from fear, but as a matter of conscience. (Rom. 13: 1—7.) This was the course of policy, as well as of duty. It was by such obedience and submission, by an exact fulfilment of their duties to the heathen government under which they lived, that they could best allay its jealousy, and secure its confidence. It was in this way, too, that they would cause themselves to be more certainly distinguished from the turbulent Jews, who were every day becoming more suspected by the heathen, and with whom, therefore, it was so much the more dangerous to be confounded.

The position which the members of the Roman church occupied in reference to each other, is very clearly seen from the strain of the apostle's letter to them. It would appear that their differences pertained not so much to points of doctrine, as of discipline and practice. In the former respect their agreement of views was far greater than that of the Corinthian Christians. Certain ascetic errors had sprung up among them, and they had become divided respecting the lawfulness of certain things, in themselves indifferent. In chapters 14 and 15: 1—4, he speaks of those who, from the strictness of their ascetic notions, would not eat certain kinds of food, especially meat, on particular days, and goes on to show how Christians should treat each other in such a case, so as not to violate the love which should bind them together. Those who entertained these scruples, derived them, no doubt, from the principles and practices of the Essenes, and perhaps also of the Pythagoreans, with whom they had been connected before their conversion to Christianity. The followers of both these sects had spread far and wide, and must have been numerous at Rome also, whither every form of religion so readily found its way. It was not to be expected that such, on becoming Christians, would entirely discard the prejudices to which they had been so strongly attached. They came into the church still imbued with them; and thus brought with them the seeds of variance and alienation. Supposing that they

were not permitted to eat meat at all, or only on certain days, and showing a disposition to make their conscience in this matter a rule of duty for others, they offended those who did not feel themselves to be thus bound, and incurred their censure as weak and superstitious. These latter, again, in asserting their liberty, were in danger of going so far as to encroach upon the rights of the others, and to demand of them concessions which they could not honestly admit. From this difference, insignificant as it may seem in many respects to have been, violent divisions and parties might easily have sprung up, as was the case at Corinth; but it appears that things had not such an issue at Rome. In the first place, the points in dispute were altogether less essential than those which agitated the Corinthian church. In the next place, the party which advocated the ascetic principle was destitute of an influential representative or head; while, without doubt, those who had been the friends and disciples of the apostle Paul exerted their authority to harmonize the conflicting elements of the church. While they maintained strongly the cause of Christian liberty, they could not have failed, on the other hand, to promote a spirit of forbearance towards their brethren, whose scruples did not permit them to use the same freedom. The instructions and admonitions, also, which the apostle gave them in his letter, must have produced a decided and happy effect. Upon the whole, therefore, the state of the Roman church, after the return of those who had been banished, would seem to have been peculiarly auspicious. No other church could boast a greater number of members and teachers, who had been personally intimate with the apostle Paul, and had enjoyed the benefits of his society and instruction. And this circumstance we may confidently pronounce a principal cause of the rapid and sure progress which the gospel here made.

From what has now been said, we can readily see what *occasion* the apostle had to write to the Roman Christians, and also what *object* he proposed to accomplish. He himself, in his Epistle to them, has assigned in general the reasons which influenced him. He has been called to be *the minister of Jesus Christ to the Gentiles*, and this has led him to write to the believers at Rome, that he may thus be the means of promoting their faith also. He

expresses in his letter, again and again, his desire to spread the gospel in person at Rome; which, as being the capital of the world, and presenting the prospect of a rich spiritual harvest, very naturally excited such a desire in the mind of the apostle of the Gentiles. He had often already purposed to direct his course thither; but had always been hindered in his design. Through the Christians who had returned to Rome, after having been connected with the apostle by various and intimate ties, he must have felt himself brought into a close relation to the church itself; and, through the medium of the same friends, he could manifestly have acquired all needful information respecting its situation and wants. Under such circumstances, it appears entirely natural that the apostle, since he could not visit Rome personally, should have felt himself impelled to address the Christians there by letter; and in this way instruct them more fully concerning the plan of redemption by Christ, and the purpose of God to impart its benefits, without distinction, to Jews and Gentiles. But as he stood in no immediate personal relation to the church, he took his position rather upon general ground, and touched less upon special local circumstances than, for example, in the Epistles to the Corinthians and Galatians. It is not till towards the close of the letter, and in a sort of supplement to it, that he comes to those local matters which had been made known to him by his friends at Rome. Hence the occasion of this Epistle is to be sought more in the apostolic commission of Paul in general, than in any special personal relations which he sustained to the church; although these also, as has been shown, must not be left wholly out of view.

The *object* which the author proposed may be easily seen from the Epistle itself. Paul endeavored to convince the Jewish as well as Gentile believers, that they were both in error, if they had any disposition to depend upon any thing else for justification than faith in Jesus Christ. "That the gospel is the power of God to save Jews and Gentiles," is the proper theme of his Epistle. Hence it was not merely his object to oppose Judaism, and the assumptions of the Jewish Christians against their Gentile brethren, but he wished also to take away from the latter all pretence for superiority and boasting. Both were

to enjoy precisely the same rights and hopes, since both were to be reconciled to God by one method, that is, faith in Christ. In this way all ground for dissensions between the two parties would be removed, and both would be united into one harmonious church of Christ. Hence, also, the course of argument which he has adopted. He labors to attain his end far more by exhibiting the universal necessity and perfection of the Christian plan of salvation, in contrast with the insufficiency and imperfection of the religion of both Jews and heathen, than by discussing and refuting the particular errors into which they had fallen.

ARTICLE III.

ON THE INDUCTIVE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy. By Sir J. F. W. HERSCHEL. London. (Lardner's Cabinet Cyclopædia.)

IN seeking any end, the first and most necessary step is, to learn the right and nearest road to it. The next is, to learn the best mode of following that road. An end may be sought blindly, and in the dark, with no true notion, either of the right road to it, or of the best manner of following that road. In such case, the end *may* be reached, it is true, but it will be only by chance; it will not be as the well earned meed of a labor rightly directed. Hence Bacon justly remarks, that the knowledge gained of facts before the inductive system was established "was owing to chance and experience, and not to true *science*."* But the road itself may be seen, and in some degree known, and yet the guiding light through it be wanting, without which many blunders will be likely to be committed in following that road. Before the time of Bacon, the *true road* to knowledge was unknown. His *Novum Organum*

* Nov. Organum Scient., Lib. I, § 8. The edition here quoted is of Lugd. Bat., 1645.

Scientiarum first opened up the view of that road to all true seekers after nature's stores. Not,—to use his own modest language,—not that “all honor and praise is to be denied to the ancients. Their abilities and powers are not disputed, but their knowledge of the *right road*. We pretend not to the character of judge, but merely to that of guide post.”* From his own time to the present, Bacon has been acknowledged as pointing to the only right road to the discovery of truth in natural science. All votaries of science, since his time, have endeavored and striven to follow the road which he thus first pointed out, and many have succeeded, and reaped a rich harvest for their pains. But many still have failed, through a want of knowing the best mode of following that road; through a want of that guiding light throughout, which shall always make that right road kept in sight.

In a former article of this Review,† an attempt was made to ascertain what must ever be the only *real criterion* for the *discovery of truth*. It was shown that this consists in *obliging every one of the modes* (there explained) *in which the function of REFLECTION acts, to be continually and equally active*. It was shown, at some length, what, in the writer's view, the function of reflection really is, and what are its different constituent parts. It was shown that “the distinguishing phenomena of reflection are, the *bringing up of two or more distinct ideas or actualities together, at one and the same time, before the mind, and comparing them together*.” As to the distinct *acts or parts* of reflection, it was shown that, in every *real, pure and deliberate* reflection, three distinct mental acts take place. The *first* of these is that by which the *similitude* of two distinct and separate actualities (or ideas) present at the same time, is perceived. The *second*‡ is that by which the *dissimilitude* between one actuality and another, each present at the same time, is perceived. The *third* act or part of reflection, and without which the two others would be useless and fruitless, is that by which the *necessary connection* between one actuality and another, present at the same time to the mind, is perceived. For, as shown in the same article, there *can be* no single cir-

* Nov. Org. Scien., Lib. I, § 32.

† Vol. IV, p. 243.

‡ This was improperly placed as *third* in the article referred to. It will immediately be seen that it should come *second* in the list.

cumstance, or fact, or actuality in nature, which is simply and independently existent in itself; which does not stand in the relation of *necessary connection* with some *other* circumstance, or fact, or actuality in nature. This *third* act or part of reflection is the *individualizer*, as it may be termed; that act whence results a *new* and distinct actuality in the mind, viz., the notion of the *truth* of the *necessary connection* or *want of necessary connection* between the existence of the various objects brought up and compared together, for similitude and dissimilitude, by the other two acts or parts of reflection. This *new actuality*, thus called into being by the exercise of this third act of reflection, is the *truth*, the actuality sought. In such truths and actualities consist the greatest and most valuable parts of man's knowledge. They are *real actualities*, though learned only by "induction," and not by any "immediate consent of the mind or *sense*;"* the extent and *boundary* of possible truth being and embracing, as shown in the article referred to, that which *does actually exist*, that which *has formerly* existed, in connection with that which does exist, or that which *may* exist in the same connection; *the mode of the connection* being as much an actuality or truth as the physical existence itself.

It was, in the same article, hinted that, in a future number, it would be shown how the principles then brought forward may be applied in the investigation of truth, in connection with physical and moral science. The points, then, at present sought to be established, are these: that, as before Bacon's *Novum Organum Scientiarum* pointed out the right *road* to the discovery of truth,—which road had before been unknown to all,—all knowledge was the child of *chance*, and not of science; and as following the road to which he thus first pointed has been, and must be, the foundation of all real science, so, in order to follow that road most easily, certainly and happily, a light is required, which can only be given by understanding thoroughly the mental function of reflection, and its different acts or parts, and the share each has in the discovery of truth; that this light will alone cause the right road to be always kept and followed; and that the want

* Bacon's *Advancement of Learning*, edition 1633, p. 206.

of it has been the cause of all those errors and theories which have disfigured the face of science even since the time of Bacon. It is maintained, further, that the inductive system itself owes its whole truth and efficiency to the existence in nature of those principles which it was the aim of the article referred to, to explain; and that, in so far as the rules of the inductive system are in accordance with those principles, it is a true, and natural, and valuable system, and points out the *right road*, and no further; and that, therefore, which is the sum of the whole matter, as a necessary consequence, the knowledge and understanding of those principles must ever be the greatest aid to him who would successfully make use of that inductive system. Though the road that system points out may be, and has often been, successfully pursued without this knowledge, yet, had this knowledge been present, it would have rendered the path easier, and would have prevented the falling into those errors which have been, and still are, too often committed; it would, in all cases, have been as a light and a guide, forcing the right road to be always kept in sight, and always closely followed.

To establish these points, it may best be shown,—

FIRST: That it was the non-compliance with these principles that produced the blunders and errors in science before the inductive system was established.

SECONDLY: That it is in so far as, and because, the inductive system forces the application of these principles, that it is a true, and valuable, and *right road* to science.

THIRDLY: That it is the want of knowledge of, or attention to, those principles, that causes the errors and vague theories which, in our own day, exist.

“The true cause and root of almost all the evils and errors of science is this,” says Bacon,* “that, while we bepraise and exalt unduly the powers of the human mind, we do not make right use of those very powers.” That this, in a general sense, is the fact, will be self-evident, if the first position just stated be true, viz., that it was the non-compliance with the principles laid down for the discovery of truth, already explained, that produced the blunders and errors in science before the inductive system was established. Supposing that the first steps to the

* Nov. Org., Lib. I, § 9.

discovery of truth, viz., the collection of instances, be well taken, even in that case, *unless each of the three modes of mental act embraced within the function of reflection be equally put into action, the truth cannot be discovered.* But, before the time of the inductive system, in ancient times as well as more modern, the very first steps of the road, the true mode of collecting instances, was a matter of dispute and doubt. It will be self-evident that, if the very first steps were thus matter of doubt, the end, certain truth, could never hope to be reached. Yet Plato, as shown in the article referred to, denied that the *senses* could be the foundations of real knowledge; he denied that any thing more than *probability* was to be inferred from them. Such a dogma was fruitful of evil, destructive of all advance in science and knowledge, and the immediate road to the most pernicious skepticism. Epicurus, on the other hand, maintained the strict faith to be placed in the senses, and made their information to be the only foundation of all real knowledge. He justly remarks that,—

Facts though you heap on facts, in strife to prove
The erring road the *senses* ever lead,
These nothing prove, save this, that *reason* fails
In all such cases, in the road she takes
In *judging* of the facts ascribed to sense.*

It was shown, in the article already referred to, that the ideas present to the mind in *spectral illusions* are *real actualities*, though the reason may *wrongly infer* that those actualities were presented to the mind through the medium of the external senses. Reason, not the senses, errs in this case, and this distinction, as it appears to us, would clear away much unnecessary confusion and doubt which even now exist as to the *first steps* in the right road to the discovery of truth. It was shown, in the article referred to, that the mind of every man is necessarily stocked with a number of actualities, which he *must know* to be *necessarily true*, and from which his first steps in the discovery of truth may always be with certainty taken. Epicurus laid very great stress on the good faith of the senses, and thus ingeniously, in the language of one of his most celebrated disciples, argues against those who would impeach that faith: †

* Lucretius, Lib. IV, lin. 464.

† Ibid., lin. 480.

All truth and knowledge must from *sense* be drawn,
 Nor is it possible that *sense* can err;
 For that which can the senses prove to err
 Must be more certain, fixed and sure than they,
 And their impressions readily destroy.
 But say, what is there to which mortals yield
 More constant, willing trust, than knowledge gained
 Through *sense* of touch, or taste, or sight, or smell?
 Or when, or how, did *reason* ever prove
 That knowledge gained by *sense* is false and vain?
 For *reason's* self is based on *sense* alone.*
 Or ever did the eyes the ears disprove?
 Or did the ears e'er prove that touch did err?
 Or did the taste e'er prove the touch in fault?
 Or smell convince that eyes have wrongly seen?
 Not so: each *sense* its own right objects knows;
 And what it knows, knows rightly. Hard and soft,
 And cold and hot, the touch alone can tell;
 Colors the eye, and smell the nose discerns.
 Each its own objects knows, and only those:
 Nor e'er can other *sense* supply its place.

This is undoubtedly correct. It is merely popular error to ascribe certain actualities, present in the mind, *spectral illusions*, for instance, to the external senses. The senses can really never deceive, and, were the principles already alluded to always rightly applied, that would never be ascribed to the senses which does not really belong to them, merely because there happens to be a great *similitude* between the actuality so existing in the mind, and those actualities known to be commonly presented through the medium of the external senses. The notion that such "*illusions*" are illusions of the *senses*, is merely an instance of the non-application of the principles necessary to the discovery of truth already explained. It is an instance in which the mind, led away by a similitude, jumps hastily to a conclusion, and (by means of the third act of reflection) individualizes a new idea; which act of reflection is, therefore, in truth, alone in error, and not the senses. It is true, as Bacon says,† that "the subtlety of nature far exceeds the subtlety of the senses and of the intellect;" still, all that we can know of external nature must be derived alone, *in the first place*, from the information gained through the senses; all three acts of reflection being rightly turned on these. It is justly remarked by

* That is, obtains all means of judging from what it gets through the senses in the first place.

† Nov. Org., Lib. I, § 10.

the same writer,* that one of the "greatest causes of hindrance and error to the human intellect is the dulness and small reach of the senses, so that those things which they can reach are few, in comparison with those which they cannot reach." Hence idle speculations and theories into the unseen and unknown, instead of carefully taking that which can be got at by the senses, applying carefully to it the three parts of reflection, and hence producing new and true actualities, which last may be afterwards applied as *themselves* steps to reaching further truths. This alone is true philosophy; and it was because such a philosophy was not at all followed before the days of Bacon, that error, and not true science, prevailed; that theory and speculation occupied the place of sound and real knowledge. We will next trace how *theory* and *speculation* themselves grow up in the mind, and show that it is wholly to be ascribed to the non-appliance of the principle so often mentioned as necessary to the *discovery of truth*; and without the appliance of which all truth that happens to be got at is merely owing to *chance*, and not to *science*.

It has been already remarked that the tendency to perceive *similitudes* is very great among the majority of mankind, far exceeding the tendency, equally necessary to the full act of reflection, to see *dissimilitudes*. To prove this, it is only necessary to refer to the universally popular mode, in ancient and modern times, in works sacred and profane, of teaching by *parable* and *fable*, where the casual *similitude* is more seized upon by the mind than all the *dissimilitudes*, abounding as the latter necessarily do. In searching after truth, then, in searching, in other words, to learn, by means of that which is known, that which is unknown, the *cause* or mode of necessary connection of one fact or set of facts with another being desired to be known, any *casual similitudes* are readily seen in different objects, and, all *dissimilitudes* being overlooked, a *new* idea is individualized in the mind, by means of the third act of reflection, viz., that these different objects are similar in their relation to another object, or are related to each other as cause and effect; and this new idea, thus formed in error, is taken as one fact or actuality in seek-

* Nov. Org., Lib. I, § 50.

ing other truths, and, being compared by the acts of reflection with other facts, hence other conclusions or actualities (as they are imagined to be) are formed in the mind, which again become the foundation of other errors. It will at once be perceived that, at each step, the errors will become multiplied; the last error will be far greater than the first, and each advance accumulates error, and the chance of error, in regular arithmetical proportion. The least attention will immediately make it clear that this is the *natural history* of every *speculation* and theory that ever existed in the world, in ancient times or in modern.

An illustration will render the course of this argument clearer. One shall be taken from the doctrines of Epicurus. That philosopher gained the nearest approach of any of the ancients to the true *inductive* system, and it is surprising how near in *theory* he did approach to that system, but the want of knowledge of the principles which it is the aim of this article to illustrate, was the reason he did not, in many cases, successfully apply that theory to practice.

One part of the physical system of Epicurus consisted in the doctrine, that the perception by the senses of all external objects was gained by means of thin *films*, which passed off from all bodies, and which, retaining their shapes, colors, &c., as they struck any of the senses, were perceived by them. A few casual *similitudes* were the whole foundation of this singular view; which, however, once established, became the fruitful source of numberless other theories, as erroneous as itself. This case, therefore, affords a perfect illustration of the above argument. One passage from Lucretius shall be here translated, which will give a good idea of the nature of the *similitudes* thus seized on as the foundation of so important a doctrine:

My doctrine is, that likenesses of things,*
Thin films, their figures keeping, are sent off
From every body which a being has.
Clear proof of this the dullest sure may see;
For oft the film itself is seen to rise
In clear and open sight:—some more diffused;
As smoke from burning wood, from water, steam:

* Lib. IV, lin. 46.

Some more condensed ; as insects cast their coats ;
 Heifers the membranes of their budding horns ;
 Serpents their skins. If then with these 't is thus,
 What shall prevent that films more rare than these,
 And thus less palpable, from every form
 And thing shall pass continual ? Which must be
 The easier that each surface is composed
 Of parts minute and rare ; which well may pass
 Off freely, without loss of form or shape,
 With greater ease the finer they may be.

It may seem very extraordinary how, upon such very meagre similitudes, a doctrine, whence so many consequences are drawn in the same system of philosophy, should have been founded. But such is only one of endless examples which might be given, of the gross errors in science before the time of Bacon, owing to non-application of the principles already explained ; to not equally and rightly applying all the parts of the function of reflection to the facts or actualities compared together.

It will easily be seen, that such an erroneous way of philosophizing, besides the individual errors produced, must give rise to a *habit of generalizing* from a very few facts,—which habit is totally destructive of all probability of reaching truth. This habit, so prevalent in former times, led Bacon to remark,* that “there are two ways of seeking and finding truth. One jumps from a few individual facts to general axioms, and makes use of such axioms in all other individual and mediate cases ; and this is the way hitherto in use. The other draws axioms from facts also ; but it is by going gradually up from one to the other, by slow steps, until, at length, the general axioms are reached ; and this is the true though untrodden way.” The remarks already made will explain the cause of these two ways being followed. Each is, in truth, *inductive*, but the former is inductive from observing only a few *similitudes* ; the latter from carefully marking, not only *similitudes*, but also *dissimilitudes*. The same author elsewhere observes ;† “Each way begins in facts, and ends in generalizations, but they differ widely ; the one only seizing hold of facts and cases here and there ; the other systematically and regularly : the one sets out with framing abstract and useless generalizations ; the other goes on, step by step, from that which is

* Nov. Org., Lib. I, § 19.

† Ibid., § 22.

known, to that which is unknown." The whole real difference between the two is this, as before expressed, that the one seizes only on the casual *similitudes*, while the other closely searches for *dissimilitudes* also; which latter plan leads to a *habit* of close and careful examination of every fact that can be reached. And it seems to us, that this explanation, or mode of expression, of the difference of the two cases renders the distinction clearer, and makes the necessity of following the latter course, in order to the real discovery of truth, more evident.

It is a well known fact, that, in no branch of science was any material advance made by the ancients, *except in mathematics*. The fact of such advance having been made by them in mathematics, however, may, at first sight, be thought to disprove the position set out with, viz., that it was the non-appliance of the principles for the discovery of truth, which have been explained, that caused the slow progress of science before Bacon's time. The fact of that advance in mathematics, however, proves, in reality, directly the contrary. It proves the correctness of that position. It proves that, in the *only case where it was possible* to get at the truth without making constant and equal use of each of the three parts of the function of reflection, *the truth was got at*, but in *no other case*, unless by chance. And the reason why, in geometry, for example, it is possible to get at the truth without making constant use of all those three parts of reflection is, not that the same principles for the discovery of truth, the same *criterion*, do not apply there as elsewhere, but that *there are no dissimilitudes*, which can *possibly* exist when once the *similitude* is seen. Take, for the sake of illustration, the forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid; that, "in any right angled triangle, the square which is described upon the side subtending the right angle is equal to the squares described upon the sides containing the right angle." Here the whole *proof* rests *solely* on a string of *similitudes*; against any one of which it is *physically impossible* that any *dissimilitudes* shall exist to weaken its force. Hence, though only *similitudes* were sought after, and all *dissimilitudes* neglected, yet, as the latter *could not exist*, the truth was reached. The whole of geometry, indeed the whole of mathematics in general, consists in *comparing similitudes*,

and drawing immediate conclusions thence as to the *necessary connection*. It is for this reason, and this reason solely, that it is a fixed and certain science. That these remarks on mathematics are not unjust the following words of Sir John Herschel will suffice to show,—in which, though he does not draw the distinction, and show the cause, as connected with similitudes and dissimilitudes, he yet, in effect, allows the fact. In “mathematical demonstration,”* all the argument is on one side, and no show of reason can be exhibited on the other. The mathematician listens only to one side of a question, for this plain reason, that no strictly mathematical question *has* more than one side capable of being maintained otherwise than by simple assertion; while all the great questions which arise in busy life and agitate the world, are stoutly disputed, and often with a show of reason on both sides, which leaves the shrewdest at a loss for a decision.” That *one side* is the side of *similitudes*, with which no *dissimilitudes* can interfere. It has thus, it is thought, been sufficiently established, that it was solely owing to the non-compliance with those principles which it is the object of this article to enforce as affording the only criterion for the discovery of truth, that the blunders and errors in science, before the adoption of the inductive system, were owing. It shall next, at less length, be shown that it is solely in so far as, and because, the inductive system forces the application of those principles, that it is a true, and valuable, and *right road* to science.

The very foundation of the inductive system is placed in the information given us by the senses. Bacon’s first words are,† “Man, the servant and interpreter of nature, acts and understands so far as he has *observed nature*, either by his senses or by reflection: *further he neither knows nor can know*.” It has before been shown, that when, after a comparison made by the function of reflection, a new truth or actuality has been individualized by the third act of reflection, *that truth* may, equally with an originally observed fact, become the basis of further reflection. Again must the distinction be enforced between the real information of the senses and the conclusions reflection may draw from that information. When, putting a straight stick in water, the lower end seems bent,

* London and Edinburgh Phil. Mag., Vol. VIII, p. 432.

† Nov. Org., Lib. I, § 1.

our senses do not err, our eyes do not deceive us. Such is the impression made on the retina; but we shall err very much, if, in reflecting on this, we infer that the stick itself is bent. The same remark might be applied to every one of the so called *illusions of the senses*.

Let us now, in as few words as possible, see what the *inductive system* really is. Perhaps the fewest words in which it can be expressed are those of Bacon, already quoted; "From individual facts are derived axioms, by going on, step by step, so as at last to come to generalizations." Sir John Herschel, in the admirable work placed at the head of this article, and which is by far the best treatise on the subject, thus more fully expresses the simplest ground-work of the inductive system. "Whenever* we perceive that two or more phenomena agree in so many or so remarkable points, as to lead us to regard them as forming a class or group, if we lay out of consideration, or abstract, all the circumstances in which they disagree, and retain in our minds those only in which they agree; and then, under this kind of mental convention, frame a definition or statement of one of them, in such words that it shall apply equally to them all, such statement will appear in the form of a general proposition, having, so far at least, the character of a law of nature."

Now it will be observed that, in order to take this very first step aright, it is absolutely necessary that each of the three parts of the function of reflection should be brought into activity: else it will be impossible to frame a definition which, all the *disagreeing qualities* of each object being omitted, shall express the *agreeing* qualities of all. This will best be made clear by an example; and we take one given by Sir J. Herschel himself.† There are a great variety of substances which exhibit the curious phenomenon of "periodical colors," when exposed to "polarized light." If we examine the individuals which exhibit this, we find among them the utmost variety of color, texture, weight, hardness, form and composition. But, when we come to examine them closely, in all their properties, carefully separating all the *similitudes* from the *dissimilitudes*, we find they have all one point of agreement, in the property of *double refraction*; and therefore

* Page 98.

† Page 99.

we may describe them all truly as *doubly refracting substances*. We may, therefore, state the fact in the form, "Doubly refracting substances exhibit periodical colors by exposure to polarized light:" and this is universally true, and, in so far, a law of nature;—a law of nature being best defined, perhaps, as being a proposition announcing that a whole class of individuals agreeing in *one* character, agree also in *another*. In the case before us, the *actuality* learned from this comparison is, that there is a constant relation or *necessary connection* between the two phenomena of *double refraction* and the *exhibition of periodical colors*. The actuality or truth thus discovered may, of course, be made the basis of further comparisons and reasonings.

It must be very clear that such a mode of proceeding as here described is very different indeed from that which, when a single casual analogy has been observed, immediately jumps to a generality, without stopping carefully to search for the *dissimilitudes*. Thus, in the case of the periodical colors, many of the substances which exhibit them are *transparent solids*. If these had happened to have been first seen in two or three cases, the conclusion might have been immediately jumped at, that *all* transparent solids exhibit periodical colors; which, however, on carefully searching out for *dissimilitudes*, is found *not* to be the case.

"Whenever, therefore," again to quote Herschel's words,* "we would either analyze a phenomenon into simpler ones, or ascertain what is the course or law of nature under any proposed contingency, the first step is *to accumulate a sufficient quantity of well ascertained facts or recorded instances*, bearing on the point in question, and the more different these collected facts are, in all other circumstances but that which forms the subject of inquiry, the better;"—since it is self-evident that the greater the *variety* of cases, and the greater the *general* difference between them, the more *distant* is the *chance* of finding any one or more points of *similitude* between them. This prime rule, then, of accumulating the *largest number*, is neither more nor less than a caution against admitting a few casual *similitudes* without having sufficient care to hunt for *dissimilitudes*. For example,—to add another to that of periodical colors

* Page 118.

already named,—if a few cases of the effect of temperature on liquids were examined, it might be generally said that, “as heat is withdrawn the dimensions of liquids decrease.” When the inquirer multiplies his instances, however, in the rigid search for *dissimilitudes*, he finds that, while water obeys the supposed law till the temperature reaches 40° Fahrenheit, on its arrival at that point a slight and gradual increase in dimensions takes place, until the freezing point is attained. Hence it is found that the law, hastily assumed from some similitudes, is not a universal law, certain dissimilitudes existing. *If these dissimilitudes had not been observed, the truth would never have been discovered.* This example alone is, we think, sufficient to establish the whole position we are striving to sustain, namely, that it is in so far as, and because, the inductive system is in accordance with the principles which have been explained, as the *only criterion for the discovery of truth*, that that inductive system opens up the right road to science.

Upon the *number* of instances collected depends the whole certainty of arriving at the truth, and this simply because *the chance of any dissimilitude* diminishes at every step. If, after the most careful search, no dissimilitude can be discovered, then the truth is established, and may safely be employed as the ground-work of further induction. Such careful search will have extended so far, that even though, at a future time, some dissimilitude shall be found out, yet the similitudes extending, to our certain knowledge, so far, the assumption of it as a law, until disproved by discovery of a dissimilitude, will be safe and useful. Since, moreover, at each step, fresh dissimilitudes are sought, there will be no danger of the error, if any should exist, accumulating, as in the case of the theories before described. If there be an error at the foundation, it cannot go through many steps without showing itself. It must be remarked, that a *single real dissimilitude* must upset any law, previously presumed upon observation of ever so many similitudes; since, as before observed, between facts of nature there *is* a necessary connection, or there is not. If there *is*, no exception can exist, for the statement of such exception involves a contradiction; viz., that there is *not* a necessary connection. How necessary, therefore, it must be to search for dissimilitudes becomes very evident.

Hence the importance of another observation of Herschel's:* "Whenever we think we have been led by induction to the knowledge of the proximate cause of a phenomenon, or of a law of nature, our next business is to examine deliberately and *seriatim* all the cases we have collected of its occurrence, in order to satisfy ourselves that they are explicable by our cause, or fairly included in the expression of our law; and, in case any exception [dissimilitude] occurs, it must be carefully noted, and set aside for reëxamination at a more advanced period, when, possibly, the cause of exception may appear, and the exception itself, by allowing for the effect of that cause, be brought over to the side of our induction." We must, in short, "place ourselves in the situation of the antagonists of the supposed law, and even perversely endeavor to find exceptions to it. It is in the precise proportion that a law, once obtained, endures this extreme severity of trial, that its value and importance are to be estimated†" [as real truth]. The whole of these remarks is nothing but the enforcement of the necessity, in order to the discovery of truth in natural philosophy, that the *second* act of reflection, which compares *dissimilitudes*, should be continually active. Laws of nature, truths, actualities, thus reached, become, indeed, true points, which may be used to reach to higher and more general truths, and thus, in the language of Bacon, science may rise "slowly and step by step till it reaches wide generalizations."

It is needless to enlarge upon the inductive system further. It must have been seen that it is in so far as, and because, the inductive system forces the application of the principles here maintained, as necessary to form the only criterion for the discovery of truth, that it is a true, and valuable, and right road to science. It remains very briefly to show that it is the want of knowledge of, or attention to, those principles, that causes the errors in science and speculative theories which do, in our day, exist.

Those principles are not recognized and enforced, in terms, in the inductive system. They never yet have been recognized and enforced in terms. It is the object at present to show the *practical importance* of that recognition and enforcement; in other words, to show how important it is, that all who would pursue science should make

* Page 165.

† Page 167.

themselves thoroughly familiar with the functions of reflection; with the three distinct mental acts or parts of which it is composed; and should feel the necessity of actively employing each in order to the discovery of truth. The theories and speculations prevalent in modern times differ not in *kind*, but only in degrees of absurdity, from those which have been noticed, and whose cause and *natural* history have been explained, as existing before the establishment of the inductive system. It is unnecessary, therefore, to enter into a detailed examination of their causes here. Enough to say that the whole is owing to the want of searching for and finding out *dissimilarities*.

Many a man is perfectly *honest* in his belief in a theory, the absurdity of which is self-evident to all the rest of the world. He sees a few casual similitudes. Instantly he jumps to a conclusion of some necessary connection between the instances observed. All like cases, or similitudes, are eagerly caught at, while all dissimilarities are unheeded. Self-love is a great blind to the mind in such a case, and adds weight to every similitude which will support the favorite theory, while it hinders all sight of any dissimilitude. Yet a man, honestly the dupe of such a theory, is far more to be respected than he who, for interested or selfish purposes, opposes all *legitimate similitudes* by producing *apparent* dissimilarities, which, however, he knows may, in the language of Herschel, "by allowing for the effect of certain causes, be brought over to the side of the induction;" and who carps at all such explanations, which do in reality afford some of the strongest evidences of *similitude* and truth, as merely ingenious methods of escaping from a dilemma.

Induction, then, and not theory, or, as Bacon termed it, "*anticipations*" founded on the observation of a few casual similitudes, is the only true way, the only *right road* to science. And the grand and main point in that induction, and the sole reason why it is that *right road*, is the constant enforcing of the *searching for dissimilarities*. Bacon well remarks,* that "if every intellect of every age could assemble, and labor in united and transmitted union, but little progress could ever be made in science by the method of *anticipation*." This is neither more nor less than saying that the first thing, the second thing, and the third thing,

* Nov. Org., Lib. I, § 30.

essential to the discovery of truth in natural science, is the *searching for dissimilarities*. If, then, the inductive system is indeed the right road to science, and if its excellence consists solely in enforcing compliance with the principles endeavored to be explained in this article and the one formerly referred to, may it not be truly said that the full understanding of these principles, of the function, and of the distinct parts of the function of reflection, may be considered as a light and a guide, forcing the right road to be always kept in sight and always closely followed?

A word more, in general, on the head of natural science;—and it is to the principles explained, as applied to *natural science* alone, that we have here confined ourselves. They may, however, be equally applied to moral science.

From what has been said it appears, that nature opens her stores of knowledge freely to those who will approach them by the one right road, but that the approach must be made with care: that it is no trifling thing to attempt to read aright her wondrous volume: that she requires close and watchful labor of her votaries—labor, however, which will be well rewarded. Let none absurdly cry that exalted science is anti-religious,—apt to withdraw the mind from the Creator of all nature, and to puff it up with vain conceits. Exalted science must, in every well regulated mind, have an effect precisely the opposite. It must cause the votary to feel, at every step, more profound awe, and more reverential admiration, for the greatness of that Being who is the author of all the wonders which his study of the book of nature unfolds to his astonished gaze. Between God's written word and his created work there can be no contradiction and no opposition; and, if we would raise the mind to adore God's greatness and his excellence, let us consider his revelations by his *works* as not less worthy of our study than his revelation by his *Word*. "It is fitting," to use the words of a European contemporary,* "that, in due season, the soul should prostrate itself before the throne of its Maker; should teach itself, with all humility, to feel the littleness of its own powers and the utter inadequacy of its faculties, compared with the magnitude and complexity of the machinery, moral and physical, with which it is surrounded and intimately connected."

* British and Foreign Review, Vol. III, p. 363.

ARTICLE IV.

BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION.

QUALIFICATIONS OF AN INTERPRETER.

To the inquiry, What qualifications are necessary to an interpreter of the Bible? we may obtain an answer, by considering a kindred question;—What qualifications are necessary to one who would interpret the works of Cicero? Plainly, he must understand the language in which Cicero's works are written; he must be acquainted with the history, geography and condition of the Roman empire and of the nations with which Rome was connected; he must be acquainted with the manners and customs of the Romans, and with the local and personal circumstances which originated, or which were connected with, the particular production he is examining. Let him possess this knowledge, and then, in the exercise of sober common sense, and of patient reflection, let him study the works of Cicero. Let him place himself in the circumstances of a contemporary Roman, and endeavor to peruse the works as such a man, unbiassed and impartial, possessing good common sense, would have perused them. We may believe, that he would then rightly understand and explain his author's works. Nor need he wait to obtain all this information to the fullest extent, before he begins to read Cicero. On the contrary, much of this knowledge is to be obtained from Cicero himself; and the habitual studying of an author is requisite to a right apprehension of his sentiments. The knowledge which the student has, of history, geography and philosophy, may not be complete; yet so far as his knowledge extends, it may enable him rightly to understand his author, though he will more thoroughly understand him the more extensive is his knowledge of those subjects, and the greater is his native ability judiciously to explain intelligible language.

Apply this illustration to the case of one who seeks to interpret, that is, to explain, the Holy Scriptures. His learning must be adapted to the work which he desires to accomplish. He must have a knowledge of the languages in which the Scriptures were written. No translation, however good, of any work, can supersede the necessity, to one who would adequately explain that work, of reading it as it came from its author's hands. An acquaintance with the original languages of the Scriptures is held as necessary to the interpretation of the Scriptures, on the ground, that no translation of any book can be presumed to be as correct and as perfect an exhibition of its author's thoughts, as his own original work. So far as a translation is a perfect representation of the original, so far it may be relied on as implicitly as the original itself. Who can doubt, that a reader of Cicero's translated works, provided they are perfectly translated, may obtain as correct a view of Cicero's meaning, as one who reads the works in Latin? Who can, however, for a moment presume, that each, or any, translation of Cicero is, in all respects, a perfect exhibition of Cicero's thoughts—such an exhibition, as he himself would have made, had he spoken the language into which his works are translated? And however good a version of the Scriptures our common English Bible, or any one of the numerous translations, may be, who will venture to think that it is throughout a perfect representation of the original? No translation, then, can be made throughout the basis of interpretation; it is only the original, to which this honor can fairly be accorded. Yet, so far as a version is a perfect representation of the original, so far it is as good as the original. There is no charm in a knowledge of Greek and Hebrew, that can transform a person into a good interpreter; and, doubtless, a student of the English version, if pious, devout and diligent, may attain a better understanding of the Scriptures, than some attain who read the original languages; because he may apply to the study of the sacred volume that good sense, and that habit of attention and of prayer, without which the knowledge of Greek and Hebrew can be of little avail.

The interpretation, or rather the illustration, of the Scriptures requires an acquaintance with the ancient history and civil condition of the Jews, and of the nations

with which they were at different periods connected. It is obvious, that so particular a knowledge of the history of those nations as of that of the Jews themselves, is not required. A general view of their history and condition at particular times, however, is indispensable. Of equal, if not superior, importance, is an acquaintance with the geography of the country of the Hebrews and of neighboring nations. The names of countries, mountains, seas, rivers, &c., are perpetually occurring in the Bible; and without a knowledge of biblical geography, some of the most familiar portions of the Scriptures will fail to be correctly and vividly apprehended. We may, indeed, without such knowledge, be betrayed into mistakes. It need scarcely be added, that a full explanation of the Bible requires a knowledge of the manners and customs which prevailed among the Hebrews and the neighboring nations.

It is also desirable to know the character and circumstances of the writers, and of the people to, or for, whom they wrote. Many of the books in the Bible were written on special occasions and for specific objects; the more, then, we know of the personal and local circumstances, the more prepared shall we be to understand and appreciate those books. It is from the books themselves that we must acquire much of this information; and the statements of writers concerning such circumstances, and the design of any particular book, are valuable in proportion as the information has been condensed from the book itself. Not merely, however, must the individual book be read and analyzed, in order to discover its design and allusions to circumstances, but other portions of the Bible may also give needed historical or other information.

In the work of interpretation, both at its commencement and in its more advanced stages, it is of importance to enjoy the assistance of those who have already toiled in this department of labor. In the early stage of critical study of the Scriptures, the instructions of a living guide are to be preferred. These will prepare the way for a proper use of written commentaries. Judicious commentaries furnish the results of much and varied study, pertaining to the very line of employment in which the biblical student is occupied. And while he does not allow himself to cherish a slavish dependence on any human

help, he ought not, on the other hand, to underrate those whose studies have been of such a nature as to impart a value to their opinions.

The preceding sketch gives a brief view of the kind of learning requisite to the interpretation of the Scriptures. In the use of these helps, let a person honestly and patiently apply himself to the study of the Scriptures, without the palsyng impression that he is approaching a totally mysterious book, and entering into a region of shadows; let him regard the Scriptures as a book having a definite meaning, like other books, and whose meaning is to be discovered in the same way substantially as is the meaning of other books; let him thus, with good common sense, endeavor to ascertain the thoughts of the sacred writers, and he will acquire a satisfactory understanding of the Bible; at least, so far as to have definite views of its principal parts, and to be able with confidence to lead his fellow-men as their spiritual guide.

But here it may be asked, Is there not a particular science of biblical interpretation, which it is necessary to study? We hear of principles, or canons, of interpretation, or rules which must guide in the interpretation of the sacred volume. Can we proceed to the study of the Bible, without attending to the science of biblical interpretation?

In reply, let it be asked, Does a man need to study the science of interpretation, before he can understand the works of Cicero, or any ancient author? Is there a set of scientific principles and canons with which we must become familiar, and which we must learnedly apply, before we can understand the writings of Franklin? If a man understands the English language, and will read attentively, with desire to understand, we never doubt that he can ascertain Franklin's meaning. His Creator has already implanted within him the principles which secure to him a right result. The necessity, if there be any, for special scientific canons of *biblical* interpretation, results from the fact that the Scriptures have been regarded as so peculiarly different from other books, that words and phrases occurring in them must have different meanings from those which they have in other books. Hence all sorts of mystical and allegorical explanations have been attached to them, such as no human author would for a moment allow to be ascribed to his book. But discard

such views, regard the Scriptures as a communication from God to man in human language, and intended to be understood as the guide to eternal life, intended, too, for the mass of men, and adapted to human faculties; then the same mental faculties and the same principles which are applied to the study of books in general, are called into exercise here and lead to a correct understanding. No other scientific rules are needed, in studying the Scriptures, than in studying other books. Any scientific system, if correct, must consist of rules which the human mind instinctively applies in ordinary cases. Notice a person who is reading a work in his own native tongue. How does he ascertain the meaning of his author? He knows the meaning of each word and of the combinations of words into phrases and sentences, and by these elements he ascertains his author's meaning. But presently you see him stop—there is a word, or a phrase, which he does not understand. He then re-peruses the sentence, or the paragraph, and again and again reflects on it; he turns to other passages where he has met the difficult word, or phrase, and makes comparison; he recollects some passages where thoughts, similar to those which he obscurely discerns in the difficult place, were expressed; to them he turns; he thinks of the nature of the subject about which the author is treating; he resorts to his dictionary and seeks aid from an arranged collection of meanings, and compares the definitions in the dictionary with the connection in which he is reading. In all these ways he seeks the meaning of the word, or phrase; at length, probably, he finds it, and can show why he concludes such to be the meaning. Similar is the process necessary to the student of the Bible; and there is no more need of a separate science, for learning the meaning of the Bible, than for learning the meaning of other books. The interpretation of the sacred books is so far regulated by fixed rules, as is the interpretation of other books. Nearly all rules may be embraced in a small compass: Get an accurate knowledge of the language, and in the exercise of good common sense and sound discrimination, view the particular passage in its own connection. There may be a word in it, which is used in many other passages; and yet, such may be the connection, that those passages cannot decide the shade of meaning in the case supposed.

Some writers who profess to be guided by rules of interpretation, often neglect those rules and still more often modify them, to suit their own views; and rules are sometimes framed so as to accord with their previous views of certain passages—views which may often be questioned. The same examples, too, are sometimes brought under different rules, and thus seem to bear different meanings. Commentators, of varying religious sentiments, yet professing a regard to rules of interpretation, put very different meanings on the same passages. Is there not ground, then, for saying, that the interpretation of language cannot be made a matter of mathematical precision? and that the science of interpretation is one, which must be, occasionally at least, modified by circumstances? That there are scientific principles involved in the understanding of any book, is unquestionable. Language has a definite meaning, and is capable of being understood; but in order to understand it, special regard must be had to the particular connection in which words and phrases occur. The science of interpretation, then, has quite as much to do with good judgment, sound common sense, and nice discrimination, as with fixed canons and a mechanical process.

Much benefit, however, may result from reading works on the interpretation of the Scriptures. Such works lead a student to the habit of investigation and discrimination, and furnish many useful suggestions. The best way, notwithstanding, to study biblical interpretation is, to study the Bible itself. We shall thus become acquainted with its forms of expression, and be led to seek for information of a geographical and historical character. We shall thus form ourselves on the model of the Scriptures; we shall acquire that intellectual and spiritual tact which is of incalculable service in the interpretation of the sacred volume.

Since so much dependence must be placed on a sound judgment, in explaining any book, and especially the Scriptures, it is not at all surprising that different men, of equal literary attainments, should come to different results in attempting to explain the sacred volume. They may have all the requisite learning, and yet they may greatly differ in regard to good judgment and the ability to apply their learning. They may also view the same passage,

or word, in different aspects, and there will, consequently, be shades of difference, if not real diversity, in their opinions. Then, again, it must be considered, that every man is liable to a countless variety of influences, arising from early prepossession, from interest, from his associations in the world, from the peculiar qualities of his mental constitution. Why should not all these influences affect him in his study of the Bible, as well as in his study of other books? and more so, since the Bible comes into more close and frequent contact with his moral qualities?

This leads us to remark, further, that among the requisites for a thorough interpretation of the Scriptures, true piety holds a distinguished place. The Scriptures are the word of God; they proceeded from the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. If we bring not a spiritual mind to the study of the sacred volume, we shall almost inevitably ascribe different meanings to many passages, from those which the inspired writers intended to convey. Nor is there any thing unaccountable in this remark. To the proper explanation and elucidation of a poem, is not a spirit in harmony with that of the poet a necessary qualification? But besides the need of a temper of mind harmonious with that of the sacred writers, we learn from the Scriptures themselves, that the enlightening influence of the Holy Spirit is necessary to a proper apprehension and appreciation of religious truth. "God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, must shine into our hearts to give us the light of the knowledge of his glory." "The natural man discerneth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." It is unspeakably important, then, that students of the Bible earnestly cultivate a spirit of piety. It is thus that their frame of soul will most harmonize with that of the sacred writers, and they will be able to view the topics of the Bible in a light similar to that in which the sacred writers viewed them. "If any man *will* do the will of God, he shall know of the doctrine." The enlightening influence of the Holy Spirit will be imparted to the man who walks with God. We cannot too deeply feel the necessity of the Holy Spirit's influence to a proper discovery and reception of divine truth. If our depend-

ence on his aid be not practically acknowledged, it will not be surprising should the fundamental and the plainest principles of religion be overlooked or denied. The most illiterate inquirer after divine truth, who seeks and obtains the guidance of the Spirit, will acquire a better knowledge of the ways of God, than the most learned student, who, relying on his external means and his intellectual preparation, fails to yield himself to the guidance of the Holy Spirit. We must come, then, to the Bible as a sacred book. We should guard against those views of it which secularize the mind; and with habitual, earnest prayer, seek light from Heaven.

Nor is it amiss to enjoin on ourselves a most ingenuous candor, and an endeavor to have our minds open to the fair and full impression of divine truth in all its parts. Let it be our simple object to discover what the Bible teaches, what its writers meant to convey to their readers, and then to follow their guidance. If to piety and candor, we add the learning which has been mentioned, and if, with sober judgment, with a habit of accurate discrimination and attentive inquiry, we diligently study the word of God, we shall not labor in vain; we shall find the Scriptures not a sealed book; the light of Heaven will shine on our path.

R.

ARTICLE V.

POPULAR EDUCATION.

By *popular* education is meant, that education which belongs to the great mass of any people, not including the higher branches of study which are prosecuted by a favored few. It is not really, though it may at first be thought superfluous, to propose this definition; for the expression, *popular education*, is often used to denote the entire subject of education, considered in a general way as pertaining to the interests of a people. In the remarks which we intend to make, we shall confine ourselves to the view of education which has been indicated.

Popular education has been a subject of special legislation in most of the cultivated nations of modern times; but not in all countries in exact proportion to the rank which we commonly assign to them in the scale of civilization. In theorizing upon the subject, we could hardly avoid coming to the conclusion, that the instruction of the humbler classes of society would invariably be promoted by public enactments, nearly in proportion to popular influence over those enactments. We should suppose that despotic governments would neglect the education of the ordinary classes of their subjects, from a fear, lest the increase of intellectual and moral light should betray the flimsiness of those pretexts under which they shelter themselves in their unjust sway; and that republican governments, on the other hand, would, from the importunity of their constituents, and from regard to their own permanence and well-being, sedulously seek to communicate to the people under their authority, as extensive, as correct, and as thorough knowledge as possible; conscious that, by so doing, they would be responding to the constant craving of human nature for mental aliment; that they would be acting in accordance with the manifest desires of their constituents, and that they would have nothing to fear from the broadest noon-day glare of light, in respect to the basis of their authority, so long as it was founded upon genuine republican principles. Yet this conclusion from general theory is, like many others of its class, found false in fact. Particular circumstances vitiate the deduction. Some of the despotic governments of the Old World have devoted more pains to the general education of their subjects than our own American governments (taken together), or any free governments which ever existed. The system of education now current in Prussia, for instance, under the sanction of public authority, is admitted by all intelligent men who are familiar with it, to be, in many of its main features, a proper model for the enterprise of all other nations. A perusal of the "Report on Elementary Public Instruction," prepared a year or two ago, by Prof. Stowe, of Ohio, will suffice to convince any one who is at all familiar with the arrangements for public instruction in the various States of our Union, that the prevalent tenet of our immaculate superiority, in all important respects,

over every other community, is but a dream of ignorant self-complacence. Where, then, is the fault? In our political institutions, or in ourselves? In ourselves, most certainly. The example of Prussia, in this matter, is pregnant with rebuke to a nation constituted like ours. Alas! the conduct of men is not always such as their advantages would lead us to predict. Individuals and communities sometimes demean themselves nobly in the most unfavorable circumstances, and (would it were not so!) demean themselves ill in circumstances the most propitious, and even the most impulsive to right action.

It is our intention to consider the subject of education only in a *secular* light, with exclusive reference to its operation upon human welfare in this present state of existence. The other aspect of the subject we resign on this occasion, only remarking, that, according to the avowal of all sensible Christians, whatsoever best fits the human race to discharge the duties incumbent upon it in this life, viewed in all its relations, must likewise tend to prepare it for another, since piety consists, not in neglecting this world and indolently dreaming of a future, but in acting well our part in present circumstances, whatever they may be.

We may regard education either in its *personal* or in its *social* bearings; either in its influence upon the individual, as it raises him from contiguity with the brute creation, and confers upon him richer and richer sources of happiness; or, in its influence upon others connected with him by the numberless ties of human society, as it renders him able and willing to perform his duties towards them in the various circles of social action.

The only proper end of government being the welfare of the people, education should be promoted by legislative authority with reference to *all* its numerous bearings upon human happiness, whether they be personal or social. Yet one of the most prominent of these bearings, and that which is generally adduced, especially in free countries, to establish the obligation resting upon government to do what it can for the advancement of popular education is, *its effect upon the perpetuity and strength of political institutions*. This effect is of very great importance in all countries; and, although there can be but one best system of general education with

reference to the good of man, yet, with reference to the perpetuity of different governments, it becomes the part of adroit policy to adopt different systems, according to the nature of the springs which actuate public authority. Montesquieu affirms that the basis of a despotism is *fear*, that of a limited monarchy *honor*, and that of a republic *virtue*. From this theory it would follow, that, in order to maintain a despotic government, the system of popular education under that government must be such as to form habits of servility, so as to prevent the common people from questioning the stern mandates of authority; that in a limited monarchy the cultivation of a peculiar sense of honor should be aimed at; and that in a republic the design of every scheme of general instruction should be the dissemination of virtue. The statement of Montesquieu is extremely simple and pretty; the misfortune is, we fear, that it is not fully correct. Like many other theorists, Montesquieu, in his zeal for simplicity, often presents but partial views; thereby leading those who rely implicitly upon his judgment into error as fatal as total untruth would occasion. We do not object to the assertion, that fear is the main principle of despotic governments; but that honor can with as much propriety be considered the principle of a limited monarchy, or virtue that of a republic, we do not believe. We have a different theory; one, however, that does not lack simplicity withal. We are of opinion that there are properly but two characteristic springs of public authority, viz., enlightened popular consent on the one hand, and coercion by unjust force or by craft on the other. Governments seldom, probably never, rest on either of these principles exclusively. In other words, it is probable that no national government ever existed which was wholly evil, without the slightest mixture of good; as, certainly, none ever existed, which was wholly good, without the slightest mixture of evil. The various nations upon earth are ruled by fear and consent conjoined, operating with different proportions of energy. In most, alas! the former predominates. In what are called despotic governments, it predominates to such an extent, that it is no misuse of language to speak of it as *the* spring of public sway, although other influences may have a partial operation in securing the stability of that sway. In what are called limited monarchies,

popular consent makes itself apparent as an element of the national constitution. It is evident that the degrees of influence which this consent exerts, may be infinitely various in different monarchies, or in the same monarchy at different periods. Accordingly, there is no national designation so indeterminate as *limited monarchy*; since, on the one hand, it may verge towards a despotism, or, on the other, towards a republic. Montesquieu would never have pronounced *honor* the principle of limited monarchies, had he not been seduced by a desire to impart the charms of regularity and simplicity to his theory. If kings and other magistrates possessed no basis of authority over a people save the principle of honor (in any and every possible sense of that term), they would be impotent. Under a government once established upon some more solid foundation, honor may be made to exert a partial influence over the minds of its subjects. This may be the case in a republic and even in a despotism, as well as in a limited monarchy. The feeling of loyalty to a prince is analogous to the feeling of patriotism in a republic; and honor may have as much to do with the latter as with the former.

Not to dwell longer, however, on this point, let us pass to another more immediately relevant to our purpose, viz., the basis of republican institutions. As we have before remarked, this is stated by Montesquieu to be virtue. There is a greater degree of truth in this position than we have conceded to his account of limited monarchies; that is, if we take the word republic in its narrowest sense. If, however, we include all aristocracies under the term republic, as Montesquieu does, the case is altered. An aristocracy, in the current sense of that term, differs essentially from what we consider a proper republic: and thus cannot be founded on the same basis as a republic. Looking at aristocratical government generally, we can obtain no fixed footing for a theory concerning its principles. We must know the particular character of the aristocracy, if we would know on what it rests. It may be a despotism; and then, as is the case with other despotisms, fear is its vital principle. It may be analogous to a limited monarchy, force and popular consent operating together, in concord or in conflict, with different degrees of energy. But it cannot be a republic; for it is

the essence of a republic, that the power of government should emanate from the whole body of the people. We have said that, taking the word, republic, in its strict and proper sense, the account of its principles given by Montesquieu is more correct than that which he gives of the principle of limited monarchies. Virtue is indeed one of the main props of republican institutions. Yet we do not think it right to represent it as *the* spring of such institutions. General *intelligence* is almost of as much consequence to their perpetuity in any country, as general virtue. If knowledge without virtue goes wilfully astray, with its eyes wide open, virtue without knowledge falls into the ditch from blindness. In both cases, the issue is nearly the same. Were it required to state in one word the proper basis of republican government, we should answer, *perfection*. It is the only species of government, in our opinion, which favors or would even allow, the highest possible cultivation of human nature. Despotism can flourish only in the soil of ignorance, vice, and every kind of degradation. Freedom needs nutriment from nobler sources.

The remarks which we have made indicate what is true republican policy in regard to popular education. Montesquieu presents us a chapter on "Education in a republican government," in which he follows out the partial view he has taken of the basis of republics, inculcating only the dissemination of virtue as thoroughly as possible under the operation of legal enactments and other influences. But, though virtue be one of the chief requisites to the continuance of civil freedom, it is not, as we have already said, the sole requisite. It is one of the ingredients of the perfection of human nature, to which alone freedom can look for entire security; but it is not itself that perfection.

The two main principles of human perfection are virtue and intelligence. Only the suppression of these will insure the continuance of arbitrary power. Physical force is on the side of the million; the one or the few must either corrupt or blind the many to keep them under tyrannical sway. A strict analysis of the means by which despotism is upheld in any country, revealing the stupendous and lamentable extent to which sottish ignorance, self-complacent prejudice, immersion in sensual pleasures,

and manifold moral villany, have deprived men of almost every enjoyment worth possession, would, perhaps, be of no less value to the human race than any mental achievement to be found in the world's records. *The progress of the million* is the noble motto of the age, as it will be that of all future ages; and what would tend more to promote this progress than a disclosure of the impediments which have been created or fostered by interested cunning, for the purpose of retarding it? Who can tell how much sinister influence has been exerted over the common mind under despotic governments through the characteristics of a system of public instruction? Napoleon spoke out plainly, as was his wont, when he said that he did not wish moral philosophy to be taught in the schools of France, since it would make Frenchmen intractable for his purposes. How many monarchs have, more silently but as effectually, withheld from their subjects the sources of acquaintance with principles which would lead to inconvenient results, if suffered to work like leaven in the national mind! It is fortunate for mankind, that, in general, perhaps always, despotism is, to a great degree, unconscious of its true character. Were it not thus ignorant, it would be far more formidable. The moral atmosphere by which monarchs are surrounded from their cradle upward, disables their judgments, so that they cannot perceive their real position; else they (or at least most of them) would not so readily suffer and even foster plans for human improvement which are surely undermining their ascendancy. They foment the spreading flame of intelligence, which will, ere-long, melt away their wax-work pedestals. Thanks to the short-sightedness of man and the providence of God, no system of popular instruction has ever been devised, that did not serve to elevate the nation that came under its influence. The very schemes resorted to by arbitrary domination in order to inculcate servile obedience, have recoiled with compulsory force upon their regal patrons. Instruction of any kind is dangerous to tyranny. Teach the mind to advance in one path of thought, and you give it the capacity and the desire to seek out and pursue others.

The general observations which have been made on the policy of arbitrary governments in regard to popular education, are sufficient for our purpose. We have made

them, in great part, on account of the reflected light which they cast upon the policy of republics. The more minute development of despotic policy, in this respect, as well as the actual introduction of it, may be left to such a stay of tyranny as prince Metternich, than whom few men probably have ever lived more worthy of universal execration.

In considering generally the system of popular education best suited to perpetuate republican institutions, what has been said as to the basis of such institutions leads us to remark, that, in the first place, *correct moral sentiment* should be sedulously infused into the common mind. On this point, we cannot but think that the people of the United States are pursuing a wrong course. We speak of the country as a whole, not meaning to deny that there are numerous exceptions to the censure. It is a fundamental principle of our social compact, that liberty of conscience shall not be infringed. This principle may be, and we think has been, misused to vindicate an extreme. From fear of violating conscience, we have been induced to neglect the diffusion of morality. We do not desire, any more than the sternest advocate of liberal views, that religious sectarianism should intrude within the walls devoted to public instruction; but we do desire that the broad, essential principles of morality, respecting which all good citizens are agreed, and to which all bad citizens ought to be constrained to do reverence, may be inculcated therein without stint. Thus would the foundation on which rests the beautiful structure of our country's freedom be greatly strengthened. The virtues, which come into action between man and man, all have likewise a general political bearing. Moreover, there is a virtue—patriotism—which has for its direct object the welfare of one's country. It comprehends many lesser virtues, that we shall not stop to enumerate. All the virtues, public and private, should be the object of careful consideration and inculcation in our common schools. Little knowledge and much uprightness are infinitely more auspicious to national freedom, than much knowledge and little uprightness.

Nor would the moral instruction which we recommend require any extravagant expenditure of time or pains. It would lessen the amount of both now necessarily con-

sumed. The first essential would be the selection of virtuous instructors. Instead of regarding only, as is now too often the case, the intellectual characteristics of the candidate for the responsible charge of youthful minds, it would become requisite to examine with scrupulousness his moral qualifications. It should be well understood by the teacher thus selected, that an important part of his duty would consist in cultivating the moral sense of his pupils, not only by formal instruction, but especially by exemplification; by incidental commendation or rebuke; in fine, by every means, direct or indirect, which should seem to him likely to be promotive of the desired end. Every one can perceive, that if the culture of the heart were to assume a prominent rank among the duties of instructors of common schools, much might be done by them beyond what they now do for the formation of good citizens. Suitable text-books of morality might be framed with no great difficulty; but, in our opinion, it would be best to count chiefly upon impressions conveyed without book, or through incidental observations upon passages in books not directly pertaining to morality, than upon any which could be conveyed formally and through the express design of exhortation. May the time soon arrive, when the proper medium in regard to moral education shall be observed; when men will no longer, from fear of trespassing on the manorial rights of conscience, leave uncultivated a field which is rightfully within their control, and which, if duly cultivated, would yield a harvest of incalculable importance to the general welfare!

In the second place, *useful intelligence* should be diffused among the common people. It is not necessary to argue this general proposition; for all assent to it. It is the professed principle of our public schools. We have already expressed our opinion, that it has exerted too exclusive influence over those who frame the machinery of education in our country; and now express our belief that there is much error current in respect to the kind of intelligence most useful to the common people of a republic. With reference to the particular topic to which we have hitherto directed attention, viz., the influence of education upon the perpetuity and prosperity of political institutions, it may be remarked, that this influence is not suitably regarded in the selection of objects of knowledge

for the pupils of our public schools. We mean, especially, that sufficient importance is not conceded to studies relating to the constitution and history of the United States, to the present condition, interests and relations of the various portions of the country, to the general principles of public welfare, and the political duties of individual citizens in every capacity, public or private. It is not our purpose to dwell on this special remark. We propose, rather, to desert the exclusive consideration of the political bearing of education, and to make a few observations on its *general practical bearing*.

No learning is worth a straw to any man, in whatever condition of life, which is not, in the strictest sense, *practical*. This truth is of peculiar importance in its application to the humbler classes of society, who live solely by the employment of those capacities which they have received from nature, as extended or lessened, as nourished or starved, by the course of education to which they have been subjected. If it be permitted to any man to wander into regions of thought, which will in no respect yield him a return of practical value, it certainly is not permitted to the day-laborer or the mechanic.

Nor is it enough to know that the arrangements of our public schools are practical in their character; it being of consequence to know *what kind and degree* of practical bearing they possess. To exemplify our meaning—it would certainly be an occupation possessing a practical bearing, were a child to spend all its hours of application in acquiring the art of making a pin with consummate skill; and yet this end, though practical, would not be deemed worthy of employing the whole period of a child's education. Every thing may be said to have a practical bearing, which tends to prepare for action of any kind, good, bad, or indifferent. Our aim should be to adapt public instruction so as to secure the most useful bearing upon action. Now, we assert, in respect to the general condition of common schools in our country, that notwithstanding all the laudable characteristics which may be pointed out in it, it exhibits this prominent defect, that the end intended to be accomplished is partial, imperfect, grossly inferior. The assertion is a grave one, and needs proof of a cogent nature. Such proof will be suggested, we think, by every man's reason, upon a little considera-

tion, provided he be at all familiar with the actual procedure in our common schools. Can any well-informed person deny, that in most of them it is too exclusive an aim to impart to the pupils such knowledge as is demanded for the gratification of the prevailing passion of our country *to get money*? Now no truly enlightened person will maintain that such a practical bearing as this, deserves to be the exclusive, or even the chief one, in the economy of our public schools. There are other and higher objects of life than the accumulation of wealth. The people of the United States, as well as of all other countries, need to be thoroughly reformed in regard to their notions of human happiness and human duty. It is possible that reform, in regard to an undue estimate of riches, is more glaringly requisite in our country than in any other. This our enemies aver. The position may be disputed; but at any rate reform is necessary. The most efficient means of effecting it will be, amendment in our nurseries of instruction, where the errors in question are assiduously sown, to gain in time a mature solidity which almost defies eradication. The studies and arrangements of our seminaries of instruction should be ordered upon the plan of developing, in proportion to their relative importance, all the useful capacities of our nature. An exact and prudent pursuance of this plan would make important changes in the constitution of all our schools, and, probably, of our common schools in particular. The application of this plan we will not attempt to specify, as they demand the space of an entire article for themselves alone.

Further, it is of importance to scrutinize the *means* which are employed to effect the end usually intended in the arrangements of common schools. Having objected to the end itself, we may be supposed to object to the means by which it is prosecuted. But this is not all. We object to the means more than to the end. For the end is one, which, in conjunction with other ends, and in its proper place, is laudable; but the means are not discreetly adapted to its accomplishment. It is a pity, that, in addition to the fault of selecting so narrow an object of assiduity in instruction, the means of attaining the object should also be extremely ill-chosen; but so, we fear, it is. The chief principle of thrift is sagacity. Now, the instructions of

our common schools are not (we speak generally) well calculated to foster this principle. There is too much of the passive, too little of the active, on the part of the scholar; too much endeavor on the part of the teacher to introduce, too little to elicit; too much of mechanical procedure, too little of sound intelligence, on the part of both. Plainly, this is all very wrong; and if those who have been thus educated become eventually clear-sighted and sagacious in business, it is in spite of such education, not on account of it; it is because the light of natural intellect is not wholly extinguished by the lamentable process. In many instances, we have no doubt, a mind, naturally luminous, has been completely "shorn of its beams," by the perverse treatment it has encountered in the common school. Every mind subjected to such discipline must suffer from it, so far as to exhibit diminished attainment at least, if not some marked obliquity or inferiority of structure. We remark, in conclusion, that we may reasonably congratulate ourselves, if we are behind some other nations in the wisdom of our arrangements as to the great cause of popular education, there are very few who surpass us. We are by no means last in the race. We are somewhat lagging, it is true, but (we may rejoice in the conviction) it is not for want of ability. We have foolishly suffered ourselves to be diverted from direct and earnest progress to the goal; other objects have attracted a disproportionate share of attention; we have sacrificed to lust of gain and to the spirit of party, time and energies which should have been consecrated to loftier achievement. But the race is not yet terminated. The goal of perfection has not yet been attained by any people. With our preëminent advantages, we may still outstrip our competitors. Whatever may be the fact in regard to the comparative excellence of schemes for popular education in different countries, it cannot reasonably be denied, that the motives to improve them and the facility for doing so, are much greater in free governments than in others. These motives and this facility may be disregarded; but if a great republican nation, like our own, once becomes thoroughly sensible of its interest, in regard to the momentous subject we have been considering, its progress must be resistless and matchless.

D. F., JR.

ARTICLE VI.

PROFESSIONAL LABOR INDISPENSABLE TO PROFESSIONAL SUCCESS.

BEFORE proceeding to establish this truth with reference to the ministry, we feel bound to make one or two remarks for the purpose of guarding against misapprehension. Let it not, then, be supposed for a moment that we are going to place the clerical profession on the same ground as that on which the other professions rest; and, copying a species of declamatory reasoning quite common at the present day, just saying to a man, if you wish to secure success, work and you will have it. This is the only condition. Nothing else is needed.

We repeat, therefore, that it is not our purpose to imitate that mode of popular reasoning which sacrifices truth to novelty, and holds up one view of a subject in so strong a light that it has all the effect of falsehood in misleading the reader. It is our design, indeed, to press the necessity of labor in the ministerial calling, but we wish to be understood here as distinctly recognizing the grand truth of our dependence upon the Holy Spirit, without whose influences all our efforts will prove abortive. Nor can there be too deep a sense of this doctrine resting upon the hearts of every member of the sacred profession. The deeper the better. And here, before dismissing this point, the attention of the reader is solicited to one or two observations.

We have spoken of a deep sense of this doctrine. We add, it is not enough that there be a *general acknowledgment* of this truth, there should be a *profound conviction* of it. It should be received not as a part of a system, but embraced in the love thereof. It should be regarded not as an opinion of the head, but as a sentiment of the heart; not merely entertained in the intellect, but cherished in the affections. A scriptural sense of our dependence upon the Holy Spirit will not allow us to adopt this doctrine in the light of an abstract notion; but will constrain us to embrace it as a warm, living, quickening, sanctifying and

gracious truth, having in it such sweetness and excellency, such freshness and beauty, such fulness and adaptation, as to elicit from our hearts their holiest affection. Our minds will love to dwell upon it for comfort and support. So was it regarded by the apostles, who lose no opportunity to introduce it to our notice, and celebrate its glory and its grace.

But their absolute dependence upon the Holy Spirit, and their admiring views of this truth, did not deter them from exertion, nor abate the fervor of their professional zeal. So far from this being the case, they plainly derived from this entire reliance upon supreme aid the strongest reason for personal effort in their own and others' salvation. They worked *because* it was God who worked in them.

And this is the unfailing fruit of such scriptural dependence upon the Holy Spirit. It deepens humility, while it increases zeal. It makes us feel our nothingness, while it excites our ardor. It produces lowliness, while it warms our fervor. It convinces us of our emptiness, while it kindles our engagedness. It teaches modesty, while it redoubles our perseverance. It makes us see that God is all in all, while it stimulates us to work, because then only do we realize, "that they who are *for* us be more than they who are *against* us."

The absence of such scriptural dependence upon the Holy Spirit ought to be deprecated, if for nothing else, for the influence thus exerted in sapping professional energy of character, and destroying that enthusiasm, which is necessary to make a man fresh as the morning in prosecuting the duties of his calling. The truth is, when this dependence ceases, sloth begins. Such independence on divine aid being the highest dishonor which we can offer to God, it is retributively followed by spiritual indolence and sluggishness, which blight the fairest professional prosperity. Nor does it stop here. It produces a state of feeling which is blasting to solid piety in our own bosoms; and sows with salt that vineyard of the Lord, which is cursed with our laziness.

With these truths in view, we now proceed to substantiate the position at the head of this article, which affirms the indispensableness of professional labor to professional success.

This we suppose to be the doctrine taught in 2 Tim. 2: 6. The husbandman must *first* labor, before he can expect to partake of the fruits of his soil. The metaphor here employed carries with it all the force of an argument. For we see, at once, how idle it would be in a farmer to think of reaping before he has sown. Its absurdity is evident, and would justify our calling a man a fool who thought otherwise. But there are no such fools among the children of this world. Among them, "all things are full of labor," as the requisite to success.

Thus is it in moral agriculture. There, also, "all things must be full of labor." A church, which is the peculiar field of professional exertion, is aptly called "God's husbandry." Success there has its antecedents, no less than in other scenes of toil. It is not to be produced by miracle, while a minister folds his hands in his bosom and sighs for the prosperity of Zion. In this way nothing will be reaped.

And, further, it is suggested by the agricultural allusion, already cited from Scripture, that real success is never produced in a day or a week. Time is an essential element in accomplishing any great object. However plain this may be, some expect success almost in a moment, and hence put forth one or two strong efforts, which they think are to produce mighty effects. In this, however, they are sure to be disappointed. And why? Simply because they expect to accomplish by a little toil, what can be accomplished only by a great deal. Important moral results can never be effected by a single blow, however vigorous. A large amount of good can never be wrought by a few professional exertions, no matter how strenuous they may be, nor how much talent they may exhibit. The husbandman might as well think of making a mighty effort in order to realize a harvest in a single day. The traveller might as well think of reaching the summit of a mountain by one or two strides. In both cases, utter failure would be the consequence. But not more so, than the failure that must attend upon him who expects to accomplish in the moral world, by a few efforts, those great results which require patient and sustained toil. In all these cases, time and labor are the prescribed requisites.

But it may be of advantage to pursue this analogical reasoning a step or two further. Cast your eyes, then,

over the world, and see how universally the principle now maintained is admitted and acted on, in every profession and avocation. From such an examination, who fails to observe how invariably men rely upon labor for success? In every walk of life, professional and mechanic, we see an illustration of the truth, that "all things are full of labor." Whatever end is contemplated, labor is the appointed means of reaching it. Whatever good is sought, labor is the established way of finding it. Labor enters into every pursuit, which is crowned with success. Without it, the merchant would dream for ever of his fortunate enterprises, and die a bankrupt. Without it, the mechanic would devise schemes for spreading the celebrity of his skill, and thus growing rich, only to have them dashed to the earth by the curse which follows indolence. Without it, the student would exult in his fancied attainments in knowledge, only to be mortified by his real ignorance when he came to measure himself with some patient thinker. Without it, the lawyer would assume the air of great legal learning, and talk of his numerous clients, only to have nothing to do except counting his fingers in his office, or lounging along the streets. Without it, the physician would wait in vain for patients, and drag along far in the rear of his profession, an object of scorn and a butt for ridicule.

From this hasty appeal to analogy, we see how much evidence might be drawn from that source, in establishing the truth of the sentiment to which our attention is now directed. But enough has been said on this point, to convince us that no law is more universal in the business of life than the necessity of labor in order to secure success. God has written it upon every thing we behold, and his providence is constantly enforcing the lesson. In the contemplation of human affairs, how frequently are we taught that "he who gathereth by labor shall increase, but that drowsiness clothes a man with rags."

But what is true of every secular, is no less true of that sacred employment of which we are now speaking. With regard to that, it is a settled truth, "that in all labor there is profit." In that field of exertion, "he who gathereth by labor shall increase." To him whose business it is to prepare souls for heaven, no less than to him whose busi-

ness it is to cultivate the earth, God says, "By the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread."

From this general reasoning, let us now proceed to a more particular examination of the truth before us, with regard to the ministerial calling. And we think it is obvious,

1. That professional labor is necessary to gain professional *enthusiasm*. How can a man acquire this, if he give only half his mind to his business, and discharge its duties in a hurried and desultory manner? Who ever felt ardently attached to any pursuit which was secondary to something else, and in which his powers were sluggishly employed? Can ardor be kindled in any profession, unless a man give himself wholly to it? It is impossible, till the laws of the human mind be changed. To have attachment to any occupation, we must labor in it; and in proportion to the amount of real work we expend upon it, in that proportion shall we love that occupation, and identify ourselves with it. And hence, we may ask, when did the reader ever see a man feel enthusiasm for his profession, who, instead of alertness, energy and activity in its duties, plainly dragged himself to them, and performed them with a mind only half aroused to exertion? The thing was never seen. Fervor of spirit cannot be kindled in this way. It is labor which produces that excitement of the powers and faculties, which is another name for enthusiasm. Indolence, on the contrary, is the parent of indifference, which makes a man remiss and listless in his business, and disposes him to fold his hands in slumber.

The influence of professional enthusiasm is too plain to need description. We repeat only a settled maxim, in saying that it is an element of success. No great results are ever accomplished without it. Nor did a man ever make his mark upon society without it. Learning and talents are invaluable, but they achieve little apart from enthusiasm, because they need, in such a case, that impulsive energy and fervor which are necessary to the mind's working advantageously and productively. Observation is constantly offering examples of the truth of this remark. And thus, we frequently see men possessed of moderate abilities, but those abilities brought into active, steady exertion, under the influence of professional ardor,

accomplishing results far superior in every respect to those accomplished by others, who, though endowed with finer abilities, are yet deficient in that ardor which is necessary to render their great powers effective.

2. It is obvious, that professional labor is necessary to professional *influence*. Respect, veneration and esteem are necessary to real influence; but who ever cherished any of these feelings towards a man characterized by indolence in his calling? We may admire such a man for his splendid powers, and be enraptured by his eloquence, when, once in a great while, he gets roused up to exertion; but if he be lazy, a spendthrift of his time, and a loungeur from place to place, as if he had nothing to do, we can neither respect nor venerate him. It is impossible that he should get a strong hold upon our regard. He will be viewed as an uncertain man; one on whom reliance cannot be placed, because devoid of those sterling qualities of character, on which the best interests of society depend.

Were it necessary to enforce the truth of what has now been said, an appeal might be made to the bosoms of our readers. From that source abundant testimony might be derived, to corroborate what we have now advanced. There is no one who can feel respect for a man that fails to give himself to the work of his profession; nor is there any one who can entertain deep regard for a man that is decidedly indolent, a despiser of little duties, and a stranger to persevering labor. Whereas a man who evidently works in the vineyard of his Lord, is sure to win our veneration. The feeling cherished towards him will be that which is so happily expressed by the wise man, "Seest thou a man diligent in his business, he shall stand before kings, he shall not stand before mean men."

Now such feelings are at the basis of real influence. But is a single remark needed to show that this influence is an important element of professional success? If those are left to answer, who have had the largest experience of human life, we can be sure of their reply. They will tell us, that in the absence of such influence, a man, though ever so gifted, "fights like one who beateth the air." His mind does not tell upon the community. It is too much like a cipher, which needs another figure before it to give it value.

3. It is obvious that professional labor is necessary to professional *power*. This is another element of success. A word of explanation will, however, facilitate our object. We mean by the power here spoken of, that which is often expressed by a man's being perfectly at home in his profession, having its principles entirely at his command, its duties fully before his eye, being thoroughly acquainted with its details, and aptly meeting every demand it may justly make upon him. Such a man would properly be said to have professional power; because he would move with strength in prosecuting the duties of his calling, and would act with promptness in those emergencies that call for energy, decision and resolution, and which can be met in no other way, without insuring defeat and doing real injury to the interests of truth and religion. He would be, moreover, prepared for new and unexpected events, growing out of the fluctuations of human passions, and the revolutions of human opinions; and, thoroughly comprehending his relations to society, would have his professional course marked out, and the ground of his conduct so settled as to keep him from being driven like a wave of the sea and tossed.

Such a man, we repeat, has professional power. He is familiar with every branch of his profession. He has mastered its various parts, but those which call for study, and those which demand action. Uniting a complete knowledge of divine truth to a careful observation of man in every condition of life, he is able, by superior aid, to adapt that truth to the wants of those whom he is called to instruct. By steady toil at the mine of Scripture, he succeeds in extracting therefrom its pure ore, which he fuses in the crucible of his own mind, till it comes forth a sacred treasure adapted, not to man in general, but to man in particular, as he appears in the light of fact and observation.

That such professional power is an element of success in one's calling is obvious. Nor is it less obvious, that it can be attained only by real labor. Such power comes not from chance, nor from a happy stroke of fortune. It is not the offspring of circumstances; nor can it be produced by musical qualities of voice or natural grace of elocution. It refuses to be thus bought. Splendid abilities alone can-

not purchase it. Vast learning alone is too small a price for it. Popularity cannot buy it. The greatest address in moulding the opinions of others cannot alone procure it. It cannot be brought from far. Nothing can buy it but hard, persevering, professional labor. At this price it can be had, not only by great, but also by moderate intellects; not only by those who are vastly learned, but also by those, who, though far from being erudite, are yet disciplined to patient effort, and are willing to submit to steady toil.

The truth which has now been contemplated suggests several inferences and observations, a due notice of which will occupy the residue of our pages.

Among the inferences, the following seem to us to claim special notice.

1. We see one reason why the sacred profession fails to have that hold of the community which it is designed to have. Understand us not as saying that it has entirely lost that hold. God forbid. What we have intimated and mean to aver is, that its influence is weaker than it once was, and is rather on the decline than increase. We do not think that the members of the profession win as much respect and veneration, as is necessary for their highest usefulness; nor as much as one would suppose their office, from its very nature, must inspire. We do not think that they have that strong grasp of the public mind, which "overseers" of souls might justly be expected to have. At the same time, we are not ignorant that a portion of this evil is to be laid at the door of those itinerant abusers of the profession, who have spoken upon this subject "great swelling words of vanity, and thus allured, through the lusts of the flesh, through much wantonness, those who were clean escaped from them that live in error." Such men are pests to society, their miserable business being that of drawing out the pins of the social fabric and hastening its demolition. In spite of all their pretensions, their true character has been sketched by the divine pencil. "They are men who walk after the flesh, and despise government. Presumptuous are they, self-willed, they are not afraid to speak evil of dignities."

At the door of such men, we repeat, a share of the evil deplored ought to be laid. It would, however, be wrong to lay it *all* there. We hold that no one can in this way

essentially and fatally injure another, till a man begins to injure himself. Equally true is this maxim with regard to a profession. There are numerous ways in which it may be temporarily harmed; and among them may be reckoned that method of annoying it and doing it mischief, which has been mentioned. But no real and permanent detriment can be suffered by it, unless it turns its own enemy and hurts itself. The most deadly stabs it receives are such as are given by its own members. It can sustain every other injury and live it down; but these self-inflicted blows it cannot endure.

It is on this ground, we say, that the absence of professional labor will do more real harm to the sacred profession than all it can suffer from those who bring against it a "railing accusation." In our apprehension, nothing else can so effectually counteract that influence which is absolutely necessary in order to accomplish the great object of the salvation of men. But here we are solicitous to be understood. We therefore observe, that the labor to which we refer does not consist in a man's taking a deep interest in every thing, busying himself with every new scheme of a social or religious character, and attending to all sorts of things except the concerns of his own flock. We submit, whether this course is not sure to make a man professionally despised? The labor we mean, is professional, consisting of steady, patient toil, directed mainly to the spiritual interests of one's own parish,—persevering effort in feeding one's own people with knowledge and understanding, and thus preparing them for heaven; unremitted exertion to improve the religious condition of one's flock, and watching for them with the assiduity of one who must give account. Humbly and patiently laboring in this way, nothing can permanently harm us. We may defy gainsayers. The thunder of every itinerant declaimer against priests and priestcraft will break harmless at our feet. They can do nothing to withstand the influence of days' works in one's profession.

2. We see one cause of the frequent removal of ministers. There are other causes, arising from the conflicting tastes and passions of men, together with that strong effervescence of human opinions, which is now so rife. Still the one, which has been mentioned, has a powerful

influence. Too many, it is to be feared, imagine that they can get along without labor. But it is a false notion. As God has made work necessary to success in any calling, so the sacred profession is not exempt from this law. In that, no less than in all other employments, "He that gathereth by labor shall increase." Hence, it is believed, that patiently working in one's profession would do more towards giving stability to the relation between pastor and people, than all the artificial means which are employed for this purpose put together. The connection would be thus cemented too strongly, to suffer it to be sundered by the fluctuations of popular sentiment, or the revolutionary movements of a few restless spirits with which every congregation is liable to be cursed.

3. We see why it is that so many attain their utmost professional growth in a few years. That growth continues so long as labor continues, and ceases when labor ceases. No man can long thrive in character and influence, without working. Laziness rusts all the powers, and spreads languor through the whole mind. Constant exercise of one's faculties is necessary in order to keep them bright and sharp. Indolence blunts the understanding, impoverishes the invention, and dulls the edge of inquiry. It stamps upon all a man's productions a tame and tiresome monotony. Under its influence his mind refuses to stretch itself to exertion, till at last he becomes content with desultory efforts, and is too apt to cherish the feeling, that it is time for him to enjoy repose from labor. While such a feeling is entertained, all professional growth is at a stand. He gains neither moral nor mental strength. He has reached his goal. And thus his views are as large, his conceptions as vivid, his grasp of the truth as strong, his power over the understanding and conscience as great, in two or three years as in twenty. And thus, we see too frequently a ten or twenty-year-old professional infant.

4. We see one cause of that feeling of discouragement which is apt to seize upon ministers. There is no better cure for this moral disease than patient labor, which enlivens and strengthens the powers, and gives that robustness to the mind which is necessary, under the divine blessing, to "endure hardness as a good soldier of Jesus Christ." When we are at work, we have no time for

those gloomy views which produce a nervous depression of the spirits,—the parent of despondency and discouragement. It is well known, that if we cradle our bodies in the lap of sloth, they are sure to be weak, incapable of effort, and unable to bear the slightest exertion without sinking. Even a grasshopper is a burden. So it is with regard to our minds. Labor is their true catholicon. They are made for work, and in its absence are constantly liable to those moral and intellectual maladies which produce an unconquerable feeling of discouragement. The effect of indolence, of having nothing particular to do, having no object at which we are resolutely aiming, is utterly disheartening. How well is the operation of this principle described in *Rasselas*? The British moralist, in that incomparable tale, represents his hero as utterly miserable and dejected, his life a burden, till he found some object for whose accomplishment he might labor. This restored him to himself, and scattered his complaints to the winds.

Let us now proceed to notice some of the observations naturally suggested by the truth, to whose support this article has been devoted.

1. This subject places in its true light the course pursued by those who resort to various kinds of factitious means for building up their reputation, to the neglect of professional labor. One aims at great popularity, and, as the nearest road to this object is that of adulation, he will studiously flatter people, till they lift him upon their shoulders, and bear him aloft, the observed of all observers. Another would gain notoriety, by joining in some popular excitement, which he does, and rides into public favor on the voices of the crowd. Another tries to acquire celebrity on the rostrum of a lyceum, the price of which is two or three months of neglect of his own calling; and thus uses this dearly bought *éclat* as a sort of professional capital. It must, however, be evident, that such a pursuit must, in the nature of the case, be fruitless. Efforts of this kind may indeed be followed by a temporary success, but can furnish no permanent basis for professional character. This can be had in no other way, than by labor devoted to one's calling. God has established this law, and we cannot alter it. Hence in nothing, can a man more

egregiously err, than in fancying that reputation can be acquired by a few happy hits, or by some one or two fortunate efforts, or by a felicitous combination of circumstances, so long as labor is wanting. It cannot be. It is against the settled constitution of things on which is written a law of universal application, "The soul of the sluggard desireth and hath nothing; but the soul of the diligent shall be made fat."

2. This subject sets in its true light a disposition, too frequently seen in churches, to expect success all at once. They do not reflect, that in the moral world seed does not grow as rapidly as in the natural. Nor do they remember that moral and religious results, besides being less quickly produced than others, are also less apparent to the eye, and are often steadily going on, while to a careless observer, nothing seems to be accomplished. Hence they are apt to pass a very superficial judgment upon the state of things; and, too hastily deciding that nothing is done, begin to deal out, most unceremoniously, their complaints, much to the annoyance of their minister. Now the folly of all this appears, it seems to us, very evident. And we humbly propose to such people a more excellent way. If they see that a man is idle, then is there abundant ground for fear. But if they see that a man labors diligently in his calling, let them dismiss their alarm. They have no reason to be afraid. Steady work in one's profession may with certainty be relied on, or nothing can. The effects of this will assuredly be seen. "In due time we shall reap if we faint not." These effects cannot, however, be produced all at once, nor is such a thing to be expected. They require time. Great moral results are never brought about suddenly, but are accomplished by hard and continued labor. If, then, a minister is known to be devoting himself to his appropriate work, people should be ashamed of growing restless and uneasy, and worrying him with their senseless complaints.

Before dismissing this branch of the subject, we feel compelled to notice a mistake, made by too many, as to what professional labor is. Some suppose that it consists of one incessant round of visiting; and, what is rather a sober difficulty in the case, each one fancies that calls upon *him* should be peculiarly frequent. Others identify professional

labor with a minister's gossiping for hours together, as if such a frittering away of time were the proper business of the ambassador of God. They call it paying them attention, and are good enough to wish, and unreasonable enough to expect, that these attentions should be a minister's chief employment. This is all exceedingly kind, but we are constrained to ask, is this professional labor? We are sincere friends to pastoral visiting, which, when rightly conducted, is second to no other instrumentality for doing good. But we ask, does professional labor consist in a man's employing nearly all his time in going round to pay his respects to people, so that they may say, our pastor has called upon us so many times? We are convinced that this is not the sort of work which promotes the solid interests of a church. It is not the kind of toil which is necessary to feed a people with knowledge. It is not that species of professional labor, at least, which has been maintained in this article, as indispensable to professional success.

Though our remarks have already been extended so far as to prove we fear, a tax upon the patience of our readers, yet, as practical good should be the end of all discussion, we cannot lay down our pen, without offering a few persuasives to professional labor.

We have seen that God has made it necessary to success. To every minister of Christ, he says, "Thou must *first* labor, and afterwards partake of the fruits of thy toil." We see, then, the price at which the Supreme Lord of the harvest will give us his blessing. We see the condition on which he will bestow the reward. Hence, we must pay the price, and comply with the condition, or be destined to meet with professional failures. Would we acquire professional enthusiasm, would we gain professional influence, would we wield professional power, there is but one method, under the divine blessing, and that is diligent labor in our own calling.

Nor is this all. The common sense of the community has stamped labor with dignity. We live among a people by whom it is esteemed honorable to work, and dishonorable to have time upon one's hands to idle away. And hence, nothing so surely undermines a man's character, as to have people wonder what he finds to do, and inquire

whether he have any business. This never fails to make a man cheap; than which nothing is more destructive to influence and usefulness.

And further. The constitution of our nature has made labor essential to our happiness. No enjoyment is so exquisite as that derived from this source. Exertion of mind, especially when directed to the attainment of the high and noble aims of religion, is a spring of pure joy. A man who is diligent in business, provided he join to it uprightness of heart, cannot be miserable if he tries. He will have cares, and troubles, and anxieties, indeed, because these are the lot of humanity. But labor will prevent his spirit from being preyed upon by these causes. It will enable him to resist their depressing influence, by the healthy action which it gives to his moral and intellectual powers. A man of decided work in his profession, is a man of calm, peaceful and sober enjoyment, of which he can neither be robbed by enemies, nor stripped by misfortune.

ARTICLE VII.

HISTORICAL OUTLINES OF GERMAN RATIONALISM.

Historical Sketch of the Revolution in Theology which commenced in 1750 in Germany. From the German of Dr. A. THOLUCK. Translated by the Editor.*

WE design, in this essay, to give a sketch of a revolution in religion, which is without example in the history of the world. There was a time, indeed, when the religion of Greece and Rome had lost its authority over the public mind, at least in the higher classes of society; but the

* This production of Tholuck's appeared, in its original form, many years since. The substance of that first draught may be found in some of the early numbers of the Princeton Biblical Repertory. In 1835, the author, in revising it and preparing it for publication in Hengstenberg's Church Gazette, found it necessary, not only to make great alterations, but to write the whole anew. In 1839 it made its third public appearance in an improved form, in Tholuck's Miscellaneous Writings. As it is impracticable, on account of its length, to present it here entire, we have omitted, in the translation, such parts as would be least interesting to American readers.—ED.

priests still continued to be the guardians of the sanctuary. France, also, as well as Protestant England, has seen infidelity spread and prevail in the higher walks of life; but the *clergy*, whatever were their motives or their skill, undertook the defence of the truth. In Germany, on the contrary, a disbelief of the fundamental truths of Christianity sprung up about the middle of the last century chiefly among the *theologians*. And, while most were aiming only at reform, many had sagacity enough to perceive that the course which was pursued threatened the overthrow of the church. Among the causes of this remarkable change in the spirit of theology, may be mentioned the speculative taste and love of theory which distinguish the Germans; with whom it is a greater evil not to carry out a system to its last results, than it is to demolish the most important and the most sacred religious institutions. The governing principle of this revolution in theology will be differently explained by different individuals, according to their own views of its character and utility. Some will see, in this remoulding of theological science and religious belief, nothing but the advancement of truth; others will go to the opposite extreme, and see nothing but the legitimate fruits of an open abandonment of God. There are those who would even carry us back to the old forms of theology, as they were in the seventeenth century. But the far greater portion of those whose simple object is to support the pure doctrines of the Bible, attribute these changes partly to the impiety of the age, and partly to the absolute necessity of having a theology more conformed to the true nature of Christianity. To this latter class we profess to belong. We have not, therefore, entitled this essay a history of Rationalism, as if to brand every change that had been made as the vagary of error; but preferred to use the term, "revolution in theology," leaving out of view, for the present, the inquiry, how far any of these modifications may be for the better, or for the worse. That question must be settled in the treatment of the particular points involved, as they come up in the various branches of theological science. It is our present business to show, in what way, under what influences, and by what process, these modern views of theology have been formed.

The state of theology at the commencement of the second half of the eighteenth century.

The theologians of the Evangelical [*i. e.* Lutheran] church were, in a great degree, at peace among themselves. The learned Löscher, the last powerful champion of the Lutherans, who contended against the Reformed [*i. e.* Calvinistic] church and against the Pietists, died in 1749. About the same time, his bold coadjutors, J. Deutschmann, of Wittenberg, E. Neumeister, of Sorau and Hamburg, S. Schelwig, of Dantzic, J. F. Mayer, of Greifswald, and others, disappeared from the stage of action. The theologians of Wittenberg, as K. G. Hoffmann, C. F. Bauer, and G. W. Kirchmeier, were, in 1750, moderate and gentle opposers of Pietism; but they were not men of great renown. In Halle, Pietism had lost its bold and vigorous character, and stood cautiously on the defensive. S. J. Baumgarten, member of the theological faculty from the year 1734, was the only star that shone here with lustre; the other professors of theology, the younger Francke, Clauswitz, C. B. Michaelis, Callenberg, J. G. Knapp, in connection with Von Bogatzky, who took up his residence in Halle in 1746, acted a timid part, faintly warning against Baumgarten, rather than boldly meeting him in the confidence of faith and with the weapons of science. In Leipsic, Ernesti was just beginning to rise; Clausing, Hebenstreit, Bahrdt (father of the unprincipled theologian), were little known; the learned Deyling was near his end; only C. A. Crusius, Bengel's pious disciple, professor of theology here in 1750, shone with the splendor of superior talent. Even he found but few followers, but those few were of a very decided character. Göttingen was continually rising by the untiring efforts of Münchhausen, and had men of great celebrity in theology. And yet the immediate influence of these men was not very deeply felt. Here chancellor Mosheim was still living, enjoying the reputation of being second to no theologian in Germany, except Baumgarten. Still he exerted but little influence as a university teacher. Here also was the active and pious Heumann. Ribov and F. Walch made no great impression. J. D. Michaelis was now rising in fame as professor of theology and of oriental literature. In Frankfort on the Oder, P. E. Jablonsky was

distinguished by rare and various learning; but his colleagues, Claessen, Grillo and others, barely attained to mediocrity. In Tübingen were the learned and excellent chancellor, C. M. Pfaff (afterwards chancellor in Giessen), C. E. Weissmann, the pious church historian, and J. F. Cotta, the learned editor of Gerhard's *Loci*. In Königsberg was Lilienthal, the erudite apologetical writer. In Giessen, J. J. Rambach was laboring in the spirit of Francke, and with great activity.

None of these theologians were zealous partisans after the manner of Calov or Löscher. The spirit of theology was now peaceful and tolerant, as it had been half a century before; especially was it so towards the Reformed church. Those who had the universities in charge, as the ministry of the Prussian government, Münchhausen in Hanover, and the Wirtemberg authorities, in appointing professors, required them to be tolerant towards others of a different faith. There was an attempt made in Prussia as early as the reign of Frederick William I [1713-1740], to unite the Lutheran and the Reformed churches. There was but one controversy now agitating the public mind, that against the Herrnhuters [*i. e.* the United Brethren]; and this was conducted in a milder spirit than formerly. It was exactly in 1750 that A. Volck issued his malignant work, the "Mystery of the Iniquity of the Herrnhuters Revealed." In 1746, Fresenius, of Frankfort, a more honorable opponent, had published his "Account of the Herrnhuters." Instead of the Pietistic controversy, this now filled the public religious journals of the times.

The practical piety of the age may be said to have presented a better aspect than it had done at any other time since the period of the Reformation. The religious influence which went out from Halle, had operated like leaven upon all Germany. In 1751, the number of students at Francke's Orphan House School had risen to two thousand, and the number of orphans regularly supported from the charity funds, from the year 1743, were two hundred. The University of Halle, during the first twenty-nine years of its existence, when but one spirit, that of gaining souls for Christ, pervaded all the professors of theology, had six thousand and thirty-two students in theology educated within its pale. No wonder that the

seed so plentifully sown, should, in the next generation, spring up and produce a rich harvest in all Germany. But Halle was not the only point from which such a religious influence went forth. Spener's pious efforts, direct and indirect, had awakened a deep religious feeling in many other places. Germany had never since the Reformation seen so great a number of truly pious men, both in the ministry and in the church at large, as towards the end of the first half of the eighteenth century. The piety of this age was even purged of many of the errors which still adhered to the church at the time of the Reformation. In Wirtemberg, we may mention as *instar omnium*, J. A. Bengel (ob. 1752), and his friend, F. C. Oettinger, to whom we might add the names of the Court Preacher Oechslin (ob. 1738), Pastor Seeger (ob. 1743), Superintendent* Rieger (ob. 1743), and many other worthy Wirtemberg preachers. In Bavaria we will name only the excellent Rehberger, of Nuremberg (ob. 1769), whose character Schubert has so beautifully portrayed in his life of Kiesling. In Prussia there were Steinmetz, of Klosterbergen, an humble and decided Christian hero (ob. 1762), E. G. Woltersdorf in Bunzlau (ob. 1761), J. F. Burg, First Pastor in Breslau (ob. 1766), and J. C. Steinbart, director of the orphan house in Züllichau. In Hesse was J. J. Rambach (ob. 1735); in Cöthen, J. A. Manitius (ob. 1758); in Denmark, J. G. Reichenbach, Pastor Primarius in Altona (ob. 1767), the excellent A. Struensee, formerly preacher, and for a short time professor in Halle, at last General Superintendent in Holstein (ob. 1791), and the pious Dr. Hauber, Court Preacher in Copenhagen; in Mecklenberg, Ehrenpfort and Hüvet; and in Hanover, J. F. Jacobi, General Superintendent in Celle (ob. 1791). Many other pious men of the highest distinction in the church, as well as pious statesmen and their wives, might be mentioned, upon whose character the school of Spener and Francke at the beginning of the century, and the United Brethren afterwards exerted the happiest influence.

In perusing the journals of the missionaries of the Callenberg [Halle] Institute, those of Manitius, Schulz, Woltersdorf, Tychsen and Hansen, for example, or the

* A superintendent is a kind of bishop, having the supervision of the churches within a certain district.—ED.

biographies of Büsching, the reader frequently meets with the names of noble and princely families in all parts of Germany, in which domestic worship was never neglected. We learn, also, from those journals, that conventicles, or social religious meetings were held throughout all Germany, without any tendency to separatism, and generally in connection with the clergy. Beside these retired and sometimes cold and formal meetings, those of the United Brethren sprung into fresh vigor in 1730. What little piety there was at the beginning of the second half of the eighteenth century, was owing, in a great measure, to the pious zeal of these Moravians. After the year 1730, the Pietism of Halle ceased to bear much fruit. Such men as Breithaupt, A. H. Francke and Porst were no longer trained there. From this time to 1760, the Pietism of Halle had barely enough energy to sustain, not enough to propagate itself. The piety of the United Brethren, on the contrary, was working itself clear and rapidly gaining influence.

Such was the religious state of the Evangelical [*i. e.* Lutheran] church, when infidelity began to enter its sacred enclosures. There were circumstances which prepared the way for its introduction. We have exhibited the religious state of Germany in its brighter aspect; it has, also, its darker side. Neither in the time of the Calovs, the Carpzovs and the Schelwigs, nor in that of Spener, Francke and Breithaupt, would it have been possible for infidelity to have such a triumph. The former would have driven it into a corner with the sword of the flesh; the latter would have subdued it with the sword of the spirit and of love. But in the period of 1750, the church had neither the power and authority which even a cold orthodoxy has sometimes wielded, nor the ardent love of the Pietists. The Zion of orthodoxy had, indeed, its watchmen; in the Hanoverian Consistory, it had Götten; in Dresden, Dr. Löscher; in Hamburg, M. Götze; in Weimar, the pious Schneider; in Frankfort on the Mayn, it had Plitt. But instead of withering anathemas, there were now nothing but timid manœuvres and intrigues, with which the rising spirit of opposition was well able to compete. Pietism had already lost its power. The well-meaning, and in many respects, venerable men, belonging to the second generation of the Halle school of theology, were

of a timid and submissive character. This is abundantly evident from the biographies of G. Francke, G. Knapp, Von Bogatzky and Hähn of Klosterbergen. They had the respect of few of the new school of theology, and were able to awe none into submission.

There was still another cause of this revolution in theology. The polemic theologians of the seventeenth century were deeply versed in their science. Flacius, Calov and Quenstädt still deserve to be respected for their great learning. After the rise of Spener's school, things were changed. When it was no longer the object of learning to gain academical honors, and to lecture against Papists, Socinians, Calvinists and Pietists, men seemed not to know of what possible use learning could be. The Pietists attached most importance to a knowledge of Hebrew and Greek, because such knowledge furnished the means of a skilful and profitable exposition of the Scriptures. The preachers trained at Halle, were generally good Hebraists. They had an able and zealous teacher in J. H. Michaelis, and afterwards in his nephew, C. B. Michaelis, who had a principal hand in the *Biblia Hebraica* and in the comparison of the Erfurt manuscripts. We have already shown how few celebrated scholars there were in the universities of Leipsic, Wittenberg, Halle, Königsberg and Frankfort about the year 1750. How little did the Halle professors, Clauswitz, Callenberg, Hernschmidt, J. G. Knapp, J. L. Schulze, and G. A. Freylinghausen accomplish in theological literature! The United Brethren did not trouble themselves at all with learning. And yet infidelity did not make its appearance in Germany, as it had done in France, with the weapons of wit and ridicule, but it was strongly fortified with solid learning. In such a state of things, it is not strange that those, whose office it was to defend the church, were easily vanquished.

There are four external causes to be considered here, which operated in producing this revolution in theology, viz., the influence of the Wolfian philosophy, the influence of the English Deists, that of France and that of the reign of Frederic the Great.

1. The Influence of the Wolfian Philosophy.

Wolf was made professor of mathematics in Halle in the year 1706. Before he was known to the public, except by a single work on practical philosophy, he had,—notwithstanding the whole theological faculty, and Thomasius, the celebrated jurist, spoke disparagingly of him,—gained by means of his lectures many adherents among the students, and even among the theologians. During his first residence in Halle he published little else but mathematical works. It was his expulsion from Halle, that directed the public attention to him. From that time, he uttered his sentiments more freely than he had done while in Halle. His influence abroad became so great, that, by the time of his recall in 1740, professors of theology (as Canz, Rensch and Reinbeck), of law, of medicine and of belles-lettres, adopted, in their instructions, the arrangement and method suggested by his philosophy. But, owing partly to the fact that his colleagues in theology and law were still opposed to him, his reputation, on his return to Halle, was not so great as might have been expected. In the mean time, young men who had adopted his system of philosophy, came to occupy the chairs of philosophy and theology. We may mention Ludovici in Leipsic, A. Baumgarten and Daries in Frankfort, Canz and Bülfinger in Tübingen, and S. J. Baumgarten in Halle. The provost Reinbeck in Berlin also decided in his favor, and even a Wolfian philosophical society was formed in Weissenfels. In short, the fame of Wolf was continually rising. Upon theology he exerted his influence chiefly through his celebrated disciple, S. J. Baumgarten, who became professor of theology in 1734. The enthusiasm with which men then listened to this professor of theology is almost incredible. About four hundred theological students,* and even some who were pursuing legal and medical studies, sat at his feet, and wrote down every syllable that passed his lips. Scarcely could any other academical exercise be sustained when Baumgarten lectured. And yet, in his printed lectures, what lifeless

* He must have had nearly all the theological students [always predominant in this university], for from 1760 to 1770 the whole number of students averaged but about six hundred and eighty. From 1777 to 1783 the number rose to one thousand,—afterwards to fifteen hundred [but it is now reduced to 625].

skeletons and dry tabular views do we meet with ! All this, too, was formally dictated to the students in the most tedious manner.

But prejudice governs the world. So great was this man's reputation, that Münchhausen, on the death of Mosheim, chancellor of the Göttingen university, though not ignorant of Baumgarten's tedious manner, could find no other person who could so well fill the vacancy. Nothing but his advanced age, or the conviction that he would decline the proposal, hindered his appointment.

Although the theologians of that age warned the public against Wolf, there was nothing positively dangerous in his doctrines. His principles were essentially those of Leibnitz, whose philosophy could be dangerous only to those who should trace it back to that of Spinoza and Bayle. Wolf's philosophy, though it came forth in opposition to the systems of Spinoza and Bayle, was still of a congenial spirit with these. But if the system of Leibnitz be really an advance upon them, the retrograde movement from Wolf back to them is, to say the least, unnatural. The only direct charge brought by the polemic divines against Wolf's philosophy, was that of fatalism. This was done by Buddens and Lange ; the latter proceeded a step further, and by *inference* made out the charge of atheism. The evil of Wolf's system lay, not in its positive doctrines, but in its spirit, or rather its want of spirit, which was manifested also in its method. His system was syllogistic both in substance and form. By laboring to make every thing plain by a uniform mode of reasoning from the two logical principles of a *ratio sufficiens* [sufficient ground, or adequate reason] and the *principium contradictionis* [contradictory propositions] and rearing geometrically the superstructure of all the sciences, he became tedious and dull. He commenced with definitions, but did not thereby disclose the nature of the facts observed ; he merely substituted for them logical forms of thought. Thus by reasoning from definitions, and drawing out a series of inferences, he went on to establish the truth of propositions, without inquiring into their real nature and essence. The mind that was hungering after truth, had indeed viands spread before it, and partook of the repast ; but it was feasting in a dream,—there was no nourishment in it.

Wolf undertook to construct, strictly on these principles, a system of Ethical Theology. The mysteries of faith he neither attempted to demonstrate, nor to deny. In regard to this point, he took the ground maintained by Leibnitz in his treatise "On the Agreement of Faith with Reason." That great philosopher made a distinction between *logical* necessity, and *physical* necessity. Logical necessity, according to him, cannot be altered by God himself; and therefore it cannot *contradict* reason. Physical necessity may be altered by God; and therefore there may be mysteries *above* reason. In other words, revelation must agree with *immutable truth*, but not necessarily with *contingent* or *variable truth*. The ubiquity of Christ's body was admitted, on the ground that it might be a contingent or physical, though not necessary truth; and so the doctrine of the trinity was defended, on the ground that trinity and unity were affirmed of God in different senses. This method, which seemed to make philosophy subordinate to theology, and, consequently, to favor revelation, was equally favorable to the Catholic doctrines, and was unhesitatingly adopted by the Roman church. Such a result was perfectly natural, for Wolf's system of formalism contemplated things only externally, and might easily be employed in defence of the Catholic faith. The danger of this method was, that it tended to a mechanical way of treating Christian doctrines. It could never penetrate the *spirit* of religious truths, but was insusceptible of impression, and employed itself with definitions and syllogisms till the heart became cold. Thus the Wolfian philosophy contributed to that cold and lifeless mode of preaching which characterized the pulpit near the close of the last century. The rigid Wolfians went even so far as to introduce the technical terms of their philosophy into the pulpit. An absurd attempt was made to give philosophical definitions for every thing. For example, on the passage, "Jesus went up into a mountain," the preacher said, "a mountain is an elevated place which, &c." Again, "Jesus put forth his hand and touched him,"—"a hand is a member of the body which, &c." In the Wertheim Bible, a mother is defined to be "a woman who, &c." Such preaching was styled philosophical! But it was a philosophy which inflated its adherents, and undervalued the Scriptures.

Still more deleterious was the distinction which Wolf introduced between *natural* religion and *revealed* religion, the former to be established by demonstration, the latter to be received by faith. What was more natural than that men should content themselves with what could be demonstrated, especially when the English Deists were maintaining, that those things which were received by faith, were for the most part *incredible*.

The indirect influence of Wolf's philosophy in creating doubts as to the truth of the orthodox theology, was particularly manifest in his distinguished disciple, Baumgarten. Too timid to venture any innovations himself, he still cherished doubts in regard to many sentiments entertained by the Evangelical church. Semler, in his biography, mentions a remarkable fact in regard to him. He had remarked to Baumgarten that the common theological arguments were not valid; and the latter "replied to me," says Semler, "that I might, upon my own hazard, venture to give public sentiment a new direction; he was sure that I feared God, and would do nothing from levity, or without good reasons."

But the most direct influence of the new philosophy was seen in the case of the translator of the Wertheim version of the Bible. A version under this name was commenced in Wertheim in 1735, with the full title: "The Divine Writings before the Time of Jesus the Messia. Part First, containing the Law of the Jisreels." From this singular conformity to the Hebrew orthography (he wrote Mosheh for Moses, and Moabs for Moabites), one would expect a faithful adherence to the Hebrew idiom. But instead of that, biblical expressions were modernized, and the *sense* of these ancient records was given in the style of the eighteenth century. There was no want of acuteness and philological learning; and had the work appeared in 1785 instead of 1735, the translator would have been received with applause in all the critical journals, instead of being disgraced and imprisoned. We will give a few specimens of his manner of translating. The beginning of the Bible is given thus: "1. All the heavenly bodies and the earth itself were in the beginning created by God. 2. In regard to the earth, in particular, it was originally entirely desolate. It was enveloped in a dark mist, and the waters

flowed all around it, but high winds began to blow over them. 3. Soon, however, light began to appear, *as the divine purpose required.*" We here see that the translator had anticipated the light of the nineteenth century, and deserves to be ranked with Dinter in the history of Bible translations! To the modernized version were appended notes in the newest style of philosophy. The notes, and the translation, and the whole spirit of the author are the fruit of the Wolfian philosophy. The author himself, Lorenzo Schmid, said that Wolf kindled in his mind a desire for the work by remarking that it was in vain to think of defending the Bible, until there should be an intelligible and perspicuous version. Wolf was pleased with the undertaking, although he thought it presumptuous to explain away the idea of a Messiah in the Pentateuch. The great Mosheim was not displeased with it, and when he afterwards opposed it, he yielded to motives of prudence rather than to his own convictions. All the Wolfians, both the philosophers and the theologians, were in favor of the attempt, and had it not been for the arguments of the magistrates, it would have succeeded. But the author was in 1737 arrested, according to a decision of the *diet*, and now all Germany, every body that could hold a pen, theologians, lawyers, professors, Catholics, Protestants, clergymen and laymen, wrote against him. The book was prohibited under severe penalties! So great is the difference between 1737 and 1837!

Other similar effects of the Wolfian philosophy would undoubtedly have been witnessed, had not the fate of Schmid filled the theologians and philosophers with terror. But, as it is, we see only the better fruits of this new philosophical direction of the public mind, to which Reinbeck's Contemplations on the Augsburg Confession preëminently belong.

We must not fail to notice the influence of the Wolfian philosophy upon the popular philosophy, which stripped off the forms of the schools, and left only a "sound understanding," or the Wolfian philosophy diluted. Here Christian theology found no place, and even natural theology faltered; for the rigid geometrical demonstrations with which Wolf attempted to establish natural religion gave way to hypothetical reasonings. Thus

Garre represented *theism* [the Christian view of the Deity] as the best *hypothesis* respecting God, that had yet been presented. Some of the governments of Germany opposed, others favored the philosophy of Wolf. In Prussia, the works of C. A. Crusius, the ablest opponent of Wolf, were prohibited.

2. *The Influence of the English Deists.*

The influence, direct and indirect, of English deism upon Germany was much greater than would at first be supposed, or than has generally been believed. In England we find what existed neither in France nor in Holland and Italy. It possessed, as early as the first half of the eighteenth century, a tolerably complete system of Rationalism. A full view of what the English deists effected in the departments of criticism, interpretation, theology, ethics and church history, would show how little of the doctrines of the Rationalists belongs exclusively to recent times, and how unfounded is the assertion of Bretschneider, that Rationalism is the fruit of the unexampled progress of science in the nineteenth century. While French deism, with the single exception of Bayle, employed wit and ridicule, the English deists resorted to learned investigations, and this is the reason that the latter made a deeper impression than the former upon the thorough-going Germans. As early as the beginning of the eighteenth century the English deistical writings were extensively known in Germany. How widely they were circulated in England, France, and Germany, may be learned from the numerous notices and extracts in the periodicals of the day, and no less from the multitude of answers which they called forth. Against Toland's small but not unimportant treatise, "Christianity not Mysterious," no less than *fifty-four* opponents seized the pen in those three countries before the year 1760. Among these, Leibnitz was the most formidable, and next in importance followed Lilienthal, F. G. Rambach, J. G. Walch and others. Against Toland's "Amyntor," in which he attacked the canon of the Scriptures, *twenty-nine* works appeared. The "Deistical Bible," as it is called, "Tyndal's Christianity as old as the World," was attacked in those three countries by *one hundred and six*

opponents before the year 1760. The ablest and most learned of all the opposers of English deism was Lilienthal, in his "Good Cause of Revelation." The university professors, especially Pfaff and Mosheim combated, in their lectures, the deistical doctrines. By Suero, in a little work published in 1708, the deists are called *Rationalists*, and the world is said to be full of them.

The attention of the German theologians was directed to England more especially by Baumgarten. They were indebted to him for much of their knowledge of English literature, and for many translations into German. Semler and J. D. Michaelis followed his example; and these were followed by Nösselt, Rambach, Zollikofer, Spalding, Sack, and even Schleiermacher. Many excellent works were thus brought before the Germans, such Lardner's Credibility of the Gospel History, Doddridge's Paraphrase, Leland's Deistical Writings, Nelson's Anti-deistical Bible, and many others. It is remarkable that these translations, including even the defences of Christianity, as Ernesti well remarked, diluted the German theology. Christianity was defended on deistical principles. Those Germans who were most conversant with English theology, as Zollikofer, Nösselt, Spalding and Jerusalem, fell in with this yielding temper of the English Christian apologists. Even the Boylean Lectures, established for the very purpose of defending Revelation against deism, were often written in such a tone that men like Zollikofer and Bretschneider could easily adopt them.

English theology has sustained irreparable injury from the writings of Locke, so highly lauded by the Episcopal theologians. We have elsewhere shown his defective views of Christianity.* Still, not only in England, but for a long time in Germany, he was regarded as a sound interpreter and an able apologist of Christianity. His Paraphrases of the Epistles of Paul, translated by J. D. Michaelis, are not only deficient, as Ernesti has shown, in philology, but they most miserably dilute and weaken the doctrines of the Apostle. The chief fault of this

* Evidences of Christianity, and Apologetical Literature, Miscellaneous Writings, Vol. I, p. 163.—Ed.

reputed orthodox divine is the oversight of the doctrine of human depravity,—the Pelagian error. From this source spring all his other errors. According to him, every man's reason, without previous regeneration (which is not included in his system), must recognize Christian truth; then this Christian truth is diluted and brought down to the standard of unregenerated men. The chief evidence of the truth of Christianity is found in miracles, or in the beautiful moral precepts of the Bible. The doctrine of atonement has as little place in his system as that of original sin.

We mention one more author, the Presbyterian, John Taylor, an opponent of the deists. "The deists mistake their own interests," says Ernesti, when speaking of Taylor, "if they contend with such writers; for they are both substantially on the same foundation." Here we see our own rational supernaturalism, which believes, indeed, in a divine revelation, but when you inquire for the matter of that revelation, you find nothing but natural religion. The effect of the English literature upon the German theologians might easily be shown from the biographies of the latter, of which a clear example is given in the case of Laukhard.

3. *The Influence of France.*

It has become a custom to ascribe to the frivolous French writers great influence in spreading infidelity in Germany. But French infidelity by no means originated in the period of Voltaire and Rousseau; it had a much earlier origin,—in the age of Louis XIV. The immorality and hypocrisy of this court could not fail to have a most deleterious effect upon the interests of true religion. The *mémoires* of this period give us an insight into the lives of the great, which fill us with horror. Then came the *beaux esprits*, who made it their business to ridicule not only hypocrisy but true religion. Vassor, in the year 1688 said, in language that would seem to belong to the year 1780: "We hear only of *reason*, of *taste*, of *force of intellect*, and of the superiority of those who can rise above the *prejudices of education*. Pyrrhonism is the order of the day. Incredulity and skepticism are the surest proof of a great mind."

It is a relieving consideration, that in the mental as well as physical world, life often grows out of filth. Even amid the impiety of this age, and among persons of the highest rank, we sometimes meet with pious Jansenists, shining like so many stars in a dark night. It is refreshing to read occasionally in the journals of Zinzendorf and Von Geusau of a pious Jansenist marchioness, duke or priest, who, in the saloons of Paris, with the Pharaohs and Carmagnols, amidst the splendor and confusion of the vain world, speaks freely of eternal and heavenly things. Voltaire and his associates did not create their age, but the age produced them, as its offspring. Except in the case of Bayle, French deism and frivolity were introduced into Germany at a somewhat later period than English deism; and in the field of theology that muddy stream had far less effect. What could a German writer learn of such a theologian as Voltaire, who in the history of Christ, could rely on the fabulous work, *Toldos Jeshu*; and who, in examining the authenticity of the writings of Moses, should speak of "the books of Moses and Joshua and the rest of the *Pentateuch*?" The little that he knew of theological subjects, he learned of the English deists whose acquaintance he had made during his residence in England. D'Argent was the most respectable of these enemies of religion, unless we except Rousseau, who, however, did not belong to that class of trifling jesters. But if the French infidels had little influence on theology, their influence in corrupting the higher classes of society was fearfully great. In the age of Louis XIV, every German prince, every duke and baron, who had the means, felt bound to ruin his purse and his character in Paris, the capitol of the refined world, in order to return to his graceless native land an *homme comme il faut*. How much poison has in this way been imported into Germany since the beginning of the eighteenth century! When the young nobility of Germany were left destitute of the protective influence of religion and exposed to all these temptations, when they found even German courts, above all that of Frederic the Great, where, if possible, was poured out against every thing holy still bitterer scorn than in the French capital; when he was obliged to wade through the most corrupt literature in order to obtain his education, how

could it be otherwise than that the higher ranks of society should be thoroughly poisoned in their moral character?

Occasionally the German theologian may have been corrupted by reading a French author, but rarely did this occur where a corruption of the heart did not precede. What the skeptical Laukhard says of himself in this respect is highly characteristic. "From Voltaire," he observes, "I learned nothing except to ridicule; but Tindal and others enabled me to judge rightly of the doctrines of the church and of religion. I have derived great pleasure from reading that poet, who with his wit and ribaldry has done more, perhaps, to overthrow the priests' religion than all the English and German deists. The English are thorough, and attempt to convince their readers by philosophical arguments; the Germans pursue nearly the same course, but add history to their philosophy, and bring all their learning before their readers. The French deist, on the contrary, throws out, at random, a few superficial reasons, hurries us away from the point of controversy, and then pours out his ridicule as if he had demonstrated all his assertions."

4. *The Influence of the reign of Frederic the Great.*

If one desires to obtain a distinct view of the corrupting character of this monarch's immediate personal influence, he has only to read Büsching's authentic account of the sentiments he entertained and the language he used in regard to religion. It is easy to perceive what must be the personal influence of a monarch who never spoke of the clergy in terms more respectable than those of *monks* and *Shakers*;—whose ordinary reply, when one was recommended to an ecclesiastical office, was, "I know nothing about the Shakers,—if he is shrewd, that is enough;"—who, when the university of Halle requested the removal of theatrical amusements, decided to the contrary, and said to the minister as he hesitated to execute the order, "The comedians are to remain, and the old hypocrite Francke shall, as a punishment, be compelled to attend the theatre;"—who pronounced all positive religion to be mere prejudice, and, in his hours of merriment, delighted in nothing more than in pouring

ridicule upon its public servants. Add to all this the subduing tone and manner, which made his whole court involuntarily acquiesce in all his wishes and emulate each other in tokens of entire submission, and the pernicious influence of his principles, supported by such an example, is made obvious. And farther still, the society and influence of Voltaire, Maupertuis, D'Argens, La Mettrie and the host of frivolous Frenchmen who thronged the Prussian capital, could not fail to deepen the fatal impression. In this manner the sentiments of the irreligious monarch spread through all the departments of government and inundated the whole land. A striking example is furnished in the case of Zedlitz, who was so long minister of instruction and of religion. His predecessor, Münchhausen, after being in office about one year, was removed on an occasion similar to that just mentioned in regard to Francke. According to Büsching's account, the despotic king conceived a particular dislike to the pious Hähn, abbot of Klosterbergen, on account of his scrupulous religious character, and contrary to all advice and to justice, was determined to displace him. He repeatedly inquired whether the hypocrite was yet deposed. The upright minister delayed the matter as long as possible. Finally the angry monarch threatened to disgrace the minister himself, if the "Shaker" was not immediately deposed. Though the minister yielded at last, he was himself soon afterwards transferred to another situation. In 1772, Münchhausen was succeeded by Zedlitz, who was minister during the whole period until 1788, in which infidelity was triumphantly introduced into all the learned as well as the lower schools of Prussia. No one needs to be told what was the character of this protracted ministry, or what was its effect upon public sentiment.

*Semler.**

We shall next attempt to portray the theological influence of a man, who, without being the head of any particular school, had within him the fire which sent out

* On this branch of our author's subject, we have felt obliged to content ourselves with a summary of naked statements, omitting numerous details and nearly all his copious extracts from Semler's writings. In the original, the chapter on Semler occupies 44 pages.—Ed.

sparks in every direction, kindling the combustible materials of the age, and producing a revolutionary excitement which has continued to the present day.

Semler is only to a very limited extent to be regarded as the product of his age. Whatever he was, he was of himself. He was indebted to his age for nothing except for preparing men's minds to receive what he imparted, and for his freedom from restraint. It is true, that he appears to have had unlimited confidence in Baumgarten from the beginning, and to have regarded his productions as the result of the most thorough investigation. He even studied Wolf's philosophy, and his earlier occasional writings bear the marks of Wolf's method and principles. Still that philosophy was never digested and received into his system, but was merely cast around him like a loose robe. A more striking contrast to Baumgarten's logical synopses, and Wolf's compact demonstrations, can hardly be conceived than the perfect chaos which pervades Semler's writings.

Among the various things which then agitated the minds of men, French deism and atheism might seem most likely to affect him. But his religious education, and his disinclination to elegant literature, in which the skepticism of France was clothed, guarded him from such influence. The learned Bayle is the only French free-thinker of whom he makes frequent mention; he recommends the writings of this scholar to students of theology. The English theological literature alone produced much impression upon him.

Still the negative influence of the age upon Semler in preserving him from what he might have been, was great. The religion of the times, such as it was, served to prevent him from carrying out his principles to their legitimate consequences, and led him to occupy a peculiar position, which few could be induced to share with him; and this is the reason why he left behind him no peculiar school of theology.

It is our object here to give a true representation of his peculiarities. In this, our task is the less difficult, since he has recorded them pretty faithfully in his autobiography. In his writings he was not disinclined to allude frequently

to his dear self and in such a way too, as to interweave many circumstances connected with his private life.

"I was altogether of a sanguine temperament," he observes in his memoirs of himself; and in these words he has given us the chief element of his character. Few scholars have studied so much as Semler; but his scholarship bears distinctly the stamp of his sanguine temperament. We find in him nothing of that considerate character, which, in order to clear up the enigmas of the present and the past, of the visible and invisible world, pauses reverently before the untried paths of science, and deliberates seriously which of them will conduct him the most safely to his place of destination, and then follows it with the caution inspired by an honest search after truth, and with the solemn earnestness resulting from the conviction that the most sacred interests of humanity are involved. Semler was a *helluo librorum* [a gormandizer of books] who could say with Logau, "My taste none can measure; I prefer *smelling* to *eating*." Without plan or order, he read promiscuously Selden De Deis Syris, Brentz and Schnepf [Luther's contemporaries], Neander's Cosmographia and Theophrastus (in searching out the history of alchymy), Vossius on the Septuagint and Richard Simon on the Old and New Testaments, the Quodlibetarians and Sententiarians, Weigel's and Gutmann's fanatical writings, and the history of the Havelberg and Lebus ecclesiastical establishments. The more recondite and curious the materials, the prouder was he of his acquisitions. Leibnitz also nourished his mind with knowledge drawn from the most secluded parts of the field of literature, and Haman, to use his own words, stuffed his head in one day with as heterogeneous materials as he did his stomach. But these master spirits classified the most heterogeneous matter, resolved diversity into unity, and sublimated the rudest materials into pure ideas. With Semler you find nothing but interesting and unconnected details. With all his wonderful sagacity on single points, he had a confused head. As is frequently the case with men of sanguine temperament, he abounded in penetrating and keen glances; but single flashes of lightning, however vivid, never constitute the broad light of day. He did not un-

derstand the art of giving a vital union to numerous scattered details. Such was the character of his studies.

The same temperament predisposes one to vanity. Semler was always playing the gallant with the public. With what unwearied pains did he seek the favor of his contemporaries! How sensitively did he feel an unfavorable notice of any of his productions!

He was a man of narrow views. His was a mind with no power of imagination, no depth of feeling, no loftiness of ideas. He dwelt in the lower regions of the world of intellect. Besides, his mind was never expanded by general intercourse with mankind. Except on a few excursions to Leipsic and Berlin, he scarcely ever forsook the university towns of Altdorf and Halle; and even in Halle he was so implicated in little feuds with other professors and in neighborhood broils, that his intercourse there was limited. And yet he was always speaking of "little, Jewish, local ideas!" The narrowness of his scope on theological subjects will appear from what we shall have occasion to say hereafter. His style was as cramped as his intellect. Of the one hundred and seventy-one works, written by this hero of theology, scarcely one, after a period of little more than fifty years, finds any readers. But we must notice how his intellect was affected by his religious feelings. He received his education during the decline of Pietism, when its degeneracy was so apparent at the Court of Coburg-Saalfeld and even at Halle. No where are its characteristics more clearly delineated than in Semler's Biography, although the picture is frequently overdrawn. So much is certain, that religion, as then practised, was grossly mechanical,—that conversions were limited to a particular arbitrary form; that the natural freedom of the mind was checked, and an ascetic tendency cherished; that hypocrisy was not infrequent, and that learning was regarded with jealousy and disapprobation. Semler lived with a student who prayed aloud three hours daily; and he himself was exhorted to lay aside all his studies, on the ground that they prevented his conversion. He complains, in the prefaces of nearly all his early works, that the professors apply all their time and energies to ascetic exercises, and are continually throwing out insinuations against learning, and representing Baumgarten, on account of his zeal

for it, as an apostate. No doubt, such things had an unfavorable influence upon Semler's mind. But it is a mistake to suppose, as some have recently done, that the cause of his imperfect religious views lies wholly here; for both in Saalfeld and Halle, there were men in whose lives Christianity was truly represented. He was of too lively a disposition to find any pleasure in contemplating eternal things; scholarship interested him more than sacred and serious subjects. That he never fathomed the depths of the human heart in its religious state, is obvious from his disgust with Augustine's doctrines of grace, and his admiration of Pelagius. All this goes to prove that the reason of his never having experienced a decided regeneration, must be sought elsewhere than in the degenerate character of the religion in which he was educated. In many respects, his religious character resembled that of J. D. Michaelis, both educated in the Pietistic school of Halle. But Semler was the more open and ingenuous; and he had more reverence for religion than Michaelis. He never disguised his sentiments, but frankly expressed them, whether they were favorable or unfavorable to piety. The passage in his biography where he speaks of the death of one of his daughters, discloses the sincerity of his heart, and his honest feelings on the subject of practical religion. He consoles himself with singing hymns, prays with his wife, and resolves with her to trust in God and keep his commandments. His whole biography, from his own hand, is written in the same strain of candor. In the course of it, he so often speaks of his responsibilities as a teacher of theology, and so frankly confesses his weaknesses and faults, that we cannot doubt his sincerity. His character for honesty and frankness was uniform through life.

His theological character may be summed up in a few words. The result of his vast amount of historical reading, and of his own reflections was to produce a *predominant sense of the mutability of theological opinions*, the same as that which we now observe in the case of Baumgarten-Crusius. If one stops here, there is, indeed, nothing, but a *thohu vabohu* over which no spirit of God broods. But such an impression results from superficially observing the apparent diversities, without penetrating

deeply enough to discover the internal substantial unity in regard to the great principles of divine revelation. Thus the conclusion which Semler finally adopted was, "that all opinions in theology are equally good and satisfactory, if they only render Christianity the means of mending our morals,"—a conclusion which betrays the utmost mental imbecility. Still he formed a system of his own, though it was mostly of a negative character. He preferred the Calvinistic theologians to the Lutheran, and was particularly pleased with the writings of Calvin and Pellican. Of the various schools of Lutheran theology, the Calixtine was nearest to his taste. But it was with the Arminians that he was most delighted; and it was by these that he was conducted gradually to Rationalism. Towards the close of the last century, the older writers were but little read; and when Semler quoted them in justification of his own views, it was cast upon him as a reproach. But he followed his own inclinations. He edited Cramer's Translation of Richard Simon's Critical History of the New Testament, Wetstein's Prolegomena, and Libelli ad Crisin Novi Testamenti, Whitby on Original Sin, Townson on the Gospels, and Farmer on Demoniacs. The more rare and liberal a work was, the better he liked it; he took special pleasure in studying works of which others were ignorant.

We will here cast a glance at the different departments of theology, and see how, in each of these, he scattered the seeds of Rationalism. He commenced his reform with biblical criticism. "Criticism," says he, "was, at the time of my coming upon the stage, altogether an uncultivated field." He threw himself into the arms of Breitinger, whose edition of the Septuagint did so much service to the cause of biblical literature. He complained that Bengel's efforts were productive of so little fruit, and that men were so much engaged in warfare against Capella and Richard Simon, and that Mills's labors were unknown. As it does not come within our design to exhibit the merits of Semler in advancing the science of interpretation, but as our object is simply to point out the manner in which he introduced Rationalism, we shall limit ourselves to a few specimens that are to our purpose. He was very free and rash in verbal criticism. If a word did not seem to him

necessary, he did not hesitate to remove it as a gloss. His doctrinal opinions were not without their influence here. Thus in 2 Tim. 3: 16, he struck out *καὶ*, so that *θεόπνευστος* might not be construed as a predicate, and made the passage read; "all Scripture which is divinely inspired, is profitable."

Of a far more serious nature were his labors in the department of higher criticism. These, too, were greatly affected by his doctrinal views. While he defends with great learning the right of Protestant theologians to subject the canon of Scripture to a new scrutiny, and supports his position by appealing to the example of the Reformed theologians, to Luther and to the Calixtines, and maintains that declarations respecting the canon are nothing but the opinions of individuals, which we, if better informed, are not only at liberty, but are bound to correct, the Scriptures, especially the Old Testament, are made to experience a hard fate. "Suppose," he says, "an inquisitive traveller honestly inquires of the Jews of Palestine respecting the canon of the Scriptures, the greatest part of them will tell him, that there are twenty-four books of the Hebrew Scriptures; if he inquire of the Samaritans, they refer him to the five books of Moses; if he go to Alexandria, he hears of more than twenty-four books. Thus it appears, that from *historical* evidence, it cannot be shown that these books are sacred." He adds; "the only proof of the divine character of a book is its internal character of truth; this is the *fides divina*, briefly, though vaguely expressed by the biblical phrase, 'the testimony of the Holy Spirit.'" In agreement with that rule of deciding upon the canonical authority of a book, Solomon's Song, Ruth, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther and Chronicles were excluded from the canon; and Joshua, Judges, Samuel, the Kings and Daniel were pronounced doubtful.

These books were not rejected upon *historical* grounds, but purely from *doctrinal* views. The consequences of the principle, therefore, would naturally extend to questions affecting the whole of the Old Testament. He broke up the New Testament canon in a similar way, distinguishing between what tended to our moral improvement and what did not. The Apocalypse was particularly offensive to him; and was regarded by him as the work of a fanatic.

"Semler's spirit," says Eichhorn, "was far from fitting him to examine such a book." The Gospels, in his view, were of doubtful integrity and purity. They were designed for the Jews, and are adapted only to them. Here, then, we have the leading principle of Semler's interpretation, viz., *that the contents of the whole of the Old and New Testaments are of a local and temporary character*. This is the source of the corruption which he introduced into all the departments of theology.

It is at once obvious what influence such a principle of interpretation must have upon doctrinal theology. A mode of interpretation, which finds in the New Testament nothing but what is local and temporary, cuts off the very roots, from which all the vitality of theology springs. The fundamental error of Semler is, the view which, as he tells us, first dawned upon his mind while he sat at the feet of Baumgarten, his teacher, *that there is an infinite difference between religion and theology*. All the doctrines taught in the Scriptures, it was maintained, are either accommodations to Jewish prejudices, "little local ideas," according to his favorite expression (even the idea of the kingdom of God he did not hesitate to class among these little local ideas), or they are expressed in such terms, that we cannot, in our times, ascertain their import. Such are the terms, Son of God, Mediator, Justification. But it is enough for us, if we can employ them to "mend our morals." On such an hypothesis, it is not easy to see how Christian theology can have any positive doctrines; nothing is more natural or more legitimate, than that the Rationalist theologians, as Henke, Wegscheider and Bretschneider should, in carrying out Semler's views, make it their chief concern to exhibit the subject *historically*, and notice the various changes which have occurred in views of doctrine; and finally examine the basis of the Jewish notions out of which Christian theology sprung. Semler went even so far as to speak of "Christianity, as it is called," and "Christians, as they are called." That is being historical with a vengeance! The principles of natural religion, as maintained by the Wolfians, were received as true by Semler, although they were very indefinite. But the peculiar doctrines of Christianity were all set down as mere matters of opinion. In clearing the

field of theology, he commenced with the doctrine of demoniacs; and this is the reason why the supernaturalists of the last generation, as Knapp, laid so much stress upon the defence of demoniacal possessions. It was the starting point of Rationalism. The most important doctrinal production of Semler is the history of theological opinions, prefixed to Baumgarten's *Theological Controversies*. Here, as in all his writings, his chief object appears to have been to point out the origin and character of the various views which have prevailed in theology; or, in other words, to show the difference between religion and theology.

Semler's chief merit was in church history and the history of religious doctrines. As Baumgarten-Crusius says, "he is undoubtedly the first who directed the attention of scholars to the history of theological opinions; and in this new department he furnished many valuable materials." But, as we have already said, we are here concerned not with his merits as a scholar, but with his influence in the introduction of Rationalism. This was occasioned in his historical labors by his evident aversion to the doctrines of the church. He labored to set the state of the early Christians, the character of the church generally, and especially the champions of orthodoxy in an unfavorable light. It was natural for him to do so; for he himself was destitute of that depth of religious feeling, which alone could enable him to enter into the spirit of the early Christian teachers, and to draw out the true ideas from the obscure language of writers so unlike himself as Tertullian. Such men as Tertullian, Augustine, Bernard and Thomas Aquinas were highly repulsive to his feelings. Hence, he calls Tertullian "singularly strange," and "fanatical," Augustine, "hair-splitting," though "sometimes right," and Bernard, "monkish." Thus was the way prepared for Spittler and Henke. Even such men as Chrysostom and Theodoret, where they departed from the spirit of the eighteenth century, were represented in the most unfavorable light. Chiliasts, Gnostics, monks and eremites, were, in his view, all blind fanatics. But when he falls upon a "free-thinking" spirit like himself, upon a Pelagius, for example, he cordially embraces him, and publishes his works with notes of encomium and defence. So extensive was his reading and so rare his knowledge, that his dis-

coveries in church history were read with avidity, not only by the superficial, but by men of true learning; and he left a general impression upon the public mind that, until the torch of modern illumination was lighted up, Christianity had borne little or no fruit, and that men of lunatic brains had enjoyed the highest renown in theology. Some of his disciples wished to reduce church history to a mere collection of ridiculous tales about priests and monks. When we consider how much the young theologians of the present age are benefited by having returned to the study of the Christian Fathers and Reformers, and to what an honorable rank the study of church history in general has justly risen, we shall be prepared to estimate the extent of the evil of Semler's influence in this respect.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

ARTICLE VIII.

ON THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF WOMAN.

It is not our purpose, in the present article, to institute a comparison between the sexes, either in their physical or intellectual constitution; much less to enter into the controversy, in regard to the political and social relations of woman, which now agitates a portion of the community. This subject has been the medium of much unjust reproach on our institutions. The public ear has been filled with declamation upon the wrongs of woman,—her political and legal non-existence,—her natural equality,—her inalienable rights, and her degrading servitude; as though the sex, at some early period, had been conquered and subjugated by man, and were still held in a state of bondage. Disquietudes, deep and distressing, are thus created, where peace and confidence ought to prevail; and we are made to overlook that most essential preliminary in every proposed reform,—an exact knowledge of the subject to be reformed. Our first step, therefore, is to dis-

abuse ourselves of existing prejudices, by inquiring into the true and actual position of woman, as defined by our laws, and considering the reasons on which they are founded.

We shall better understand the value of her position in this country, and in our own day, by first briefly considering her condition in other nations, both in ancient and modern times, and the depths from which she has been raised to her present most just elevation of rank in the Christian world.

It is superfluous to advert to the state of females among savage tribes. It was always, and every where, a state of abject slavery. Even at this day, among the red men of the West, the severest punishment that can be inflicted on a warrior, is to strip him of his war dress, and degrade him to the rank and garb of a squaw. If we look to the semi-barbarous nations of the north, her lot was but little better. By the early feudal constitutions she could not own lands; and this, not merely because she was incapable of performing the personal military services due to the lord paramount; but also because, as the feudists allege, by reason of the imbecility of her understanding, she could render him no aid by her advice, nor keep his counsels, when confided to her. Nor was she admissible, as a witness, in any feudal court; being, in this respect, classed with children, excommunicates, and persons rendered infamous by crime.*

The condition of the Greek female partook of the characters of eastern voluptuousness and northern degradation. She could hardly act at all, without the intervention of a guardian. She was not permitted to give testimony. She could make no contract, beyond the value of a medimnus of barley. She was literally "given away" in marriage; and might again be given away by her husband to a stranger; or become the common property of him and his brethren.†

If in the country of Plato and Solon, the sex was thus humbled, we may look in vain for a juster estimate of the rights of woman in that of Cicero and Gaius and Tribonian. The whole fabric of the Roman law, in regard to

* Crag., *Jus. Feud.*, 63, 66, 523.

† Taylor's *Civil Law*, pp. 250, 252.

females, is based on the assumption of their *intellectual* as well as physical *imbecility*. The Roman lady, it is true, appeared more in society than the Greek; and was permitted to be present at public spectacles and feasts; but, like her polished neighbor, *her* testimony was not received by the magistrates; she was not capable of acting but by her guardian or tutor; she could not dispose of herself in marriage; she became the property of her husband, who had the power of life and death over her. Though wine was an article of common beverage among *men*, *she* was interdicted its use, on account of the errors it might lead her to commit; and "this severity," says Polybius, "gave occasion to the custom so prevalent among them, of the wife's being frequently saluted by her husband and relations, in order to detect her disobedience." Dr. Taylor, in his *Elements of the Civil Law*, deduces the marriage custom of *saluting the bride*, from this practice of the Romans.

Shall we find her lot improved in Asia? Take, for example, the Chinese; among whose lower classes the wife drags the plough, while the husband sows the grain. No where, is the female permitted to lose sight of her legal inferiority and nothingness. She does not sit at the same table with the man, her master and lord,—she receives no intellectual culture; all her energies, of mind and heart, are repressed by the iron despotism under which they are held. Even the feet of females of the higher classes, are crushed by the hand of *jealousy*; compelling them to seclusion, and domestic virtue, by taking away the physical power to transgress.

If we would ascertain the legal rights of women in Central Asia, no source is so authentic as the institutes of the emperor *Akber*, the *Justinian* of the East; and the liberal patron of oriental learning. But though this code regulates marriages, in *very general* terms, it *recognizes woman as possessed of very few legal rights*. She cannot be a witness, in any cause; and to kill her, is but a "sin of the *third* degree;" and in *the same* degree is placed the sin, by *that* code *equally heinous*, of killing a cow, and of selling prohibited goods.*

The code of Gentoo laws, or ordinances of the Pundits

* 2 Ayeen Akbery, 496, 542.

(ch. 20, p. 282), requires that "A man, both day and night, keep his wife so much in subjection, that she by no means be mistress of her own actions;" and it adds that "if the wife have her own free will, notwithstanding she be sprung from a superior cast, she will yet behave amiss." Indeed, throughout *all* Asia, our missionaries, in their benevolent attempts to instruct and educate the *female* mind, have excited astonishment and scorn.

It is therefore not to mere civilization,—not to advancement in the arts of life, or to intellectual culture alone, that we are to look, for the elevation of woman to her proper rank in social existence. Another element must be sought, in the composition of society, to effect this result;—and that element has been found in the Christian religion. It is remarkable that the influence of Christianity, wherever it has been felt in any nation, has given woman a new station in society, releasing her from bondage, and rendering her at once the companion, the equal, and the friend of man. Hence Christianity has been scoffingly termed "the religion of women." And it is true, that while the obligations of us all to that religion are immense, *hers* are peculiar and emphatic. The secret spring of this great revolution is found in the *spirit* of religion;—its spirit of justice, and truth, and love;—its expanded views;—its lofty aims;—its enlightened philosophy.

We do not assert that the bare assumption of the form of Christianity has alone achieved this change. On the contrary, it has gone hand in hand with the true and liberal *spirit* of that religion, and has shared both its glory and its eclipse. Like all other revolutions which have been wrought in the mind or social state of man, its first movements have been vast and extravagant. Thus, the flood of light, poured upon a military people, produced the age of chivalry; and changed the state of woman, from that of servitude, to deification. And this, again, was succeeded by the age of frivolous gallantry and excessive politeness. In *both*, her position was a false one. She is justly neither the servant, nor the sovereign of man; neither the slave of his will, nor the proper object of his obsequious servitude, or his adoration;—but his equal, his fellow-being, his partner in the social state.

Such is the *American female*, whose legal rights we are about to consider. And in the end we shall appeal to every unbiassed judgment, if her rights are not *equal*, though they may not always be *identical*, with our own. This distinction is important; and the omission of it occasions a grand error of modern reformers. They suppose that equality of *rights* gives title to an equal participation in *every duty* and *privilege* of civil life; and that if one man has certain rights, and another certain others, *both of equal value*, yet there is no *equality* unless the rights are identically the same. We shall not *now* argue the point with those who maintain that woman is *wronged* unless she is admitted to *share with man* in *all* the labors and duties of social and political life. We admit that she is *intellectually* capable of them all. But we would just ask if God has made *no* difference in the circumstances of the sexes? Is there *no* fitness in assigning some duties exclusively to one sex, and others to the other? Are the labors of the field, or those public offices, the time of whose performance is fixed by the calendar, appropriate to woman? Or, do the implements of female employment become the hand of man? These questions are already settled by the low estimation in which *both* sexes hold those of *either*, who interfere with the pursuits assigned, by nature and usage, to the other. Our *argument* will rather consist in a brief *statement* of female rights, as they are recognized by law in this country;—classing them into, first, the *political* rights of woman; second, her *civil* rights while single; and lastly, her *connubial* rights, or those which she possesses in consequence of her marriage.

In the term "*Political Rights*" is involved all which the subject or citizen may lawfully claim of the state or sovereign, whether it be of privilege or protection. It includes not only the right of electing and being elected to public office; but the right of being protected, in person and property, against the aggressions of another nation;—the right of being protected by one's own government, in the free enjoyment of life, health, and reputation; of personal security, personal liberty, and private property; the right of being governed by known laws; the right of exemption from unreasonable search of one's dwelling-

house, or seizure of one's papers; from being twice put in jeopardy of life or limb upon the same criminal accusation; from being compelled to be a witness against one's self; from cruel and unusual punishments, excessive fines and excessive bail; the right of just compensation for all private property taken for public uses; and the right of trial by jury. All these, except that of electing and being elected to *political* office, are *political rights of women*, as well as of men; and are *enjoyed* equally by both sexes.

In regard to the latter, the propriety of a lady's HOLDING and EXERCISING public office has been decided by the customs of society, in originating which her own sex has a large and perhaps an equal share. If she were eligible to *one* political office, it would be because her *sex* does not unfit her for *any*; and the same code that would admit female *legislators*, ought, in equal reason, to make them eligible to all other offices. But how would ladies themselves regard a *female sheriff*, or *captain of militia*? The very constitution of society has, of necessity, allotted these employments to man. Not that he is wiser, and *thus* more capable of exercising them; but because, in the distribution of social duties, these are more befitting his sex, and more congenial with other pursuits in which he is engaged.

But what reason is there, it may be asked, to exclude her from *giving her suffrage*, in the election of public officers? Beside the reason already given for rendering her ineligible to office, there are considerations of public expediency and wisdom, which govern this part of the law. In all free, elective governments, *parties* will exist. The elements of discord are sufficiently numerous, and active, and pervading, to give employment to all the wisdom and all the force, moral and physical, which society can command, to control their destructive operation. Amid the storms which beat without, in the political world, the domestic hearth is yet the sanctuary of repose, and the domestic altar still receives the offering of united hearts, to the God of peace and of love. But if, in addition to all our other sources of party strife, as if the thousand existing elements of contention could not suffice, we were to array male and *female* electors with *their* candidates in opposition, it is easier to imagine the uproar that would

ensue, than to foretell when or how it would end. Even Discord,

“With delight would snuff the smell
Of mortal change on earth,—and high upturn
His nostril wide into the murky air,
Sagacious of his quarry from so far.”

The experience of all nations has shown that the state of society has been rendered miserable whenever both sexes have mingled in party politics. “If women,” says Addison, “must be showing their zeal for the public, let it not be against those who are, perhaps, of the same family, or at least of the same religion or nation; but against those who are the open, professed, undoubted enemies of their faith, liberty and country.”

It is for the preservation of social peace, therefore, and of domestic happiness, that our law has assigned the labor of moving the *political* machine to *men*. In this division of labor, the rights of woman are not infringed. As in a commercial partnership, one member may have the care of the books, another of the purchases, and another of the sales; or in a corporation, one agent may have the exclusive charge of one department, and another of another, while other members have only a general participation in the profits; and yet the *rights* of all are equal, though their *duties* are various; so, in this allotment of political labors, the rights of none are invaded. Woman is still a member of political society; entitled to its benefits, and its protection. If her ships or goods are illegally captured by a foreign power, she has the same right, with all others, to require indemnity from the national government. If she is made a prisoner of war, or otherwise unlawfully detained or enslaved, her own government is bound to ransom her, as in the case of any other citizen. Nay, more; for a *prisoner* she cannot be, by the laws of modern warfare; and if her husband is a captive or an exile, she is permitted at her pleasure to share his fortunes, or visit and relieve him. A recent instance of this immunity occurred in Upper Canada, in the case of M'Kenzie, whose wife was suffered to join her husband, even when in arms against his own sovereign. In all cases of foreign aggression, she may claim the aid of the sovereign power, to vindicate her wrongs. Wherever

the rights of the citizen are secured by the constitution, other than those of office holding and of suffrage, those rights are her own.

And if any should complain that woman is not allowed a share in the *government* of the country, let them also recollect that she is not called to the peril of its *defence*. While the statesman and the soldier alike feel her influence, she, though capable of either, is exempted both from the distracting cares of the cabinet, and the dangers and toils of the field. Should she feel inclined to murmur because she is bound by laws in the making of which she had no active participation, let her remember that the blood shed in her defence, on the battle field was not her own.

We are next to speak of the *civil* rights of woman, or those which pertain to her when of age, and unmarried. Here an important distinction is to be observed between things prohibited by the civil or municipal law, and those which, though legal in themselves, are forbidden by the usages and customs of society. For example, a lady may *lawfully* appear in court, as the attorney of any suitor, under a power regularly executed, and prosecute or defend his cause. She may *lawfully* follow *any* laborious mechanical employment. She may serve writs,—she may practise medicine,—may be a preacher or public lecturer. If she owns stock in a bank, or other moneyed corporation, such as a manufacturing company, a railroad corporation, or the like, she may attend any stockholder's meeting and give her vote. Nay, she may hold any office, to which the stockholders may see fit to elect her. For these are private enterprises, having nothing to do with political government. These, and other employments without number, the *law of the land* has left open to all who choose to engage in them, male or female. There are no restrictions but those which decency may impose; and here the law leaves the general sense of the community to establish the rule, and to punish for its infraction.

A *parish* in our country, is, in the sense of the law, a *political* corporation. The law has adopted this machinery, as the medium of securing proper religious instruction; as it has created *school districts*, for the purpose of general education. They are parts of the *political* machine, from the labor of moving which the other sex is exempted.

The care of selecting suitable ministers and schoolmasters, of agreeing upon their compensation, of observing whether they perform their duty, and of dismissing them for delinquency, is confided solely to men. But subject to those restrictions in *political* matters, which, as we have already observed, public expediency and even public necessity have created, we are not aware of any distinction between the legal rights of unmarried women, and of men. She inherits, equally with her brothers, the paternal estate. She is equally capable of the office of executor, guardian, and of any other private trust. If she is injured in her person, her property, or her reputation, she, alone, may sue for redress. In whatever employment she may engage, the law affords her its protection. Should she *choose* to *violate* the proprieties of her station, whether by travelling in the character of public lecturer, by engaging with masculine energy in the distracting controversies of the day, or by any occupation which custom and propriety have assigned to the other sex, the *law* merely consigns her to the tribunal of *public opinion*, and condemns her only to its withering rebuke. From the cradle to the grave, the law watches over her with untiring vigilance, and guards her *rights* with paternal care. And wherever the word "*man*" is employed in the statute book, other than in speaking of political functions, it is understood in its broadest sense, as indicating, not the sex, but the human being. Until she is twenty-one years of age, she is a *minor*, subject to the same disabilities with her brother, and, *like him*, bound by no promise, except to pay for her necessary support and education. After twenty-one, and *not before*, she, *like him*, is supposed by the law to have attained sufficient judgment and discretion to act for herself. Yet in one respect, the law, whether in tenderness to the strength of her affections, or reliance on the earlier ripeness of her judgment in a matter so peculiarly appropriate to its exercise, we will not undertake to say; but the law accords to her a privilege not granted to our sex, that of choosing her own partner, on arriving at the age of eighteen.* *Her marriage under that age may*

* In this, and a few other places, reference is had to the law of Massachusetts; but on the whole subject of this article, the laws of the several States are essentially the same.

be prohibited by her father or guardian ; while that of the son or male ward may be thus prevented until *he* is twenty-one. Yet no action lies for breach of the promise of *either*, to marry, unless the party was of the full age of twenty-one at the time of making it. After that age, *either* of them may be liable to an action for the breach of such a promise, though the usages of society and the laws of good taste are such, that probably no *man* could endure the measure of public contempt, who should pursue a legal remedy against the other sex for refusing to fulfil that engagement.

But, *it is objected*, that “*after marriage, woman becomes a mere cipher, in the eye of the law.*”

It deserves notice, in this place, that our law offers no coercion to females, in regard to *contracting* marriage, but leaves them entirely free. No reasonable being will complain that to the marriage of a woman under eighteen years of age, the consent of her parent or guardian is requisite. This is no restraint, but a privilege. It is the *ONLY* case in which a limit can be placed to her will ; and as a protection to her youth against the arts of the designing, it is of priceless value. Subject to this single condition, or rather thus protected, *the law* bestows her upon the man of her own free choice.

This most delicate and interesting of all human relations having been thus formed, is treated by our law, with the greatest degree of care, since it affects all classes of society, and is the principal source of domestic and social happiness. This is the object for which the parties unite themselves, inseparably, and for ever. It is a partnership, on terms of equality ;—an embarkation in the same vessel, for the voyage of life ;—a community of interests,—a union of wills and minds ;—a surrender, each to the other, of person, affections, society, hopes and aims ;—a mutual pledge, under the most solemn sanctions, of inviolable fidelity, unflinching devotedness, and untiring effort to promote their mutual welfare.

Such being the nature, and such the spirit of the contract, the rules of law which apply to it will be found wisely directed to the attainment of those great ends. The first and most prominent feature of this relation is, the inseparable *union* in which the parties have engaged.

As this involves all the other elements of the contract, the first care of the law is directed to its preservation. It has therefore become a maxim that husband and wife are not to be separated. That is, the rules of law, which apply in all other cases, are, with few exceptions, to be noticed hereafter, so bent and modified where a married woman is concerned, that she shall not be separated from her husband. Anciently, this right to each other's society was capable of being enforced, even by *suit*, in the ecclesiastical courts; and at the peril of excommunication; a remedy, however, which the habits of our pilgrim fathers never required, in this country, and which has long since fallen into disuse in England. The immunities and privileges of married women are so numerous as to have given rise to the remark, very common even among lawyers, that by marriage, the husband and wife become one person in law, her very legal existence being merged in his own. In a limited and qualified sense this is true; but not to the extent which is sometimes asserted. The remark is not a *principle* of the law; but a *figure*, employed to illustrate a principle, adopted for her protection. On this principle it is, that if the husband and wife are sued for her debt, though *he* may be committed to prison (where imprisonment for debt is still practised), no creditor can detain *her* person, separate from his own. So also, her legal settlement, or the domicil which entitled her to support from the public in case of poverty is, by the marriage, transferred to that of her husband.

It is on the same ground, the necessity of preserving this domestic union inviolate, that by the marriage, the husband is made instantly liable for all the debts owed by the wife. The rule has no regard to her property, whether it be much, or little. If she brought him but five hundred, and owed ten thousand dollars, he is liable to pay it all. If it were otherwise, the consequences would be most lamentable; the wife, during every period of her married life, would be liable to be torn from her husband and children, her family broken up, and its peace destroyed for ever. On the same principle, too, he alone is generally responsible for the offences she may commit, short of that degree of crime which receives corporal punishment; or, in other words, he must answer for all her offences, for

which *money* will atone. Thus if she slanders her neighbor, the husband must make compensation; and though both may be sued together, yet he only can be personally arrested. In regard to crimes, if they are committed by his coercion, or in his company, which the law construes a coercion, she is considered as acting not by her own will, and he alone is regarded as the criminal. There are only two exceptions to this rule. The one is where the offence is joint in its very nature, having regard to domestic economy; such as habitual cruelty to an apprentice, or keeping a house offensive to the neighborhood, or the public. The other includes the cases of treason, murder, and other homicide. The *reasons* for these exceptions are, that in the affairs of the household the wife may well be supposed to exert a controlling influence, or at least to have a will of her own; that in the case of homicide, the law of nature is deemed paramount to the refinements and subordinations of civil society; and that the safety of the state requires that *all* who participate in treason, should be adjudged traitors. There is a further reason for this distribution of duties and liabilities, in its tendency to promote peace and harmony. Men have learned from experience the absolute necessity of introducing some governing or controlling mind, into all associated enterprises. In political affairs, this control is exercised either by the will of the executive, or of the majority. In the transactions of commercial life it is usually the latter. Where the enterprise involves danger, and requires sudden and energetic action, it is usually confided to one mind. Such is the case in military operations, and in the management of a ship at sea. Yet no man, whether citizen, copartner in trade, or seaman on shipboard, ever imagined his *rights* to be *infringed* or impaired by reason of this subordination. Nay, he has a *right* to *require* of those to whom this controlling discretion is confided, that it be faithfully exercised, at all times, for the common safety and protection. It is on the same principle, and no other, that while responsibility to the public is concentrated in the person of the husband, the power of determining the course of family transactions, in every case of difference of opinion, is vested in him alone. It is like the power of the *casting vote*. It is as essential to the great objects of domestic society, as to any other association of man.

It should be farther remarked, in this preliminary view, that, as the union of husband and wife is thus intimate, indissoluble and perpetual, there is little occasion for any distinction in the ownership of their common property. As it is a common fund, to which both may resort, for all the ordinary purposes of support and reasonable enjoyment, it can make but little difference, in the results, by whose name it is called. The woman, upon the marriage, acquires a new interest in the husband's estate; but as her property must be managed by some one, for the payment of her debts and her own support, the law vests this power in her husband, the man of *her own* choice. And as he is responsible, as we have seen, for all she may owe, and in his purse, for all she may do, her *personal* estate, by the marriage, becomes his own. He assumes her legal liabilities, and takes her personal property, to enable him to meet them. Yet this right of the husband is not without its limitations. In regard to the wife's money and goods, in her actual *possession* at the time of marriage, the title of the husband is absolute; for it would be extremely difficult, in practice, to make it otherwise. But in regard to legacies left to her, or other rights of her own, for the recovery of which the aid of a Court of Equity is resorted to, if, for any reason, her property is not deemed safe in his hands; he is never permitted to receive it, till he has secured to the wife or her children such portion as the Judge may deem reasonable, considering the circumstances of the case, and the amount of debts, if any, which she may owe.

We said her *personal* estate; for her lands and buildings are still her own. In the age of chivalry, when feudal property, by gradual relaxation of feudal laws, became inheritable by woman, the husband of such a tenant represented her, as her substitute, in all the military services due for her land, and employed its rents and income for that purpose. And though these tenures have long since passed away, yet as other duties, equally cogent, and equally appropriate to the husband, still remain to be performed, the *rule* of property remains unchanged; and the husband still *represents* the freehold, by taking the profits, though the *inheritance* remains in the wife. He can neither sell it, nor mortgage it, nor otherwise encum-

ber it, for any period longer than his own life. If she survives him, it is at her disposal, as it was before the marriage. If he survives her, and she has borne him a living child, the estate continues in his hands during his life, because he is bound to maintain that child. If not, it goes to her heirs, as though she had remained single. During the marriage, it cannot be sold but at her own pleasure; by the joint deed of herself and her husband, acknowledged before a magistrate, as her free and voluntary act. It is true, he may intimidate or deceive her into this measure; but it is far better to take the chance of these evils, so very seldom found in experience, than that she should not confide in him at all. Friends *sometimes* prove treacherous; but what is the worth of that fact, of seldom occurrence, as an argument against forming *any* friendships? Teeth may cause us pain, and motes give anguish to the eye; but ought we therefore to wish ourselves toothless, and blind? It follows from these principles, that if the husband is responsible for the wife's conduct, he ought to have the power of *reasonable* control over her person. The law accordingly gives him just *that* power and no more. He may restrain her from doing mischief; but should he abuse this power and tyrannically imprison or confine her separate from himself, she may be liberated by the same remedy, the writ of habeas corpus, by which every other captive is set free. The law is sparing of its interference in these as in all other cases, between man and wife; preferring to limit the exercise of their mutual rights, rather by the promptings of mutual affection, than by any sterner rule. But whenever the discretion, thus confided, is clearly abused, the aggressor is treated with the severity due to other wrong doers.

After what has been said, of the reasons for giving the husband the control of the wife's property, it is almost superfluous to observe, that he is entitled to the fruits of her *labor*. The same general principles apply to both cases; and the liability of either to abuse, is no sufficient argument against the general fitness and propriety of the regulation. All the limitations to this discretionary power of the husband, are left to be adjusted in their appropriate tribunal, the *domestic forum*; a tribunal whose decisions are generally satisfactory, and from which there is seldom an appeal.

This brief survey of the legal nature of marriage, and its incidents, with especial reference to the husband, will enable us more clearly to understand the particular rights of the wife. And it will be found that wherever it can be done without disturbing the harmony of domestic intercourse and defeating the great objects of this relation, she is regarded by the law after marriage, precisely as before.

Thus, as has already been intimated, the husband has no other control over her person than to oblige her to dwell with him, which she promised to do, and moderately and gently to restrain her, should she so far forget her duty and engagements as to resolve to leave him, or do him harm in his family or estate. If he transcends these limits, the law will set her free from restraint. If, without imprisonment, he treats her with personal violence, and abuse, she may be divorced from his society, and freed from his control. Nay, should he, without resorting to violence, disgrace her, by committing any infamous crime for which he is sentenced to the penitentiary, the law of most of the States will dissolve the bonds of matrimony, at her request; and should he, forgetting the delicacy of her sex, render his house unfit for her residence, by obscene and brutal revelries, the law of every State will justify her in seeking a home more befitting a virtuous female. And should danger to her person be justly apprehended from his violence or malignity, she may, by appeal to the law, lay him under ample and sufficient bonds to do her no harm. Thus his rights to her society are contingent, depending on his own good behaviour. The articles of the marriage covenant are mutual and the rights reciprocal, each depending on the good faith with which others are performed. The law of married life is the law of love.

Nor is it in the power of the husband to *compel* her to reside with him, under circumstances of danger or indignity, by refusing to support her abroad. Should he turn her away without cause, or compel her to leave him for the reasons just mentioned, she carries with her the legal power to use his credit to whatever amount may be necessary for her suitable maintenance. No public posting, no private notice or forbidding, can absolve him from the legal liability to maintain his wife, as she has been accustomed, in another house of her own selection, whenever

he has rendered it unsafe or improper for her to dwell in, or has unjustly banished her from, his own.

Much more, while at home, and presiding, in the family circle, she shares, equally with him, in the government of the household. Her authority is derived, not from him, but from the law. It is only where the opinions of both are *expressed differently*, that his is allowed to prevail, and this, for the preservation of peace. But in all other domestic affairs within the matron's department, she is not *obliged* to consult him; and her contracts and directions in regard to the servants, the table, the furniture and the apparel of the household, unless expressly overruled by him, are equally binding with his own; and the servants and tradesmen with whom she may have contracted, may hold the husband responsible for payment.

In the management of the children, too, they equally participate. And if, unhappily, the parents are separated by divorce, and the wife is not particularly disqualified for the duty, by her imbecility or her crimes, she will be permitted to retain, if she has them, all the children under seven years of age, and her daughters under twelve; such of her sons, too, of the same age, as may peculiarly need the attentions of the mother, are permitted to remain under her care; and the daughters of any age, if the husband, by his abandoned life, has ceased to incite them to virtue by his example. It is only where he can appeal to his own moral fitness for all the offices of a father, that he can claim the custody of his daughters, against a mother, qualified in all respects for the duties of that relation.

In all matters pertaining to other persons than her husband, the wife may still act as if she were single. Thus, she may be the agent of a third person for the sale or purchase of property, the making of contracts, or the transaction of any business confided to her. She may be a guardian. If, before marriage, she stipulated with her intended husband, by marriage articles, for the control of her own property, and the disposal of it by deed, or by will, that power she may always exercise, without his concurrence, and even against his consent. The law merely defines the duties and rights of this relation, where the parties do not otherwise agree. But it leaves them at liberty to make for themselves what regulations they

please, not affecting the *duration* of the marriage state; and enforces their contract, as it does all others, not made in violation of decency, nor against the well-being of society or the enactments and policy of law. In other words, the law requires that married persons dwell together during life, unless separated by a decree of divorce; allowing them to make any other dispositions, either of their persons or property, not inconsistent with this requirement. If the wife would secure to herself any better provision, or any other rights, or greater liberty, than the rules of law have prescribed for her, she can do this by articles of agreement, executed before marriage; and *such* articles the law obliges the husband faithfully to perform. She may exercise any powers for her husband, in the management of his affairs, that he may confide to her. And should he desert her, the law considers him, by this very act, as authorizing her to dispose of any of his effects for her support; and for that purpose will empower her, if she request it, even to sell his lands.

If the husband dies first, the law has been equally careful to afford the surviving wife its protection. In the first place, she may retain possession of the mansion house and sustain herself out of its stores as before, until sufficient time has elapsed, since his decease, to recover from the first shock of the bereavement, and collect the energies of her mind to form plans for the future. She is further entitled, by the common law, to the use, for her life, of one third part of all the improvable lands, houses, or other real property which he owned at any time during the marriage, whether sold by him or not. In some States of the Union, this right may, under certain circumstances, extend to one half and even to two-thirds of the property, and it may be claimed in fee, absolutely, and for ever. In others, it is restricted to property owned by the husband at the time of his decease. In Massachusetts, it extends to all which he owned at and after the marriage. This right she may lose, by his making other sufficient provision, at the time of marriage, by articles of agreement, called a marriage-settlement; or by her acceptance of such provision, subsequently made. She may *forfeit* it, by eloping with an adulterer. She may *release* it, by joining with her husband in the deed of conveyance by which he sells

the land to another. But it is not in *his* power to defeat, abridge, or encumber it; neither by deed, nor by will. And if he makes provision for her in his will, which she deems insufficient, she may waive it, and claim the more generous and just provision of the law.

When, therefore, complaint is made of the *hardship* of the law, in transferring to the husband, upon the marriage, all the wife's personal property, the fruits of her industry and the income of her lands; let it be remembered that by the same act he is made responsible for all the debts she may owe; is liable for her decent and respectable maintenance; is answerable, to the extent of all his property, for her language and her behaviour, though she brought him not a dollar, and though he has married a spendthrift or a shrew; and that her claims on his estate are beyond his force to resist, his art to elude, or his power to control.

The enumeration of the *rights* of the wife would not be complete, without some notice of what may, with more propriety, be deemed her *privileges*.

One of these is found in her inability to bind *herself* by any contract made during the marriage. The law has respect to the delicacy of her position, and the danger of her being circumvented by fraud, or tempted into expenses ruinous to her interest or her happiness; and protects her from the consequences of improper engagements, by putting it out of her power to bind herself by *any*. Such as she *chooses* to fulfil, she may. She is left free to follow the dictates of conscience; being only shielded from *coercion*; yet this provision of the law is so guarded, that it shall not operate to the *injury* of the party it was designed to protect. It, therefore, applies only to the contracts of the wife while living with the husband, or the legal subject of his care. If he has renounced his marital rights by abjuring the country; by deserting her; by expelling her from his house and obliging her to seek refuge and support in another State; or if she is withdrawn from his dominion, or deprived of his protection by a judicial decree; whether by divorce, where she is innocent, or by his being condemned to the penitentiary for life; in these cases, in addition to *his* liability to support her, which still continues, she may *bind herself*, as if she were single.

This power is given, to increase her credit, and the better to enable her to provide for her own wants.

Another privilege of the wife is founded in the regard paid to her conjugal affection. When a felony has been committed, so strict is the law, in order to do effectual justice, that the nearest relatives are not permitted to aid or receive one another. If the parent assists his child, or the child his parent, if aid is rendered between brother and brother, or even if the husband relieves the wife, where the party assisted has been guilty of felony, the other becomes accessory after the fact, and as such is punishable by indictment. But a married woman incurs no guilt or penalty by receiving and concealing her guilty husband. And though, in the language of books, she is *presumed* to act under his coercion; yet where the case is such that all idea of coercion is totally excluded, and her conduct is the impulse of love alone,—love undeserved and unrequited,—she may with impunity, follow *all* its biddings, and exert her utmost address to screen the culprit from the arm of the law.

There are other privileges which are mutual and common to them both. Thus if the husband or the wife should kill an assailant, in the necessary defence of the other, the act is excusable, as though it were done by the party assailed.

Neither can they be witnesses for or against each other. This rule is universal, that where either of them is a party, the other cannot be called as a witness, in either civil or criminal proceedings. "They cannot be witnesses *for* each other, for their interests are identical; nor *against* each other, for fear of creating distrust, and sowing dissensions between them, and occasioning perjury." It is essential to the well-being of society, and the happiness of man, that the confidence reposed by married persons in each other, should be placed beyond the *fear* of violation. If our griefs are lessened when shared by a sympathizing friend, and our joys are doubled by participation; if there is any value in the counsels of one to whom every trait and circumstance of the case, however dark or revolting, are intimately known; if any consolation in reposing on the faithfulness of a bosom made strong enough to retain the secrets, however mighty, which are entrusted to its

care,—any comfort to the burdened conscience in pouring its penitential confessions into any other ear than that of a merciful and pardoning God; these advantages are gained and perpetuated, by this provision of the law. It operates constantly in favor of the wife, by securing the confidence of the husband. As he alone is responsible to the community, and she never is sued without him, it would not be in *his* power to create any legal embarrassments to *her*, by violating the confidence *she* may have reposed; while *she*, by such indiscretion, if she were liable to be called as a witness against him, might occasion incalculable harm. The consciousness, in both, that *neither* can be thus constrained, gives to their conversation unlimited freedom, and imparts the highest zest which friendship ever knows, bordering on the transparencies of heaven.

The law not only grants this immunity, but it interferes, actively, to secure it. Should either, forgetting the obligations of good faith and all the proprieties of that relation, be *willing* to bear witness against the other, the law sternly forbids it. It will not allow the rule to be violated, even by *agreement*. It has no hand to raise the veil of that sanctuary;—no ear to listen to the breathings of its hallowed communion;—it lays the hermetic seal of its finger on the lip that would reveal those secrets. Nay, if the parties themselves have drained the bitter cup of domestic dissension, and been finally divorced by a judicial decree, still, neither is permitted to testify, against the other, to any matter of confidential communication, made while the marriage tie existed.

Thus the wife is enabled to take her full participation in the fortunes of her husband; and he is encouraged and invited to confide in her, by the assurance given by the law, that his confidence shall not be violated. They are recognized as mutual friends, united, on equal terms, and for life,—engaged in a common cause, and entrusted with a material portion of the welfare of society. The law grants no exclusive privileges to the husband, but such as the exigences of the social state imperiously demand;—none, for which it does not exact from him the full price of exclusive liability and peril. The condition of the American female, so far from being one of privation and

restraint, is rendered by the law a state of dignity, and honor, and freedom. She parts with no rights, for which she has not an equivalent. She contributes her share to the demands of the state; she receives her share of its protection. The matron, so far from losing her civil existence by marriage, acquires new and important relations to society. She is represented by her husband, only where the social economy requires such an arrangement. The *law* interposes no farther than to bind each party to the performance of the contract, and to perpetuate that fidelity, and confidence, and love, which they mutually vowed at the altar.

Such, in rapid outline, are the legal rights of Woman, in this country. No other code could so well secure her happiness, she herself being the legislator and judge. Restless spirits, may raise discontents with the system; for it is always easier to point out faults, than to correct them. But a fair survey of her position, will evince the liberal policy and extreme care of the law, in guarding her rights, and promoting her welfare. And happy will it be for our land, if, instead of following modern agitators and reformers, in their visionary schemes of fancied improvement, we prefer, with better reason, to enjoy the advantages already secured by our own familiar and well-tried institutions.

ARTICLE IX.

ESCHENBURG'S MANUAL OF CLASSICAL LITERATURE.

Manual of Classical Literature: from the German of J. J. ESCHENBURG, Professor in the Carolinum, at Brunswick. With additions. By N. W. FISKE, Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy (formerly of the Latin and Greek Languages) in Amherst College. Third Edition. pp. 753. 8vo. Philadelphia. 1839.

THE demand for a third edition of this Manual sufficiently proves that such a work was needed. There is scarcely any branch of study where something of the kind would

not be useful. The young student who commences the study of the Greek and Roman classics needs some general survey of the whole field that is before him. Still more necessary is it for him to be initiated gradually into the literature of his particular course of study. At the same time, even while learning the principles of classification and arrangement so that he can readily make use of more extensive critical helps, he must have before him, within a moderate compass, the *elements* of all the branches of knowledge pertaining to his department. It is far better that these should be presented in a systematic form, as in the work before us, than in the chaotic form of a dictionary; for the beginner will then be trained to those habits of order, and to a familiarity with those divisions of study, which will be indispensable to him as he advances. We think it was judicious in the author, not only to adopt the chronological rather than the alphabetical order in Greek and Roman literature, but to classify the writers into the poets, orators, grammarians, philosophers, historians, &c., and to treat of these classes separately.

How quickening to the young intellect is it to have such a door of knowledge thrown open as that contained in this volume!* There is a key put into his hand for unlocking the treasures of antiquity. Enough is said under each division to aid him in his immediate studies; and yet knowledge is so imparted as to stimulate his appetite for more; and then the deeper sources of information are referred to, and the best writers on each topic are pointed out.

All our mature classical scholars have a painful sense of the deficiency of American books on these subjects. What means have our students enjoyed for a comprehensive survey of Greek and Roman literature? How few of them, until quite recently, were able to attach any definite idea to the names of the greater portion of the celebrated writers of antiquity! If an individual wished to extend his reading, especially, of Greek authors beyond the ordinary limit, he scarcely knew what writer, or what

* Lest, in bestowing any commendation on this book, we may appear to be guilty of indirect self-praise, we deem it our duty to state, that in those labors which constitute the substantial excellences of the work, we had no participation. What the courtesy of the translator has attributed to us, should be understood as applying only to unimportant details.

work to prefer to the rest. In regard to the best editions, little or nothing was known by the mass of students; or if one, more enlightened than others, had taken a recommendation from some European journal, he probably found upon, purchasing the work, that it was mainly devoted to the examination of manuscripts and to the settling of disputed readings, and was ill adapted to his wants. It is a well-known fact, that the number of persons among us was very small, who could give judicious advice to an ambitious student wishing to apply fifty or a hundred dollars to the purchase of choice works on classical literature.

On the whole subject of ancient art, there was almost an entire blank in our school books, and in the general histories that were resorted to, a vagueness which was but little better; and the traditionary knowledge about Phidias, Apelles, &c., which was handed down from year to year in college exhibitions, scarcely amounted to any thing more than what was elsewhere taught about Methuselah as the oldest man, and Moses as the meekest.

Prof. Fiske would have done great service, had he accomplished nothing more than to spread out before the students in our colleges the wide field of literature pertaining to the study of antiquity.

It is beginning to be felt abroad, and we hope it will be equally felt at home, that not lifeless collections of disconnected facts, as in our older works on antiquities, but a living, concrete image of every thing relating to antiquity and its culture, must be distinctly viewed and comprehended, before *a true classical spirit* can be created. We have had among the mass of educated men too much of the show of it without the solid attainment. There has often appeared to be a charm in the *words*, classic and Attic, a kind of romantic admiration of something excellent, according to common fame, and a laboring, awkward enough in many instances, to drag into our compositions classical allusions. The stale character of the most current allusions of the kind, and the puerility of others, show that they have not been the fresh product of a mind stored with the knowledge and imbued with the spirit of classical antiquity. But these things are passing, we wish we could say, have passed away. America is beginning to

participate with the old world in the general progress of all the studies pertaining to antiquity. Never was there a time, not even that of the Manutii, or of Scaliger and Salmasius, or of Bentley and Hemsterhuys, when ancient art, history, antiquities and literature were investigated with greater enthusiasm, or with greater success, than at the present moment. Every new steam-ship brings the tidings of new researches, new discoveries, new books from some of the host of Hermann and Böckh's disciples. What have these two *coryphaei* of the present generation of critics, and Niebuhr, and K.O. Müller, and Lobeck, and Creuzer, and Passow, and Welcker, and Wachsmuth and Böttiger and others effected, within a comparatively short period, in exhumating the vast Herculaneum of buried antiquity! We need to have more of this passion kindled in the bosoms of our rising scholars. We could wish the work before us might prove an entering wedge for the whole body of literature of which it gives us a mere taste. While we have been chiefly dependent on a few English antiquarians for our knowledge of ancient art, and had, until Eschenburg's work was translated, no tolerable manual on the subject for students, the German critics who have written on the archaeology of art, as it is termed by them, are so numerous, that a complete catalogue of their works would occupy several pages. We will, for the sake of illustrating our remark, give the names of the more celebrated German writers on the subject, viz., Winckelmann, Lessing, Heyne, Nitsch, Gruber, Christ, Ernesti, Sulzer, Rambach, Stieglitz, Hase, Ramdohr, Gurlitt, Siebenkees, Beck, Hirt, Meyer, Thiersch, Jacobs, Böttiger, Sillig, Müller, Gerhard, Schorn, Tölken, Brönsted and Stackelberg. Even the method of studying classical literature is made a distinct branch of instruction; and while we are without a guide on this important subject, the German student has many valuable ones from which he may select. The most important are Wolf's Encyclopedia of Philology, his Lectures on the study of Ancient Literature, Ast's Outlines of Philology, Bernhardt's Outlines of the Encyclopedia of Philology, Schuch's Encyclopedia of the Study of Antiquity, Hoffmann's Studies of Antiquity for Gymnasias, and Matthiae's Encyclopedia of Philology. Most of these are recent productions.

Some of our young readers, if we may judge from the frequent inquiries that are made on the subject, would welcome a brief list of select books to aid them in prosecuting their classical studies. In attempting to meet the wishes of such, we shall consider the wants of the ordinary theological student, and make our suggestions with reference to that class of persons and their grade of scholarship. As all the branches of this department of literature are not equally supplied with standard works, the books to be recommended cannot be exactly proportioned to the relative importance of the subject; but the selection must be made in conformity to the actual state of things.

The best guides in the selection of a philological library are, Friedemann's List of Philological Works for Students, which is very general, including the various philological aids that are needed; Hoffmann's Bibliographical Manual for the study of the Latin and Greek Languages, noticed in our last number, p. 144; Schweiger's Classical Bibliography, which is devoted particularly to the various editions of the Latin and Greek classics, and which, while it is the most complete, is also the most minute and exact in stating the merits and defects of each; and Hoffmann's (new and as yet unfinished) Bibliographical Lexicon of the Whole Body of Greek Literature. This last, when it shall be finished, will probably be the most satisfactory work in regard to Greek literature.

The only general work of special value on the plan of Eschenburg's Manual is Schaaff's Encyclopedia of the Studies pertaining to Classical Antiquity, which does not treat of the *method* of study, as the Encyclopedias above-mentioned, but gives an admirable outline, in five parts, of Greek and Roman literature, Greek and Roman antiquities and of ancient art. Bernhardt's Outlines of Roman Literature is, of course, fuller than those parts of Eschenburg and Schaaff which relate to the same subject. But the largest and best work for maturer scholars is Bähr's History of Roman Literature, in two octavo volumes. Bernhardt has also published a History of Greek Literature. The work which best answers the demands of ripe scholars on this subject is that of Schöll, translated into German, with numerous corrections and additions.

Pauly's (unfinished) *Real-Encyclopedia*, or *Classical Dictionary*, prepared with the assistance of many of the distinguished living scholars of Germany, promises to surpass every work of the kind which has yet been published.

On Grecian antiquities there are many recent works of great value, at the head of which stand Wachsmuth's *Hellenic Antiquities*, in two large volumes, Hermann's *Political Antiquities of Greece*, in one volume, and Böckh's *Public Economy of Athens*, all of which are translated into English. In studying the Attic orators, Meier and Schömann's *Attic Trial* (in German) is indispensable; Schömann's *Antiquitates Juris Publici Graecorum*, and Westermann's *History of Grecian Eloquence* are also very valuable.

On Roman antiquities there are no general works of equal merit to be recommended. Eschenburg and Schaaff give the best summaries. There are several special works of great interest. Such are Böttiger's *Sabina*, representing the life of a Roman lady of rank; Becker's *Gallus*, or *Roman Scenes in the Age of Augustus*; Heineccius's *Legal Antiquities of Rome* and Bach's *History of Roman Jurisprudence*, the two former in German, the two latter in Latin.

Cramer is the best author on Greek and Roman education; Sprengel (in the first two volumes of his *History of Medicine*) on the natural sciences among the ancients; Brandis's *Manual* and Ritter's larger work on Greek and Roman philosophy; K. O. Müller on the archaeology of art (translated into English); Ideler's larger and smaller work on *Chronology*; Ulrici and Bode on the history of Greek poetry; Schirlitz's small manual, Sickler's larger work (in two volumes), and Uckert's more extensive as well as more scientific, but unfinished work, on geography, to which should be added Reichard's *Orbis Terrarum Veteribus Cognitus*, and Hoffmann's *School Atlas*; Schlosser, Müller, Helwing and Droyson on Greek, and Wachsmuth, Niebuhr and Drumann on Roman history; Nitsch's *Mythological Dictionary* (rich in its details), and Lobeck's *Aglaophamus* and Müller's *Prolegomena* (on the theory), and Creuzer's *Symbolik* (abounding in facts, but rather fanciful in theory), and Millin's *Mythological Gallery* (190

plates, Tölken's German Translation, second edition, 1836) on Mythology.

Kühner's is now generally regarded as the best Greek grammar; Buttmann and Rost are too well known to need remark; Bernhardt's Greek Syntax has great merits mingled with some defects. Pinzger's Greek Lexicon pays considerable regard to synonyms and is highly commended. Passow is in every one's hands.

Zumpt and O. Schulz have published the best Latin grammars for schools. Ramshorn's large Latin grammar, though not without its faults, is the best for advanced students. The new edition of Vossius's Aristarchus by Förtsch and Eckstein furnishes the richest collection of grammatical materials for the critical scholar. The extensive Latin Lexicon, commenced by Freund, is regarded as the best specimen of lexicography before the public. Georges's new edition of Lünemann is as yet the best school Lexicon. Grysar, Hand and Krebs may be recommended as the most distinguished writers on Latin composition and style. On Latin Synonyms, Ramshorn and Döderlein were noticed in No. XVI, p. 614, of this Review. To what was there said we may add, that Schmalfeld's new Latin Synonyms which have rapidly passed through three editions, are the clearest in their distinctions and, according to Ellendt in Jahn's Jahrbücher, the best, upon the whole, for students. Hand's Turselinus is the only satisfactory work on Latin particles. On Greek particles, there is nothing of equal value. Hartung, though a little too ingenious, is the most critical. The second volume of Devarius, containing the notes of Klotz, will, according to Hermann's prediction, be better. The small anonymous Europa Latina, and Bishoff and Möller's larger Dictionary of Comparative Geography, are the most convenient in regard to the geographical names which occur in modern Latin authors.

Our space will not allow us to give an extended account of the editions of the Greek and Roman classics; we must confine our remarks to a few of the most important.

1. *The Greek Poets.* The most valuable school edition of Homer's Iliad is that of Spitzner, prepared for Jacobs and Rost's Bibliotheca Graeca. All the works embraced in this collection are on the same general plan. The notes, which are always in Latin, are chiefly explanatory, and

ordinarily occupy about one third of each page. The *Odyssey* by Crusius, with copious notes in German, is the best adapted to the wants of ordinary students. The edition of Baumgarten-Crusius, with the Greek scholia and additional notes, is also valuable for more advanced scholars. The Explanatory Notes of Nitsch in German are very valuable. Buttmann's *Lexilogus* (translated into English) is a very important aid in explaining the language of Homer. The last edition of Köppen's Explanatory Remarks on the *Iliad* by Spitzner, in six small volumes, is a very good, perhaps the best, commentary on the *Iliad*. Dissen's *Pindar* is altogether the best for the American student. The Commentary, in Latin, is very full, and is founded upon the views of Böckh. Böckh's edition is too learned for common use, and Heyne's is unsatisfactory. Klausen's *Æschylus*, Wunder's *Sophocles* and Pflugk's *Euripides* in Jacobs and Rost's *Bibliotheca*, though possessing different degrees of merit, may be the most safely recommended to students. Schneider's *Æschylus* and *Sophocles*, with a copious German commentary, err only in explaining too much. Wellauer's *Lexicon* to *Æschylus* is good, and Ellendt's *Lexicon* to *Sophocles* is still better. The *Œdipus Coloneus* by Reisig, and the *Ajax* of *Sophocles* by Lobeck, are rich and splendid productions. Gruppe's *Ariadne*, or the *Tragical Art of the Greeks*, is an important work for the study of the tragedians, as also, though more general, E. Müller's *History of the Theory of Art among the Ancients*, both of them recent productions. Bekker's *Aristophanes* is excellent, but is somewhat expensive, and is designed for critical scholars. *Anacreon* by Möbius, uniform with the *Bibliotheca Graeca*, is more convenient than Melhorn's edition. Of a similar character are Wüstemann's *Theocritus* and Götting's *Hesiod*, included in the same collection.

2. *The Greek Historians.* Gaisford's *Herodotus* has a good text, and a very rich and valuable collection of notes in Latin which may be purchased separately. Struve's *Herodotus* is, perhaps, a better school edition; it constitutes a part of the *Bibliotheca Graeca*. Poppo's *Thucydides* is too good; this is the only objection we ever heard made against it. Few can afford to pay for a work that so completely exhausts the subject. Göller's edition,

with Latin notes, in two volumes, is by far the best for those who cannot aspire to the possession of Poppo's splendid work. Bornemann's school edition of Xenophon, in Jacobs and Rost's collection, deserves similar commendation. The *Anabasis* by Krüger, and the *Memorabilia* by Herbst are admirably executed. Of Polybius, the excellent edition of Schweighäuser is too voluminous and expensive for ordinary scholars. The Leipsic stereotype edition contains a few select notes from Maio. 3. *The Greek Philosophers*. Stalbaum's Plato, in the *Bibliotheca Graeca*, is universally approved. There are many good critical editions of Plato, of which we will mention only those of Bekker and Heindorf. Ast's *Lexicon Platonium*, his *Life of Plato*, and C. F. Hermann, Van Heusde and Bonitz on the philosophy of Plato are all very valuable. Much less has been done in recent times for Aristotle. His whole works are best edited by Bekker; his *Ethics* by Zell, his *Ars Poetica* by Gräfenhan, his *De Anima*, and selections from his logical writings by Trendelenberg, his *Metaphysics* by Brandis, and his *Rhetoric* by Bekker. His biography has been written by Buhle and by Stahr. The *Moralia* of Plutarch by Wyttenbach is a treasure of learning; the Notes may be had separately. 4. *The Greek Orators*. The *Attic Orators*, by Dobson, is the best complete collection with translations and commentaries; that of Bekker is purely critical, having no commentary. The Selections from the principal Attic orators by Bremi, with explanatory notes, in the *Bibliotheca Graeca*, will, as to extent, literary character and expense, best suit the case of most scholars. The *Critical and Exegetical Apparatus to Demosthenes*, by Schäfer, in five volumes, has a very high reputation. Hermann pronounces it Schäfer's best work. Becker's *Demosthenes as a Statesman and Orator*, and Ranke's *Life of Demosthenes* in Ersch and Gruber's *Encyclopedia*, both in German, are very important aids to the study of Demosthenes.

For those whose object it is to become masters of the Roman language, and who desire the aid of commentaries on the Latin classics, in which the principles of the language are explained, we would recommend Bremi's *Cornelius Nepos*, his *Suetonius*, Herzog's *Cæsar* and *Sallust*, Sallust by Kritz, Ruhnken's *Dictata* to Terence,

Suetonius and Ovid, and the Commentaries of P. Manutius on Cicero's Orations and Epistles, edited separately by Richter. There are numerous commentaries, more or less valuable, that may be purchased apart from the text. Such are those of Ruperti on Tacitus and Juvenal, Schmieder on Plautus, Ruhnken and Manutius, as stated above, and many others.

The best edition of Cicero's entire works is that of Orelli. The few notes relate chiefly to the various readings. His Orations are best edited by Klotz, the Verrine Orations by Zumpt, and Select Orations by Matthiae and by Möbius; his philosophical writings by Görenz (only the *Academica*, *de Legibus* and *de Finibus* were completed), *de Natura Deorum* by Moser, *de Officiis* by Heusinger (new edition by Zumpt), and the *Tusculan Questions* (admirably executed) by Kühner. The whole body of Cicero's Epistles, with explanatory notes, has been lately published in a cheap form by Billerbeck. Abeken's Cicero, in his *Letters*, a kind of historical commentary, is commended in very high terms. Schirlitz's *Introduction to the Writings of Cicero* we have elsewhere noticed with commendation.

Of the various editions of Horace, that of Döring, though not the most critical, is the most convenient and best adapted to schools. The *Odes* by Mitschertich, the *Satires* by Heindorf and the *Epistles* by Schmid, are all excellent. The commentaries of Heindorf and Schmid are very copious and rich.

The new edition of Heyne's *Virgil* by Wagner is very splendid. This was Heyne's great work. To those who cannot purchase so costly an edition, the *Abridgment* by Wunderlich may be recommended.

Quintilian by Spalding, continued by Buttmann and Zumpt, may well compare with Heyne's *Virgil*. The *Lexicon to Quintilian*, the last volume of this edition, recently published by Bonnel, has a very high reputation.

The most extensive critical edition of Tacitus, is that recently issued by Ruperti; the best edition for common use is that of Walther. Walch's edition of the *Agricola* is very valuable for the advanced student, as is also the *Germania* by Passow.

Ovid's *Metamorphoses* are best edited by Bach, his *Fasti* (for schools) by Conrad, his *Tristia* anonymously, Leipsic, 1829, a school edition. We have room only to add

Plautus, with a critical text by Lindemann, and with a pretty good commentary by Schmieder; Lucretius by Forbiger, Propertius by Lachman, and the *Corpus Poetarum Latinorum*, in one volume, by Weber.

There is no branch of literature connected with our general subject, on which the student makes so fruitless inquiries as respecting the biographies of eminent classical scholars. Even the Manual before us gives but little information on this point. It is true, indeed, that only a part of that honored class of men have had their lives and labors portrayed in a manner worthy of their fame, and that not a few of their memoirs are inaccessible to the mass of readers, in consequence of being in costly critical journals, transactions of learned societies, or in large biographical collections. Still there are many valuable biographies of such men that may be found without much trouble. There are some cheap collections, of which the best are Lindemann's *Vitae Duumvirorum*, or the *Lives of Hemsterhuys and Ruhnken*, written by Ruhnken and Wyttenbach; Frotscher's *Eloquentiam Virorum*, &c., or *Eloquent Biographies of Learned Men*, containing Reiske's Life by Eck, Life of the same by Morus, Life of J. A. Ernesti by A. G. Ernesti, Funeral Oration on the death of Graevius by P. Burmann, Ruhnken's Eulogy of Hemsterhuys, Reiske's Autobiography and Gesner's Life by Ernesti; and Friedemann's *Vitae Hominum Eruditissimorum*, &c., embracing the Life of Wyttenbach by Mahne, the Life of Reiske by Morus, and the Lives of Christ, Gellert and Jöcher by Ernesti. These three collections, making only five volumes in the whole and costing about as many dollars, are generally recommended to German students, not only on account of their internal value, but on account of their pure Latinity. A fourth collection in German by Hoffmann, of which one volume has appeared, containing the lives of Jacobs, Böckh, Zell and Politian, promises to add much to our scanty stock of this species of biography. We subjoin a list of the most valuable separate biographies of distinguished classical scholars. Monk's Life of Bentley is well known. The Biographical Sketch of Böttiger by his son has considerable interest to the lovers of ancient art. The Life of Erasmus has been written in French by Burigny, in

English by Jortin, Knight and Butler, and in German by Hess, and best of all by A. Müller. The Life of Fabricius by Reimar, and of Forcellini by Ferrari, are both in Latin. There is a Life of Gedike, in German, by Schmidt. Besides Ernesti's Life of Gesner, there are two others by Michaelis and Baumeister. There is a Latin Eulogy of Dousa by Siegenbeck, and another of Duker by Saxius. Of the several biographies of Grotius, we will mention only that by Butler in English, and that by Luden in German. The Life of Heyne by Heeren needs no commendation. Coray's Life by de Sinner, in French, is the best. There is a Life of I. J. Hottinger in German by the celebrated Bremi, and one of Köppen by Süstermann. Of Manso there is a brief biography in Latin by Passow, reprinted in his *Opuscula*, and another in German by Kluge. Meiroto's Life by Brunn, and that of Reiz by Bauer, are both in German. There are three Lives of Morus, two in Latin by Beck and Höpfner, and one in German by Voight. An account of the new and admirable biography of B. G. Niebuhr was given in our last number. The Life of Passow, by Wachler, just published, is highly commended. There is an excellent Biography of Reuchlin in German, by Mayerhoff; that of Gehres has less value. Rhodomann's Biography was written in Latin by Lang, and in German by Volborth. That there is a Life of Ruddiman, by Chalmers, hardly needs to be mentioned. Passow's Life of J. G. Schneider is reprinted in his *Opuscula*. The memory of Schweighäuser is preserved by Dahler in a Latin *Memoria*. Krebs has recently written a brief, but admirable Life of Sigonius in Latin. Beside the old Latin Eulogy on Perizonius by Schulting, there is one of recent date by Kramer. The Life of Spalding by Walch is a good specimen of biography. For the Lives of the Stephensens, we refer the reader to what is said in No. XIV, p. 535, of this Review. There is a Sketch of the Life of Voss by Paulus, and a recent Biography by Döring. Wakefield's Memoirs were written by himself. Of J. A. Wolf there is a full Biography by his son-in-law, Körte, which is censured by the critics.

Beside these separate works, there are many excellent biographical sketches contained in larger publications. In the *Zeitgenossen*, a magazine for contemporary biog-

raphy, there are good autobiographies of Creuzer and Buttmann, and biographies of Garve, C. Burney, Porson and Bouterwek. In Wolf's *Analecta* are short sketches of J. Taylor, Larcher, Bentley, Porson and others. In Justi's *History of Hessian Scholars, Authors and Artists* there are autobiographies of the two Grimms. A sketch of the Life of P. Burmann is found in Wyttenbach's *Opuscula*; a Life of Casaubon by Almeloveen in his collection of Casaubon's Letters; sketches of Dissen's Life and Character by Thiersch, Welcker and K. O. Müller in Dissen's *Smaller Miscellaneous writings*; Eichstädt's Autobiography in his *Annals of the University of Jena*; G. F. Grotfend's Autobiography in his *History of the Hanover Lyceum, or gymnasium*; G. C. Harles's Life in Seebode and Friedemann's *Miscellanies*; C. Heusinger's Life in Seebode's *Archives*; Parr's Life in the *Annual Biography*, Vol. X, 1826; Porson's Life in the *Königsberg Archives*, by Erfurt; Scheller's Life in Schlichtegroll's *Necrologue for the nineteenth century*; Schlosser's admirable autobiography in the *Zeitgenossen*, new series; the Life of Schutz by Jacobs in the same; Sylburg's Life by Creuzer in the *New Acts of the Latin Society, Jena*; and a sketch of Villoison's Life in Wyttenbach's *Opuscula*.

In naming the most eminent classical scholars and critics from the time of the Greek refugees and the revival of letters to that of Wolf, and in hinting at what is most striking in their history, character, or works, we shall be guided mainly by the views of Hermann, whose lectures we heard on this subject. Passing over the names of the Greeks who introduced the language and literature of their ancestors into Italy, we come in the order of time to Politian, the beautiful modern Latin poet, Linacer, the morning star of classical literature in England, Crocus, the teacher of Camoens, and an inhabitant of many countries of Europe, Budaeus, one of the greatest of Greek scholars, upon whom H. Stephens drew so largely for his *Thesaurus*, Reuchlin, who did for Germany what Linacer did for England, P. Victorius, one of the greatest of Florentine scholars, P. Manutius, the accomplished Ciceronian, Camerarius, the biographer of Melancthon, celebrated for his critical labors on Plautus, Cicero, Horace and Nepos, the Demosthenian Wolf, C. Gesner,

the German Pliny in natural history, Muretus, "good in all his works," H. Stephens, the unsurpassed lexicographer, Sylburg, accurate and erudite, employed by Stephens, the younger Scaliger, "who knew every thing," and was as haughty as he was learned, Rhodomann, the paragon of modern Greek poets, Lipsius, "who knew Tacitus by heart," the great Casaubon, "whose Athenaeus, Strabo and other editions of the classics are all good," Gruter, "who was professor every where," and whose chief work is his *Thesaurus Inscriptionum*, G. T. Vossius, "a man of great learning, author of Aristarchus, the richest Latin grammar," Isaac Vossius, "a man of undoubted talent, but of a peculiar character," Meursius, whose industry collected more learned materials than his genius could master, D. Heinsius, a man of talent and a good critic and Latin poet, Grotius, the statesman, scholar, and wonderful Latin poet, Casper Von Barth, whose immense reading is shown in his sixty books of *Adversaria*, Allatius of Chios, who as librarian at the Vatican copied innumerable manuscripts, forty with the same pen, Salmasius, the learned, "with a Juno for his wife," J. Rutgers, distinguished for his excellent *Lectiones Venusinae*, J. H. Gronovius, deeply learned and humane, T. Faber, "odd," E. Spenheim, "who resided every where and understood every thing, and whose head was a perfect medley of learning," Graevius, celebrated as an academical lecturer, Duker, an admirable editor, J. Gronovius, the very opposite of his father, Perizonius, an acute antiquarian, Bentley, "one of the greatest, as well as haughtiest of critics, whose very errors are instructive, more highly prized in Germany than in England," Fabricius, "rapid and flippant," P. Burmann, "L. L. D. after the manner of the Dutch, and editor of innumerable classic authors," Küster, "who was never pleased," and never effected much, Hemsterhuys, "whose great learning, unlike that of Valcknär, made him modest and sober, and who is, perhaps, all that Ruhnken represents him as being," the Heusingers, "good in Latin," Stephen Bergler, "a singular and cynical man, a good critic and yet not a good scholar, abused by Brunck," Wesseling, whose fame rests on his Herodotus, his *Observationes* and his *Probabilia*, D'Oorville, "a learned man and good critic, but a terrible foe

of the simple de Pauw," Alberti, a feeble critic, Valcknär, who studied much and studied deeply, but was too exquisitely nice, and was fond of improving upon his author, Ruhnken, "a disciple of Hemsterhuys and Valcknär, the rival of Muretus as a Latinist" ("in his ordinary lectures he spoke no language, but employed a mixture of Dutch, English, Latin and French"), Wyttenbach, "very learned, especially in ancient philosophy and in all that related to Plutarch, and yet not very profound," Dawes, "a man of genius, though his rules of criticism are more empyrical than philosophical," Markland, "an acute, refined, modest, hypochondriacal critic," Lennep, "a real Dutchman, always collecting huge masses of materials, and seeking out parallel passages," Musgrave, "better in explaining a writer than in correcting the text," Toup, "too bold a critic, though a good expositor," Tyrwhitt, "always to the point, never deserted by his critical tact," Brunck, "learned, elegant and proud" ("he abused Schneider, as he did many others"), Villoison, excellent on Homer, and in all he did, Wakefield, "lively and rash," Porson, "a nice critic, a man of great reading but of less genius than Bentley, too empyrical, and intolerably proud," Elmsley, "a gentleman and wholly destitute of philological pride" ("his rules of Attic Greek are excellent, but the method, like that of all the English is too empyrical"), Dobree, "a mere editor, whose *Adversaria* ought never to have been published," Heyne, "not profound and thorough, but amazingly comprehensive in his learning," Reiz, elaborate and nice,—he always took off his hat when he spoke of Bentley,—Wolf, a tyrant over students, a restless spirit. He had great talent and industry, but was more energetic and versatile than philosophical. He was a man of uncontrollable passions; he became the friend of Voss out of enmity to Heyne.

We revert, in conclusion, to the *Manual* of Prof. Fiske, and recommend to our readers this new edition, on the grounds stated in the following words from his preface:

"The present edition contains a new translation of that part of Eschenberg, which relates to the Roman authors, with large additions. Besides this essential improvement, a considerable quantity of new matter is also introduced in other portions. The value of the work is,

moreover, augmented by the insertion of numerous illustrations. These are carefully combined in Plates to avoid the loss of room occasioned by scattering single cuts separately over the pages; and the whole printing is executed in a very compact style; so that, notwithstanding all the additions and the accession of several hundred cuts, the sensible bulk of the volume is scarcely increased."

EDITOR.

ARTICLE X.

LITERARY NOTICES.

1. *Crania Americana; or, a Comparative View of the Skulls of various Aboriginal Nations of North and South America, &c.* By SAMUEL GEORGE MORTON, M. D. 1839.

EVERY thing relating to the *aborigines* of this country is worthy of regard; and the attention of men of science seems to be more productively turned to this subject just at the present time than at any former period. The appearance, within so short a time, of Mr. Delafield's work on American Antiquities,* and of Dr. Morton's *Crania Americana*, speaks much for the advance of general interest in the subject. The object of each of these works may be said to be essentially the same, viz., to determine to what people belongs the origin of those numerous remains, in the shape of earth works, and stone works of cyclopean structure, scattered over parts of North and South America. Dr. Morton does not indeed carry his researches so far as to determine, like Mr. Delafield, whether or not the builders of the wondrous remains of Tiaguanica and Titicaca were of the self-same race and kindred with those who shaped the pyramids of Egypt. He confines himself to aiming to prove, chiefly by the aid of a comparison of the skulls of the parties, certain points as to the connection, in race and origin, of the present and former possessors of the soil, not of European origin, and as to the origin of the works of man's hands which still exist.

Before passing to notice Dr. Morton's theory, and the kind and value of the proofs brought forward in support of it, we must pay the just tribute of our admiration to the *execution* of the work. In these degenerate days of duodecimos and diamond editions, a goodly folio of the size before us is indeed a rarity;—a rarity which gladdens the eyes of all lovers of the good old solid literature which abounded and was esteemed two centuries ago more than, alas, it now generally is. The

* Reviewed in Vol. IV, p. 555, of this Review.

illustrations to Dr. Morton's work, in the form of seventy lithographic plates, are fit subjects for our highest praise, and are some of the best specimens with which we are acquainted. The lithographic process was rightly chosen for the purpose. The finest engraving would hardly have been so *real* or true. There are few objects more difficult to give a just idea of by drawing than human skulls, and the shading of the chalk is more effectual than the nicest touches of the graver. The majority of the plates are beautiful. A few, the earlier work of the artist we doubt not, are of inferior workmanship. The truth of the drawings we can in general feel assured of. As a collection of authentic monuments of this kind alone, the work would be of high value. Its literary merits we must examine more at length.

The theory which it is the object of Dr. Morton to establish,—or perhaps we should rather say, the conclusions to which his researches have led him, are the following :

“1st. That the American race differs essentially from all others, not excepting the Mongolian: nor do the feeble analogies of language, and the more obvious ones in civil and religious institutions and the arts, denote any thing beyond casual or colonial communication with the Asiatic nations; and even these analogies may perhaps be accounted for, as Humboldt has suggested, in the mere coincidence arising from similar wants and impulses, in nations inhabiting similar latitudes.

“2d. That the American nations, excepting the Polar tribes, are of one race and one species, but of two great families,”—elsewhere named by him the American family and the Toltecan family,—“which resemble each other in physical, but differ in intellectual character.

“3d. That the cranial remains discovered in the mounds, from Peru to Wisconsin, belong to the same race, and probably to the Toltecan family.”

We shall pass over the first point without remark.

Dr. Morton's second point is, it will be seen, in direct opposition to the usual opinion, and, what is more to the point, to the view sought to be established by Mr. Delafield, who asserts (see Vol. IV, of this Review, p. 579) that the mound builders “could not have been the existing Indian race or their ancestors; nor can any other race be found on the continent, which can be supposed to have done the work in question.”

Though Dr. Morton, however, thus asserts a proposition directly contrary to that of Mr. Delafield, yet, as we shall presently show, he does in truth bring together many facts which directly support Mr. Delafield's view. We leave these inconsistencies out of view for the present, and will speak merely of the letter of Dr. Morton's conclusions.

In support of this point, then, of the identity of the American races, Dr. Morton brings a long and very interesting array of facts, in the way of comparisons of the skulls of the (recent) Mexican and Peruvian tribes with those of the other tribes of North and South America. He shows, we think, very satisfactorily, that the same *type*

of skull prevails throughout the specimens of each; and, showing at the same time, as he does, the difference which exists between this type and that of the nations of Europe and Asia and Africa, he establishes it with a strength of proof which we think unanswerable, that the Peruvian and Mexican (recent) civilized tribes and the other wilder tribes of North and South America are identical in race, though so widely differing from each other, in the extremes of barbarism and of cultivation at which they were first found by Europeans.

We pass on to the third point. In reference to which we will quote our author's own words as to the geographical distribution, and the general character of the mounds or earth works. On page 217, he says, "In North America there are very few mounds east of the Alleghany mountains. They are extremely infrequent, if not wholly deficient, throughout the New England States, New York, Pennsylvania and other States as far as South Carolina where they are common in the interior. The latter remark is also applicable to Georgia and Florida, and all the country which skirts the Gulf of Mexico. Throughout the valley of the Mississippi they are very numerous. * * *

They abound much farther north, and are seen as far as the vicinity of Lake Travers, in lat. 46°, which is probably the northern limits of these remains. They are observed up the Ohio and its tributaries to the base of the Alleghanies; diminish in frequency westward of the Mississippi, and are not seen beyond the Rocky Mountains. To the south they are common in Arkansas, and in Mexico are vastly numerous. In Peru and its ancient dependencies, they are also seen in great number, and even as far south as the country of the Araucos, in Chili. East of the Andes they are rarely seen; and Humboldt is of opinion that there is not a tumulus in all Guiana. * * *

The uses of these structures were various, as will appear from the position they occupy, and the articles contained in them; nor can there be a question that they were mainly designed for receptacles for the dead."

* * * On page 219, he asks, "Of what race were the people who constructed these tumuli?" By turning to page 228, &c., the answer will be found. We extract sufficient to render that answer clear in this place. "The preceding illustrations embrace eight genuine mound skulls, and no one, I think, can examine them, without being struck with their resemblance to the other crania figured in this work; * * * and, when we recur to the geographical distribution of the mounds, as already noticed, they will be found scattered over those parts of both Americas which were inhabited by the demi-civilized nations embraced in the Toltecan family. Wherever these tumuli are found, whether in Peru, Mexico, Florida, or the Valley of the Mississippi, they are observed to be similarly constructed, and to contain analogous remains." In another page he makes some remarks which support, as also do those just quoted, Mr. Delafield's view of the similarity in origin of the earth and other works of antiquity scattered over the country north and south. "That the fortifications," says

he, page 229, "and other ancient structures of our western country belong to the same era and people with the mounds, seems probable from the circumstance of their almost constantly occurring together; nor is there any thing in the mode of their construction that points to a higher civilization. In fact, a careful review of all the circumstances will lead almost unavoidably to the conclusion, that the ancient mounds of America owe their origin to the various branches of the great Toltecan family, which was spread, as we have seen, from the confines of Chili to the shores of Lake Superior. * * * That they once occupied Florida and the Valley of the Mississippi, there can be no doubt." This latter view is curiously confirmed by some of the narratives of the early Scandinavian voyages to this country; and incidental confirmations of this kind are valuable.

So far, then, for the views of Dr. Morton. In the last point it will be seen that he entirely agrees with Mr. Delafield in so far as the identity in origin of the works are concerned, differing from him as to the race of workers. His own position does not, however, as we shall see, go uncontradicted by himself in another part of his work. The proof brought forward in this way, of skulls, is, however, pretty complete in so far as the recent tribes are concerned. We must next turn to the inconsistencies existing in Dr. Morton's book, and which, unfortunately, refer to the most important and interesting part of the whole subject. They relate entirely to the Toltecan race, and to the origin of those very works which excite the greatest interest and curiosity.

On the one hand, we see it represented that all the mounds and other structures, cyclopean as well as otherwise, were built by the *Toltecan*s; who, it is sufficiently and satisfactorily proved, extended at different times "from the confines of Chili to the shores of Lake Superior," and who are as satisfactorily proved to be of the same *race* as the more savage tribes of North and South America. On the other hand, we see it represented and proved that there was a race in Peru *more ancient* than these Toltecan, and to which *ancient race* is undoubtedly to be ascribed the building of those cyclopean works which yet exist there. What to make of these contradictions we know not. It is obvious that they upset the views expressed by the author completely; and that the *facts they contain* suggest totally different views. It appears to us as if the work had been composed in pieces, at different times, and that thus the mass of facts was, in great measure, forgotten before the last pages, containing the author's *conclusions*, were written. We give Dr. Morton every praise for research and accumulation of facts of interest and importance. We regret to have to remark the defect pointed out.

On the whole, we consider the literary portion of the work as valuable, though it might have been improved by a more careful and methodical examination and comparison of the facts brought together; the collection of which must have been the work of much time and reading on the author's part.

2. *An Historical Presentation of Augustinism and Pelagianism from the Original Sources.* By G. F. WIGGERS, D. D., *Professor of Theology in the University of Rostock, &c.* Translated from the German, with Notes and Additions, by Rev. RALPH EMERSON, Prof. of Eccl. Hist. in the Theol. Sem., Andover, Mass. 8vo. pp. 383. Andover. Published by Gould, Newman & Saxton. New York. 1840.

As we have in a former number reviewed the original work, and expressed our views of its character, it only remains for us now to notice the translation. It is a fortunate circumstance that the translator of this historical production is himself an ecclesiastical historian. None but such can ordinarily be expected to sympathize with the author and enter fully into all his views, or even comprehend his words. Few others would be likely to bestow upon the subject the amount of labor requisite to give special value to a translation. The entire contents of a work to be transferred into another language needs to be analyzed, understood and felt, no less by the translator than by the original author. Omissions, oversights, errors, in short, all imperfections ought to be pointed out and remedied by the translator. We are happy to perceive that Prof. Emerson well understood the nature of his undertaking, and that he has been indefatigable in his efforts to put the last finish upon this part of his work. The book has been Anglicised in more respects than one. Its general appearance and form have been improved; the Latin quotations have been revised, often enlarged, and generally translated; the wants of the American student have been particularly regarded in the notes, and the hand of the theologian and scholar, as well as historian, is every where visible.

The version itself is as accurate and unblemished in regard to thought and style as could reasonably be expected. It is no easy matter for one who has not learned a language by social intercourse and by long and daily practice, to translate a whole volume without falling into any errors. Many expressions occur in all authors whose import cannot be made out on mere grammatical principles. There must be something like an inward sense by which the genius of a language can be *felt*, something that can never be embodied in a lexicon or grammar. Nearly all the recent translations from the German betray more or less of deficiency in regard to the finer turns of expression, and the sense of idiomatic phrases, to say nothing of allusions to current opinions and events. Prof. Emerson stands on a level with others in this respect. There are, in the course of the volume, several inaccuracies; and so there are in almost every American translation from the German which we have examined. In pointing out the most important of these errors, our object is not to bring together under one view all the imperfections scattered through the whole work, and thus make out a long catalogue of sins. Such a procedure would be alike disingenuous and deceptive. To guard entirely against leaving such an impression on the mind of any reader, we would distinctly state, that these inaccuracies, when compared with the extent of the work and the difficulties growing out of the nature of the case, bear a very small proportion to the whole. Believing that a large number of our readers will procure this valuable, and to a minister almost indispensable, book, without having the means

of making any corrections, we have been induced to prepare, for their benefit (and for the consideration of the translator, should he be called to issue a second edition), a pretty full list of *corrigenda*. For the sake of convenience, we place the translations side by side in parallel columns.

*Prof. Emerson's Translation.**Corrected Translation.*

Page 15, line 2 from the bottom. "But before I completed my labor in this respect, I compared all that has been written."

Not until (erst als) I had completed my labor in this respect did I compare, &c.

P. 27, l. 22.—"the groundlessness of whose doctrine he exposed."

—*of* the groundlessness of whose doctrine *he became convinced* —sich überzeigte.

P. 29, l. 1. "It may be regarded as rather an indication and a consequence of his former mode of theological speculation, that he made Paul's epistles the object of his study."

It was not without importance and effect upon his subsequent mode, &c.—Nicht ohne Bedeutung und Folge für seine nachherige theologische Denkart.

P. 36, l. 19. "He had, from his youth up, a certain tenderness of feeling; and in the sequel, through his habit of praying for others, he was not lightly troublesome to any one."

He had a certain *delicacy* of feeling from his youth; and *he did not afterwards easily become burdensome to any one, in asking aid for others.*

P. 41, l. 10. "By Brito, however, Prosper might understand only a Briton."

By Brito, however, Prosper *can have understood nothing else than a Briton.*

P. 43, bottom.—"and hence it may well be, that the same presbyter Rufinus, who came from the East to Rome, towards the close of the fourth century (and who may have introduced into Stepsis, in respect to many doctrines, the freer spirit of Origen, whom he greatly admired), brought Pelagius to his view of the moral state of man, or confirmed him in it."

—and hence it may well be, that the same presbyter Rufinus, who came from the East, towards the close of the fourth century, *and whom the free spirit of Origen* (of whom he was a great admirer) *may have led into skepticism* (und den überhaupt Origines freier Geist, dessen grosser Verehrer er war, zur Skepsis über manche Lehre geführt haben mochte), &c.

P. 68, bottom. "Nay, at a future day, by a resurrection from all evil, and therefore from all base passions, and the infirmity which here always cleaves to him, he shall become completely free, so that he can never more sin."

Nay, he will one day, at the resurrection, *be perfectly freed from all evil*, and consequently from sinful desires and infirmity, &c.

P. 69, l. 27.—"as he well expressed himself."

—as he, *no doubt*, expressed himself—wie er sich—auch wohl ausdrückte.

P. 72, bottom. "This inference is of such a kind that every other part of his whole system ought to have been given up"—

This consequence was of such a character *that every other person would have abandoned* his whole system—jeder andere sein ganzes System würde aufgegeben haben.

P. 73, l. 7. "For a while it may have pained him"—

At times (zuweilen) it may have pained him.

P. 77, bottom. "The contest which arose—in respect to baptism (a matter in which Augustine had already so directly controverted himself during the vehement Donatist disputes) concerned—*infant* baptism."

The contest which arose—in respect to baptism, *a subject in the discussion of which he had deeply involved himself* during, &c.—in welche sich Augustinus—so recht hinein disputirt hatte.

P. 88, No. 5. "This original sin, however, is nothing substantial, but is a quality of the affections (affectionalis qualitas), and a vice indeed (vitium), a weakness (linguor)." See, also, p. 100, l. 7.

And yet this original sin is not a substance, but is an affection or quality, and that too as a defect or weakness. [The translation is faulty rather in respect to the sense and idiom than single words.]

P. 98, l. 15. "But, in my opinion, so great weakness of the flesh shows almost any punishment."

So great a weakness of the flesh does of itself, in my opinion, prove *some kind of* (irgend eine) punishment.

P. 98, l. 28. "From this, it certainly follows, then, that man has no free-will. And it was, indeed, the Augustinian doctrine, that man has lost free-will, by the fall."

From this, it follows, *to be sure* (freilich, *indeed*, in a concessive sense), that man has no free-will. *But it was* (es war aber auch) the Augustinian doctrine, &c.

P. 98, bottom. "The loss of freedom, however, will hereafter be considered, especially in regard to the weight and influence of this doctrine on the whole of Augustine's system."

But we shall hereafter speak particularly of the loss of freedom *on account of* (wegen) the importance of this doctrine, and its influence upon Augustine's whole system.

P. 107, l. 30. "The law of imitation, in connection with the acknowledged power of evil habit, was the reason why Julian would not allow that the sinner, even by his transgressions, has lost the freedom of will."

It was logically consistent, and in agreement with his admission of the power of evil habit, that Julian did not allow, &c.—Folgerecht und mit seiner Einräumung der Macht der bösen Gewohnheit noch immer bestehend war es, dass auch Julianus u. s. w.

P. 110, l. 20. "By the freedom of the will, it came to pass, that man should have sin; but now the penal vitiosity that ensued from liberty, has produced the necessity."

It was through the freedom of the will that man was *without sin* (ohne Sünde.)

P. 115, l. 16. — "the instance — *the reason against it*, which was adduced by the Pelagians, had been already touched upon, which had already been touched upon, was urged, &c. [The word *Instanz* upon," &c. So, also, p. 135, l. 8. has a technical sense, meaning, a *reason to the contrary*.]

P. 115, l. 29. — "the Pelagians, The Pelagians, according to *his* according to their own assertion," (seiner, i. e. Augustine's) assertion. &c.

P. 115, bottom. "This, in conformity with the rest of his theory, rest of his theory, and *which, upon* he definitely exhibits, and in its *his principles, would be correct*, he true position and just light, in Ep. exhibits, particularly in his 194th Epistle. — Diese seiner übrigen Theorie gemässe und von seinem Standpuncte aus richtige Ansicht stellt er mamentlich auch im 194sten Briefe auf.

P. 133, bottom. "Two other assaults on his part, may here find a place." So P. 179, l. 21. A *few* other, &c. Ein paar andere Argriffe. The word *paar* generally means a *few, some*, except where two things belong together, as a pair of boots, &c.

P. 150, l. 13. "Augustine in opposition to—the opinion that concupiscence existed in paradise, assumed the weak position, that even then, the free-will of man was not able to prove itself efficient. 'For if even then the flesh lusted against the spirit, they did not that which they would.' "

Augustine in opposition to—the opinion, &c. *urged the objection*, weak to be sure, that on that supposition man's free-will could not have shown itself efficient; for, &c., — Augustinus machte — die freilich schwache Instanz, dass alsdann u. s. w.

P. 151, l. 25. "Here he lived a year." Here he lived *some years*—einige Jahre.

P. 153, l. 13. — "the excessive frankness of Pelagius appeared to work to his disadvantage." — the excessive *independence* (Freimüthigkeit), &c.

P. 183, l. 1. "According to Augustine, this was the single grace in which the Pelagians admitted nothing meritorious on the part of man." According to Augustine, this was the *only* grace, &c.—die einzige.

P. 187, l. 2. "Finally, Pelagius was blamed by the brethren for attributing nothing to the aid of God's grace. According to their censures, he did not set grace before free-will, but, with infidel cunning, behind it; because, he said, it is afforded to men in order that, through grace, they may the more

Finally, Pelagius, censured by the brethren for attributing nothing to the aid of God's grace, yielded; not that he gave it the preference over the free-will, but, with infidel cunning, made it inferior, by saying it was afforded, &c.—Endlich gab Pelagius von den Brüdern getadelt, dass er dem Beistande der Gnade

easily perform what they are commanded to do through free-will."

P. 230, l. 14. "They blamed the stupidity and cowardice of the Romish clergy for having again taken up the sentence in respect to the Pelagian doctrine."

P. 267, l. 9. "It is remarkable enough, that the fall of Nestorius should be decreed in consequence of Pelagianism."

P. 267, l. 16. "Augustine's faith, therefore, ought now to have been received by the whole Christian world."

P. 280, l. 12. "That the soul exists before its union with the body, was a notion commonly attributed by the fathers to Origen."

P. 281, l. 27. "Oriental bishops."

P. 289, bottom. "But there was still a much more difficult point in Augustine's theory of original sin."

The moral as well as the physical punishment of Adam's sin, was a naturally *necessary* consequence of it."

P. 350, l. 26.—"that was fitted for the dead"—

P. 350, l. 30. "Lactantius."

P. 351, l. 6. "The capricious movements of the soul derive idols from bodies," &c.

P. 352, l. 15. "They had to limit the unconditional dominion of the devil over the human body."

P. 374, l. 2.—"never the doctrine of Paul."

Gottes nichts beilegte, ihrem Tadel dahin nach nicht dass er sie dem freiem Willen vorzog u. s. w.

They blamed the stupidity and cowardice with which the Romish clergy *abrogated* the sentence formerly passed *in favor* of the Pelagian doctrine—womit die Römischen Cleriker die vorige Sentenz für die Pelagianische Lehre, wieder aufgehoben hätten.

It is remarkable enough, that the fall of Nestorius should at the same time *decide the fate of Pelagianism*—musste—auch über den Pelagianismus entscheiden.

Thus Augustine's faith was *ostensibly* received by the whole Christian world—solte (was, according to report) angenommen werden.

That the soul exists, &c., was a notion which is commonly attributed to Origen *among* the fathers—unter den Kirchenlehrern.

Occidental bishops,—a mere oversight.

But there was *one more very difficult point*, &c., noch ein sehr schweigerer Punkt.

The moral punishment was *no more* (so wenig als) a necessary consequence than the physical.

— that could slay—zu tödten im Stande war.

Tatian,—a typographical error.

— derive *images* from bodies. The connection in Athenagoras admits no other translation. He is not speaking of the formation of *idols*, but of *idolrous sentiments*.

— to the human body—auf den menschlichen Körper beschränken.

Not even (nicht einmal) the doctrine of Paul.

The translator, though generally acute in discernment, and judicious in what he says, is not always happy in his notes. Some of them are occasioned by misapprehension. Thus, on page 18, he speaks as if the

word *pragmatisch*, in the sense of *tracing cause and effect in history*, were an uncommon word, to be guessed out, rather than ascertained from current usage or from lexicons. It is *now* one of the most common words in the language, and is found in the best recent lexicons.

In the note to page 203, the translator goes round and round, without coming exactly to the point either with Wiggers or with Augustine. His remarks on "historical faith" are, indeed, very just; but what he says of the relation of faith and love to each other, and of Augustine's theory on the subject, and Wiggers's representation, is exceedingly confused. *Faith*, as the act of believing and trusting in God, is, in the view both of Augustine and of Wiggers, the *instrument* by which every other blessing is obtained, and in this respect may be said to be *first*. *Love*, viewed in its *ethical value*, may be regarded as the *essence* of all correct moral and religious feeling, and may, *in this sense*, be "held as the necessary condition of all good." But faith *includes* two things, belief intellectually, and trust morally, exercised; and this latter involves love. Therefore faith and love cannot be separated; the former is not genuine without the latter; the latter cannot, in point of fact exist in us except through the instrumentality of the former. And yet they are not identical. Faith has some things in it which do not belong to the nature of love; and therefore they may be contemplated and represented as different, though not separate from each other. When thus represented, the *intellectual* part of faith is made more prominent and the *moral* part less so, in order to keep up a clear distinction between faith and love. So Augustine evidently viewed the subject, and so in substance, though not with perfect accuracy, Wiggers represented him.

We cannot but smile at a note of the translator on page 345. The author, as a *mere historian*, without the solicitude felt by his translator, spoke out, on the subject of infant baptism, honestly and frankly, according to the evidence of *facts*. "We cannot," he says, "appeal to the old church formula,—baptism is 'for the remission of sins,'—in order to prove original sin the object of infant baptism. It comes from that early period when only adults were baptized. But in every adult actual sins might be presumed; and so the formula had its full import."

To guard the reader against such heresy, the translator subjoins, in the form of a note, the following:

"Our author does not tell us exactly when that period was, nor does he refer us to any authority for the assumption, (?) that there ever was such a period in the Christian church. And, what is a little remarkable, (!) within the compass of two pages from this, we find him speaking of 'the custom, in the *early centuries*, of deferring the *baptism of children* and catechumens to easter week.' The terms '*early centuries*,' as there used, would seem to carry us back at least (?) as far as the close of the first century, (?) the time of the apostles, (?) though possibly (!) Dr. D. did not so intend them. But whether he has or has not here made an opposite assumption to the first, I cannot help thinking, from the uncommonly (!) loose (?) manner in which he has spoken on the topic, that he has never made the early history of infant baptism a subject of much investigation; (!) nor was it needful to his grand object. Nor would it here be deemed proper in me so far to divert the attention of the reader from that object as would be requisite for even the briefest

epitome of the historical evidence which, at least in my view, disproves the first assumption."

We hardly know which most to admire, the modesty of the translator, or his logic. Does Dr. Wiggers, who, with the greatest facilities, and with *German* scholarship and diligence, has spent his life in examining the original documents pertaining to the history of the early church, need to be *instructed* by his translator on the whole subject of the origin of infant baptism? What is probably the comparative amount of *original* investigation on the point made by the two men? Does Dr. Wiggers find himself, in this particular, *among* those who have "never made the early history of infant baptism a subject of much investigation?" The names of Neander and Gieseler stand confessedly at the very head of *investigating* ecclesiastical historians. To these may be added Münscher, Von Cöln and Baumgarten-Crusius, holding a similar rank in the history of early religious doctrines; and Winer, Hahn, Olshausen, De Wette, Meyer and others, in *overwhelming numbers*, in biblical criticism and antiquities. They have all strangely blundered in the same way with Dr. Wiggers. Augusti, in his Christian antiquities, maintains the old view. But his rank, as a critical antiquarian, is inferior to that of Neander, Gieseler, Rheinwald and others, who are constrained to admit that their own practice cannot be supported by the practice of the apostolic age. Will any one pretend to call in question the fact, that the *majority* of living German critics, —and that majority, the more *learned portion*,—agree with Dr. Wiggers in his statement respecting infant baptism?

It "would seem," then, that there must be some other reason beside the *conclusion* to which he was brought, to justify the intimation that the author had not made this matter "a subject of much investigation." This reason is found, perhaps, in "the uncommonly loose manner in which he has spoken on the topic." The author speaks of "that early period when only adults were baptized," and "what is a little *remarkable*, within the compass of two pages from this, we find him speaking of "the custom, in the *early centuries*, of deferring the *baptism of children*." How much the reputation of Dr. Wiggers will suffer from the fact that only *two pages* intervene between these declarations, may be seen "in the sequel." But the worst is yet to come. "The terms, '*early centuries*,' as there used, would seem to carry us back at least as far as the close of the first century, the time of the apostles." We honestly confess our utter amazement at this sentence. Can a professor of ecclesiastical history be ignorant that "the terms, *early centuries*," commonly designate the period of the Christian Fathers in general, or the first six centuries? "The terms, *early centuries*, as there used,"—how are they used? So far as the connection is concerned, the passage is preceded by quotations from *Ambrose*, and followed by others from *Chrysostom*, neither of whom lived *quite* as early as "the close of the first century." So far as it relates to the subject under discussion, it was the sentiment of the Christian Fathers *up to the time of Augustine*, in regard to "the damnation of unbaptized children." But what fixes the chronology most clearly is the argument itself: "From the custom, in the *early centuries*, of deferring the baptism of children and catechumens, to easter week, we may conclude that the doctrine, of the dam-

nation of unbaptized children, was not prevalent." Does Prof. Emerson need to be told whether it was "in the time of the apostles" that this "custom" existed?

After dwelling so disproportionately long on defects, which constitute, after all, but a very trifling part of the work, it would seem to be due to the translator, to set forth with equal prominence its numerous and great excellences. But, in our apprehension, this is not necessary. The work is before the public; and after it shall have had a fair opportunity of speaking for itself, it will need no recommendation. The translation is *generally* correct and faithful. In many parts, the execution has excited our admiration.

3. *The Works of Benjamin Franklin; containing several Political and Historical Tracts not included in any former edition; and many letters, official and private, not hitherto published: with Notes and a Life of the Author.* By JARED SPARKS. In ten volumes. 8vo. Boston. Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1840.

It is with pleasure that we call the attention of our readers to the splendid work whose title is above given. The name of Franklin belongs to the whole world. He is not the peculiar property of one age or country, any more than is any other truly great man. More than most, however, does he belong to the world, inasmuch as so large a portion of his life was past, so many of his greatest labors were performed, and so many of his works were written and first given to the world in the opposite hemisphere to that which gave him birth. We speak safely, too, when we say that the name and character of Franklin are more revered and esteemed and better known in England and in France than in America. This should not be, nor can it always be; and the publication of the edition of the life and works of this truly great man which calls forth these remarks, will do much towards making him more and better known. In speaking of him, we shall not enter into any discussion of his religious principles, but shall direct our attention to other topics.

He possessed many rare excellences both of the intellect and of the heart. Keen to perceive the right, and determined and inflexible in the pursuit of it, he was yet marked by a modesty and unassuming simplicity which won the hearts of all, and almost forbade the approach of enmity, or the dart of malice. Benevolent and kind-hearted, his conversation and correspondence were mixed with a cheerful pleasantness of manner which none but himself could have used with equal dignity, and with equal pertinence to subjects grave and gay. Of penetrating genius, and acute observation, and as acute discrimination, he yet seemed to love truth and knowledge for their own sakes, and for the sake of the good they enabled him to do to his fellow-men, rather than for the honor which their discovery reflected on him as their discoverer.

There are few men whose names stand high in the roll of philosophy and science, or who have played a conspicuous part in the political history of their time, who yet have fixed their memory and names strong in the interest and affections of the young. Yet such, and with the still more rare union of all the three, was Franklin. His name is that with

which we remember to have been almost the earliest familiar. How many reminiscences of our earliest days are mingled with his delightful autobiography, his quaint but plain and truth-telling "*way to wealth*," or *Maxims of Poor Richard*, and with that mildly and beautifully benevolent, and loftily intelligent countenance which adorns the third volume of the work before us. As years have passed on, our regard and veneration for the name of Franklin have grown with our knowledge of his life and works, and increased with our power of judging each. With such feelings towards him of whom these volumes are the noblest monument, we shall bestow a few remarks upon the peculiar excellences by which this edition stands distinguished from all others.

The editor states in the preface to Vol. I (p. xii), that it has been his "design to make a *complete collection* of the writings of Franklin, as far as they are known to exist, and to add such occasional notes and explanations as he supposed would be in some degree useful to the reader." The name of Mr. Sparks is sufficient warrant for the mode in which such a design has been fulfilled; but our readers will be surprised when they learn how much his industry has enabled him to accomplish. We have counted no less than 696 pieces in the whole, consisting of letters, essays, &c., which have never before appeared in any edition of Franklin's works, and 460 letters from him, and by distinguished individuals to him, which have never been, in any way, printed before. Altogether we suppose that two volumes or upwards of this edition consist of entirely new, unpublished, but very valuable matter. Our space obliges us to confine our remarks entirely to this new matter, which we the rather do that the value of this edition may be thereby better seen.

Every one of the pieces thus, for the first time, published serves only to fix more strongly those characteristics which so prominently distinguished Franklin. His mind was eminently *observant* and *experimental*. These traits are very strongly marked in many of the pieces here for the first time printed, and which are many of them on different scientific subjects. Thus we find him striving to discover by observation, reason, and experiment, the laws of perspiration and absorption (see Vol. VI, p. 65); the cause of the heat of the body and circulation of the blood (Vol. VI, p. 70 and 97); the cause of the greater length of passage of ships from East to West than from West to East across the Atlantic (Vol. VI, p. 74). We find him also observing curious facts, and striving to explain them, as to the origin and direction of north-east storms, (Vol. VI, pp. 79 and 105). Husbandry seems to have occupied a good deal of his attention at one time, for we find much on the culture of grass, planting of hedges, &c. (see Vol. VI, pp. 83, 112, 111, &c.) There is also some more matter on the conductors for the Powder Magazine at Purfleet (Vol. V, p. 427); whence, it will be remembered, originated the famous dispute as to *pointed* and *blunt* conductors, in which George III personally engaged, and in respect to which many persons,—to use Franklin's own words,—became "as much heated about this *one point*, as the Jansenists and Molinists were about the *five*" (see Vol. I, p. 343); and which gave origin to the witty epigram which we have heard, with some authority, ascribed to Chatham:

While great George does knowledge hunt,
And sharp conductors change for blunt,
His empire's out of joint;

But Franklin a wiser course pursues,
And George's thunder fearless views
By *sticking to the point*.*

In an original hitherto unpublished letter to M. De La Condamine (Vol. X, p. 75), we have Franklin's opinion on animal magnetism; of which he says that he "must doubt its existence till he can see or feel some effect of it."

Let us now turn to the more general correspondence of Franklin, of which a large part of his "Works" consists.

Much are we indebted to Mr. Sparks for the very great additions which he has made to this part of Franklin's works, additions comprising his intercourse with some of the most exalted minds of his own or any age. Such are the hitherto unprinted letters which passed between Franklin and Herschel, Sir William Jones, Richard Price, Joseph Priestley, Hume, De Saussure, and many others. One of those to Hume is of great importance (Vol. VII, p. 208), as proving that Franklin was not the entire author of the "History of Pennsylvania," which has been long ascribed to him. One of De Saussure's letters is peculiarly interesting, giving an account of the first ascent ever made to the summit of Mount Blanc (Vol. X, p. 278).

The same vein of pleasant humor runs through all these letters which was so characteristic of the mind of Franklin, and which, in truth, mixed itself up with all his moral and intellectual conceptions, in a way peculiar to himself, and which few others could have so employed.

The letters of Franklin to his wife,—his "dear child," as he uniformly calls her,—are one of the most interesting additions to this edition. They fill a great part of the seventh volume. They all breathe an affectionate spirit, and do honor to the heart of the writer. Our space will only allow of our quoting from one of them (Vol. VII, p. 125). In this letter he had complained that his wife had neglected writing to him, though an opportunity was present and he had asked it. He adds a postscript thus,—"*I have scratched out the loving words, being writ in haste by mistake, when I forgot I was angry.*" [His own italics.] We think those two lines could never have been effaced from the memory of his wife.

We must now draw our notice of this work to a close. Enough has been said to show the value and interest of the additions made by the care and researches of the editor. A few words on the execution of the other parts of his task. The Life of Franklin is continued by him from the time when the autobiography closes. The continuation is well done and with careful fidelity. The *notes* interspersed through the volumes are always useful and to the point, often highly interesting. We would instance especially the notes to Franklin's "Journal of the Negotiations for Peace," in Vol. IX, containing many important communications between Lord Shelburne and Mr. Oswald, &c., and to which Mr. Sparks had access through the courtesy of the present Marquis of Lansdowne. We have noticed a few errors arising from the editor's want of acquaintance with English localities.

In a few cases we differ from the editor in judgment. For example, we must totally differ from him respecting Franklin's celebrated letter

* We do not give this epigram exactly in the words given by Mr. Sparks (Vol. I, p. 344) but from another authority. The copy we give seems to us to have somewhat more *point* in it than that given by Mr. Sparks.

to Mr. Strahan (see Vol. VIII, p. 155). How Mr. Sparks can consider such a letter as a "pleasantry," we are at a loss to conceive. Franklin, we think, was incapable of such a pleasantry, and at such a time.

"MR. STRAHAN,

"You are a member of Parliament, and one of that majority which has doomed my country to destruction. You have begun to burn our towns, and murder our people. Look upon your hands, they are stained with the blood of your relations! You and I were long friends; you are now my enemy, and I am,

"Yours, B. FRANKLIN."

Such was not the subject, or the style, or the time, in which Franklin could crack jokes. We regard it, on the other hand, as the sudden impulse of the moment, resulting from his intense feeling on the subject, and which made him, *for the moment*, forget personal friendship in the strength of feeling for higher points. When his first impulse cooled, he would see that Mr. Strahan had a right to his own opinion as well as himself, and he would willingly renew that friendly intercourse which we know he did. If such was not the genuine history of this celebrated letter, there is no point or value whatever in the autograph of it prefixed to Vol. V, and it is unworthy of and derogatory to the character of Franklin. In the light we view it, it marks only his strong and generous feeling for the highest interests of his country. x.

4. *An Historical Discourse delivered at the celebration of the second Centennial Anniversary of the First Baptist Church in Providence, November 7, 1839.* By WILLIAM HAGUE, Pastor of the Church. 12mo. pp. 192. Boston. Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. Providence. B. Cranston & Company. 1839.

The review of this interesting volume has been delayed in consequence of successive disappointments. We hope soon to present to our readers a notice of it.

ARTICLE XI.

MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE.*

BENEVOLENT SOCIETIES.

American Baptist Board of Foreign Missions.—The board held its annual meeting in New-York, April 29. The following is a summary of the Annual Report:

The whole number of Missions is twenty-three:

"	"	Stations and Out-Stations,	68
"	"	Missionaries and Assistants,	98
"	"	Native do. do.,	94
"	"	Churches,	51
"	"	Baptisms the last year,	266
"	"	Church members, more than,	2500

* The Literary Intelligence is necessarily omitted. The statistics of the benevolent societies, though placed here, are not to be regarded as a matter of *intelligence*, but of *record*.

Three preachers and six female assistants have been appointed by the Board the past year, exclusively of native assistants. Six preachers, three school-teachers, and seven female assistants have been released from their engagements, including two preachers who have died. Decrease of American missionaries and assistants, 7.

The receipts from churches, auxiliary societies, and individuals, exclusive of appropriations from other institutions, in the year ending April 18, 1840, were \$57,781 36.

The expenditures for the year, exclusive of the same appropriations, were \$65,432 19.

The appropriations received for Bible and Tract operations and Indian schools, were \$18,400.

American Baptist Home Mission Society.—This Society held its eighth annual meeting, April 28. The number of missionaries and agents employed by the Society, the past year, were 93. They labored in 18 of the United States and territories; Upper Canada and Lower Canada, and Texas; baptized 761 persons; organized 24 churches, and ordained 15 ministers.

The auxiliary bodies have also employed, during the same period, 153 missionaries and agents, who have operated in nine of the States, making a total of 246 missionaries.

Baptist General Tract Society.—The annual meeting of this Society was held April 30. A plan having been proposed to change the name and enlarge the operations of this society, a revised constitution was adopted, by which the society assumed the name of "The American Baptist Sunday School and Publication Society." The Board was located in Philadelphia and Rev. Geo. B. Ide elected President.

The American and Foreign Bible Society held its 3d anniversary, April 28. The receipts for the past year amount to \$25,812; the appropriations to aid in printing and distributing the Scriptures, to \$20,000. The whole number of auxiliary societies is 122, of which 16 were formed during the last year.

American Bible Society.—This Society held its 24th anniversary, May 14. During the last year twenty-three new auxiliary societies were organized, and nearly as many more remodelled and invigorated. The receipts from all sources amount to \$97,355 09, an increase of \$2,226 83 over those of the preceding year. The number of Bibles and Testaments issued in the course of the year is 157,261 copies, being an increase of 22,324 over those of the previous year.

The American Home Mission Society held its 14th anniversary, May 13. The total amount of receipts during the year was \$78,345 20, being \$4,219 40 less than it was the year preceding; the whole number of missionaries employed during the year, 680; the number of congregations supplied in whole or in part, 842.

American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.—This Board held its 30th anniversary in New York, Sept. 11, 1839. Forty-two missionaries were appointed during the preceding year. The whole amount paid into the treasury, was \$244,169 82, exceeding the receipts of the preceding year by \$7,998 84. The whole amount of expenditures for the same time was \$227,491 56, being less than those of the previous year by \$3,151 54.

American Tract Society.—The 15th anniversary of this society was held in New York, May 13. There have been printed during the year 325,000 volumes; 3,408,500 publications; 117,970,000 pages; making since the organization of the society 1,125,644,705 pages. Total circulated during the year, 6,346 sets of the Evangelical Family Library; total volumes 291,420; publications 4,219,721; pages 123,687,707; making the entire circulation since the formation of the society 18,043 libraries; 1,444,810 volumes; 55,259,399 publications; 1,041,671,279 pages. The total receipts during the year were

\$117,596 16, of which \$41,475 49 were donations, including \$19,597 53 for foreign distribution, and \$3,264 50 for the volume enterprise. The receipts are \$13,699 24 less than the previous year; while the amount received for sales is \$893 71 more.

QUARTERLY LIST.

DEATHS.

JOHN S. BALDREY, Robertson Co., Tenn., March 22.
DAVID C. BOLLES, Jackson, Ohio, April 20, aged 47.
A. P. BRADLEY, near Middleton, Miss., April.
JOSEPH CHAUCE, Washington Co., Ill., April 30, aged 65.
CALEB CLARK, Rumney, N. H., March 26.
JAMES DAVIS, Randolph Co., Ill., Jan. 18.
OLIVER A. DODGE, Lexington, Mass., May 28, aged 27.
JOHN GOODALL, —, May 23.
DANIEL HILTON, New Design, Monroe Co., Ill., March 6, aged 61.
JEREMIAH HOLMES, Richland, Oswego Co., N. Y., April 17.
BENJAMIN F. MCGILL, Philadelphia, April 2.
HENRY D. SEGAR, Enon, Va., March 12, aged 44.
HENRY SPEARS, Maple Creek, Pa., Jan. 2.
SAMUEL WAKEFIELD, Gilbertsville, Otsego Co., N. Y., April 19, aged 87.

ORDINATIONS.

MOSES AIKEN, Bush Creek, Green Co., Ky., March 30.
LORENZO B. ALLEN, Thomaston, Me., May 27.
J. V. ALLISON, Willistown, Chester Co. Pa., April 3.
WILLIAM BAILEY, Buxton, Me., April 1.
LOREN E. BIXBY, Topsham, Vt., Feb. 15.
NEWELL BOUGHTON, Gouverneur, St. Lawrence Co., N. Y., March 11.
THOMAS BRIGHT, Richland, Oswego Co., N. Y.
CHARLES A. CLARK, Medina, Ohio, March 12.
DAVID B. COWELL, North Berwick, Me., Feb. 20.
WILLIAM G. GRAIG, Great Crossings, Ky., March 7.
THOMAS F. CURTIS, Turner, Me., May 7.
JOSEPH B. DRUMMOND, Richville, St. Lawrence Co., N. Y., March 12.
THOMAS GOODWIN, Cincinnati, Ohio, April 5.
COLLINS A. HEWITT, Milton, Pa., Jan. 18.
THOMAS HOLLAND, Perkins Creek, S. C., March 28.
S. K. KELLAM, Hillsborough, Ill., March 22.
ISAAC LAWTON, Kinderhook, N. Y., April 14.
ROBERT C. LEACHMAN, Prince William Co., Va., March 13.
MOSES LELAND, Green Township, Marshall Co., Ia., March 28.
SOLON LINDSLEY, Nashville, Tenn., April 5.
THOMAS MONTAGUE, Eren, N. H.
STEPHEN B. PAGE, Newton, Mass., May 31.
WILLIAM PETERS, Eren, N. H.

THOMAS M. RICE, Pleasant Grove, Ky., May 16.
ELISHA ROBBINS, Summit, N. Y., April 8.
PERLEY P. SANDERSON, Beverly, Mass., April 8.
RANSOM M. SAWYER, Hanover, N. H., April 8.
JOSEPH H. SHERWIN, Wallingsford, Vt., May 30.
HARRY SMITH, Ellery, Chaut. Co., N. Y., April 8.
HENRY P. STILLWELL, Walworth, Wayne Co., N. Y., March 18.
JOSIAH K. TILTON, Limerick, Me., April 15.
MICHAEL WHITE, Musk. Co., Ohio, April 18.
NATHANIEL J. WILBURN, Baltimore, Md., March 16.
GEORGE YOUNG, Burlington, N. J., March 10.

CONSTITUTION OF CHURCHES.

In Burlington, Calhoun Co., Miss., Dec.
In Vandalia, Ill., Jan. 6.
In Rivers, Mich., Jan.
In Morgantown, Butler Co., Ky., Feb. 2.
In Geneva, Walworth Co., Wisconsin Ter., Feb. 4.
In Marshall Co., Ia., Feb. 27.
In Bethlehem, Mecklenburg Co., Va., Feb. 29.
In York, Steuben Co., Ia., March 1.
In Madison Co., Ia., March 10.
In Stockbridge, Madison Co., N. Y., March 30.
In Saundersville, Miss.
In Rehoboth, Mass., April 1.
In Pipe Creek, Indiana.
In Groton, N. H., April 3.
In Washington, Davies Co., Ia.
In Dubuque, Iowa Ter., April 5.
In Brooklyn, N. Y., April 15.
In Green Township, Marshall Co., Ia.
In Lonsdale, R. I., April 21.
In West Sharon, Adams Co., Ohio, April 21.
In Fairfort, Chemung Co., N. Y.
In Hancock, N. H., May 6.
In Brattleborough, Vt.
In Minersville, Pa., May 14.
In Huntersville, Texas.
In Topsfield, Washington Co., Me., May 20.
In Darwin, Clark Co., Ill.

DEDICATIONS.

At Poultney, N. Y., Jan. 23.
At Heath, Mass., Feb. 5.
At St. George, Thomaston, Me., Feb. 12.
At Bedford, Ohio, Feb. 19.
At East Brookfield, Mass., March 4.
At Westport, Essex Co., N. Y., March 4.
At Kensington, Penn., May 17.
At Raleigh, N. C., May 31.